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Résumé
Ce mémoire explore l’apparition et la survie du mythe héroïque le plus
puissant de la nation nicaraguayenne, celui d’Augusto César Sandino depuis sa
naissance en mai 1927 jusqu’à la défaite électorale du parti Sandiniste en février
1990. L’étude part de l’hypothèse que les héros nationaux et leurs mythes
connaissent différentes phases de développement. Ces phases sont largement
déterminées par les contextes socio-politiques qui affectent l’utilisation du mythe
par les auteurs qui se l’ont approprié pour atteindre leurs propres buts. Les sources
des mythes varient selon les moyens d’expression utilisés par les différents types
d’acteurs actifs à chaque phase: politiciens, dirigeants révolutionaires, poètes ou
journalistes. En conséquence, cette étude explique l’histoire du mythe en le
considérant comme une variable dépendante sensible à l’évolution socio-politique
du Nicaragua, laquelle constitue l’arrière fond. Les conclusions majeures de cette
recherche sont que le mythe de Sandino a survécu parce qu’il incarne une valeur
durable de nature anti-impérialiste dans la conscience collective des
Nicaraguayens. De plus, l’enquête démontre que la nature du récit n’a pas changé
substantiellement au fil des années tandis que ses fonctions ont varié selon le
contexte socio-politique et les aspirations des principaux auteurs du mythe.
Mots clés: héros, mythe, nation, nationalisme, idéologie, Nicaragua, histoire
politique, révolution, dirigeants révolutionaires, rébellion.
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Abstract
This thesis explores the ernergence and survival of one of the most cogent
hero myths of the Nicaraguan nation, that of Augusto César Sandino, from its
inception in May 1927 until the electoral defeat of the Sandinista party in february
1990. It argues that national heroes and their myths undergo various phases of
development. These phases are affected by the social and political contexts that
dictate the mythrnakers’ possibilities in diffusing their aims through the invocation
of a hero myth. The mythic sources analyzed vary according to the mediums used
by the prime mythmakers of each phase, i.e. politicians, revolutionary leaders,
joumalists or poets. As a result, this study traces the mythic history of Sandino by
viewing the evolution of the socio-political background as a fundamental factor
affecting its course. The major conclusion is that the hero rnyth has persisted
because the anti-ïmperialist value it embodies continues to be prevalent in the
collective belief-system of Nicaraguan culture. Furthermore, it concludes that the
archetypal structure of the myth’s narrative has flot changed substantially in
essence, but rather that the hero myth has varied in functions according to the
socio-political context and the goals ofthe prime mythrnakers.
Keywords: hero, rnyth, nation, nationalisrn, ideology, Nicaragua, political history,
revolution, leadership, and rebellïon.
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INTRODUCTION
“The hero may or appear to szffrr defeat, but “histoiy” wiÏl aiways vindicate him. ‘
Time enfolds revolutionary leaders in layers of myth, rendering the
historian’s quest for understanding ever more challenging. Today, Augusto César
Sandino is the emblematic father of ail Nicaraguans. His image hangs judiciously
in the classrooms of Nicaragua’s youngest Sons and daughters; the sarne picture is
printed on t-shirts sold in tourist shops alongside stamps bearing the ineffable
expression of what has corne to symbolize a Nicaraguan brand of lieroism. His
mythic presence is pervasive, ubiquitous, and the memory of his deeds is deeply
ingrained in the collective consciousness ofhis people.
Ironically, the majority of Segovian society greeted his assassination,
seventy years earlier, with much relief: “Without a single known exception, ail of
the leading families of Nueva Segovia, Liberai and Conservative alike, were
stridently anti-Sandinista from the beginning to the end ofthe Rebellion.”2 What is
more, the Marine-Guardia, who fought against Sandino for over five years, was
mostly made up ofthe lower class Nicaraguans that Sandino was fighting for in his
rebellion. further compounding the irony, these soldiers were led and trained by
the very same U.S. irnperialists that Sandino sought to oust from Nicaragua.3
The guerrilla leader’s lieroic distinction only began to ensue with success
of the Cuban revolution in 1959, as a new generation of Nicaraguan anti
imperialists recognized tlie inspirational quaiity of cultural myths for the
promotion of mass insurgency against the dictatorial regime of Anastasio Somoza.
Since the victorious revolution of 1979, the rnemory of Sandino lias becorne an
Sidney Hook, The Hero in Histoy: A Study in Limitation and Possibility, New York, The John Day
Company, 1943, p. 77.
2 Michael Jay Schroeder, To Deftnd our Nation ‘s Honor: Toit’ard a Social and Cultural Histmy ofthe
Sandino Rebellion in Nicaragua, 1927-1934, Diss. University ofMichigan-Flint, 1993, Ann Arbor, UMI,
1995, p. 237.
Schroeder explains that regular pay, irnproved equiprnent and medicat care cornbined to make conditions for
the anny’s enlisted men much better than for the average Nicaraguan.
ongoing site of contention in the grand master political arena ofNicaragua’s power
struggles, with debates over his true nature continuously stimulating political
controversy as well as invigorating historical analysis. In fact, up until the eighties,
most writers depicted Sandino in a hagiographic light concordant to their anti
imperialist aspirations. The good was magnified and ail else lefi out for a faultless
version of the leader’s past.4 $uch glaring embellishment, along with $andino’s
newfound range of popularity in post-revolutionary Nicaragua, played a
determining role in triggering the latest historical tendency: to disrobe the
historical figure of his myths in hopes of unraveling the fundamental core of his
individuality.
Yet the insistence in uncovering the truest essence of Sandino’s drive
possesses its advantages as well as its pitfalls. One alrnost inescapable conundmrn
related more generally to the study of national heroes is based on the fact that
“History and myth may both look like heavily constmcted narratives”5;
demarcating historical facts from mythic data can be challenging since they ofien
resemble each other in form. As a result, many historians of hero myths,
consciously or subconsciously, have ended their judicious studies on a venerating
tone, praising the historical figure and forcing the reader to wonder whether the
author in question feu under the hypnotic speli of the myth. In other words,
remnants of hagiographic tones are oflen found in well thought-out historical
studies of modem time national heroes.
On a positive note, studies seeking to strip heroically perceived figures
from any sort of fictitious construction oflen provide the subject with a thorough
‘ Some ofthe major hagiographic works are Ramén de Belaustiguigoitia, Con Sandino en Nicatagua, MadHd,
Espana-Calpe, 1934; Gustavo A1emn Bolafios, Sandino, Estudio ‘ornpleto de! Héroe de las Segovias,
Mexico, D.R: Impresa La Repûblica, 1932; Caneton Beals, Banana GoÏd, Philadeiphia and London, J.B.
Lippincott Company, 1932, and Sofonia Salvatierra, Sandino o la Tragedia de un Pueblo, Managita, Talleres
Litograficos Maltez, 1934. These works will be discussed in detail in chapter two, “The Emergence ofthe
Hero Myth”.
Natalie Zemon Davis and Randoph Stam, Introduction to the special issue on “Memory and Counter
Memory” in Representations 16(2), (Spning 1989), p. l-7, p. 2.
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expansion on specific aspects oftheir personalities. This in tum enlarges the scope
of historical contemplation, especially when such works are studied in relation to
one another. For instance, Marco Aurelio Navarro-Génie’s interpretation of
$andino’s actions according to millenarian theory, in Augusto “César” Sandino
Messiah ofLight and Truth (2002), sheds a convincing new light on the religious
proclivities of the figure.6 Another compelling construal comes from Donald C
Hodges’ Intellectuat Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revotution (1988) for its
exhaustive elaboration on the political ami religious ideas that framed his thinking.
Anarcho-syndicalism, Zoroastrianism, Freemasonry and Theosophy are discussed
in great detail to explain the formation of Sandino’s political ideas. Unlike
Navarro, he does flot perceive him as a full-fledged millenarian but rather, sees
him as a skilled ideologue whose masterful manipulation ofmultifarious moral and
political positions enabled him to attract the most followers as possible, i.e. “the
more ideologies, the better”.7 Although neither work is capable of offering the
absolute truth regarding his ultimate drive, useful insight may be drawn from the
harmonious balance struck between history and theory for aptly clarifying certain
facets ofhis persona.
On a less positive note, arguably, historical research depends upon which
analytical approach is chosen. In the words of Roland Barthes: “The historian is
not 50 much a collector offacts as a collector and relater ofsignifiers; he organizes
them with the purpose of establishing positive meaning and filling the vacuum of
pure and meaningless series.”8 In consequence, some approaches, i.e. like
psychological ones, may be debunked more easily than others due to the
6 Navarro bases his analysis of Sandino’s behavior on the millenarian theories ofVittorio Lantemari, The
Religions ofthe Oppressed. A Study ofModern cuits. trans. by Lisa Sergio. New York, Knopf 1963, and
Norman Cohn, The Pursijit ofthe Miilennium: Revoiutionaiy Miilenarians and Mystical Anarchists ofthe
Middle Ages, New York, Oxford University Press, 1957.
DonalU C. RoUge, Inteliectual Foundations ofthe Nicaraguan Revolution, Austin, University oflexas Press,
1986, p. 73.
8 Roland Barthes, “The Discourse ofHistoiy “, trans. by Stephen Bann, Comparative Criticism, 3 (1981), p. 7-2O,p.8.
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impossibility of applying psychological analysis to historical figures. For instance,
Alejandro Bolafios Geyer’s El Iluminado (2001) explains that bis mother’s
abandonment of the young Sandino triggered a mental disorder that rendered him
deranged for the rest of his life. Whereas Pierre Vayssière’s application of
Freudian theory, in Augusto C’ésar Sandino: L ‘Envers ou le Mythe (1986), deduces
that the leader’s decision to sign the Peace Accords (1933) stemmed primarily
from his wife’s calling to his patemal responsibilities through letters invoking the
upcoming birth of their unbom child. The imposition of theories inapplicable to
historical data strain Bolafios and Vayssière’s works to paradoxically undermine
their demystifying endeavor and in tum, imbue their interpretation of the past with
new coatings ofmyth-like explanations.
Finally, one needs flot be a social scientist to understand the indubitably
erratic and elusive nature of personality. Reducing findings to a hypothesis (i.e. he
was a millenarian, Machiavellian leader or even a deranged man), or by applying
useful or doubtful theories, denies Sandino his humanity by magnifying one aspect
ofhis character at the expense ofothers. In other words, when focusing too closely
on the specific, historians are prone to lose sight of what is general in the unique.
Today, the myth of Sandino is more remembered than the history of
Sandino: “Les être qui ont impressioné les foules furent des héros légendaires, et
non des héros réels.”9 As there may well be no solution to the inefficaciousness of
myth in historical writing, this thesis examines the myth itself to better
comprehend how the memory of Sandino has trekked through time from
ignominious death by assassination to glorious vindication of mythical
proportions. The answer to this question resides in the understanding of a second
set of questions: What is a hero myth? Where, when and why does it originate,
what functions does the hero myth serve and finally, do these functions change
9Gustave Le Bon, Psychology des Foules, Paris, Quadrige, p. 24.
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with time, if so, according to what? Yet, before delving into the theoretical
approach, a brief biographical account of Sandino’s early years is crucial for the
setting of the analytical stage.
Birth of the Hero: Sandino the Man
Augusto Nicolâs Calderôn was born on May 9th 1895 in a small village
thirty miles west of Managua by the name of Niquinihomo. Until the age of nine,
his single mother, Margarita Calderôn, who worked as a peasant laborer in one of
Sandino’s father’s farms, raised him in dire poverty. At the age of 9, Margarita lefi
the village with her lover to live in Granada. Augusto went on to reside with his
grandmother and later on, moved in with his father’s family. As one of the richest
men of the village as well as a prominent supporter of the Liberal party, Gregorio
Sandino played an important role in the political education ofhis son.
In 1920, Augusto was forced to leave Nicaragua because of shooting of
Dagoberto Rivas, a native of Niquinihomo, during a dispute. He first fled to the
Pacific Coast of Nicaragua and gradually made his way to La Ceiba Honduras,
Guatemala and to Cierra Azul, a port town near Tampico, Mexico by working as a
mechanic. As a breeding ground of political ideas, post-revolutionary Mexico
endowed Sandino with revolutionary theories to spread to Nicaragua. He
assimilated current trends in freemasonry, anarchism, socialism, communism and
theosophy and developed his own eclectic blend ofrevolutionary ideology.’°
By May 1926, Nicaraguan Liberals were revolting against the American
backed Conservative government. The statute of limitation conceming Sandino’s
charges for attempted murder had expired and so, he made his way back to his
homeland and eventually found work as a clerk at the San Albino mines. There, he
began to agitate the miners with revolutionary ideas, gaining their support and
10 Sandino’s experience in Mexico is discussed in chapter two
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developing “rabble-rousing” abilities.” Although the Liberal Commander
Moncada denied Sandino’s request for weapons, lie managed with the help of
some prostitutes to gather some guns from a fleeing group of Liberal soldiers.
$andino lcd his guerrilla troops under the Liberal banner until the
following May. Afier a year of civil war, Moncada and American Representative
Stimson signed a peace treaty instantly perceived as yet another testimony of
Nicaragua’s subservience to the United States’ economic interest.12 Despite orders
from bis Commander to let down his arms, Sandino refused to sign the pact, fled to
the mountains with a group of twenty-nine men and persisted to fight against the
United States’ presence as well as any Nicaraguan (Liberal or Conservative) who
did flot back bis cause.
His figlit Ied to the most long-lasting anti-irnperialist guerilla war in
Central America up until that time. Rumors of his defiance trickled through the
isthmus granted the anti-imperialist mood with a shining example of Latin
American revolutionary heroism. finally, $andino’s heroic status was further
reinforced on february 23td1 1934— one year following the U.$. withdrawal of
their forces and the signing of a peace treaty between Sandino and Liberal
president Sacasa. Guardia soldiers under the orders of the anny’s general
Anastasio Somoza captured Sandino while leaving from a dinner at the National
Palace and executed him along with two ofhis generals.
° Neili Macauley, The Sandino Affair, Durham, N.C. Duke University Press, 1967, was one of the tirst
historical books ta speak about his chaHmatic personality. Sec p. 54.
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CUAPTER ONE:
Theoretical Framework:
Myth, Hero, and Hero Myth
A breakdown of key concepts shah now be imparted to render the
theoretical background and bibliography supporting the orientation of the
following approach. Given that the term “myth” encapsulates a broad spectrum of
stories, tales and legends of various significance spanning well before recorded
history, it is crucial to define the present phenomenon according to its suited
categories. Types are plenty and subject matters—though crosscutting peoples and
times—widely range in array and scope. There exists primitive myths of
yesteryear and primitive myths of today, secular rnyths with religious
connotations, religious one’s with political connotations and even myths purely
fabricated by masterful ideologists for the suiting their political agendas.13 To
dispel needless confusion and draw concomitant inferences, the myth of Augusto
César Sandino is heroic and political in type and contemporary in time. Finally, it
is in light of its intoxicating presence in the sphere of the nation that “rnyth”
pertains to this study.
Though national myths represent a transnational phenornenon, no two
heroes have undergone the same historical course. A Gandhi would unlikely have
emerged in Iraq, no more than a Castro could have headway in the United States
for without a doubt, the fate of a hero and his/her heroic myth is dependant on the
social and pohitical context that helped produce hirn/her. As particularities arise
from the uniqueness of their historical experience and generah theories contribute
to the deriving of specifics, the findings of this study are largely supported by
‘ A case illustrating the latter type ofmyth is the Host-Wessel legend in Gennany: A talented propagandist
invented a hero out ofa disenchanted pirnp by putting him through a program ofglorifcation that ]ed to
Wessel’s transformation into a national youth hero ofthe Nazi movement. This story is cited from Eugene
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theories of myth, hero, ideology, leadership and revolution. These theories, in
relation to historical data, shah serve to explore the emergence and survival of the
hero myth of Sandino by helping to delineate the fundamental prepositions
determining the essence and functions of its mythic course.
Orientation of Present Study
The analysis of myth may be undertaken in a wide range of approaches; each
one determined by a specific theory aimed at providing the correct methodology
for understanding its precise nature. Harris and Plazter have discerned that rnost
approaches fali under the following two categories: “extemal theories” which
daim that myths arise from “a reaction to physical nature” and so, serve to explain
natural phenomenon as well as the birth of civic and religious institutions. On the
other hand, “intemal theories” perceive myth as a spontaneous manifestation ofthe
psyche or a group dream symptomatic of archetypal urges from which one can
decipher the relationship between myth and subconscious wants of human
beings.’4 As the aim is to understand how the hero myth has traveled throughout
the century, and that political myths of modem times do not arise from an
untraceable and rnysterious past but by distinguishable niythrnakers, the present
study understands the hero myth from an “externalist” perspective. Furthermore, it
looks closely at the “official” makers of the hero myth, i.e. revolutionary leaders,
politicians and well-known anti-imperial intellectuals, rather than how it is
understood or re-appropriated by marginalized or peripheral collective groups. 15
Weiner and Anita Weiner, The Ïvfartyr ‘s (‘onviction: A Sociological Analvsis, Atianta, Scholars Press, 1990, p.
115, to explicate the nefarious usage ofmyth for the construction of national heroes.
4See chapter 2 “Ways ofinterpreting Myth” by Stephen, L. Harris and Gloria Platzner’s Classical Mythology,
Images and Insights. cd. Sacrarnento, Mayfield Publishing Company, 2001. Sorne of the major extemalist
theoreticians have been Max Mûtler (1823-1900), Sir James Frazer (1 854-1941) and Bronislatv M alinowski
(1884-1942) whereas Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), CarI Jung (1875-1961), Joseph Campbell, Claude Lévi
Strauss and Mircea Eliade are considered leading figures ofthc intemalist/psychological approach to myth.
15 lt is important to note that the masses can play an active role in their reception of national myths, re
appropriating it or challenging il to form their own version ofit. For example, sec Samuel Brunk,
“Remembering Emiliano Zapata: Three Moments in the Posthumous Career ofthe Martyr ofChinameca”,
Hispanic A,nerican Historical Revieiv 79 (3) 1998, p. 457-490, for an interesting analysis ofthe appropriation
ofthe hero myth by marginalized groups.
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Consequently, the approach taken in this study is evolutionary and structural;
evolutionary in the sense that it believes that the hero myth of Sandino has
undergone different phases of development, and structural in the sense that it
considers the influence of regime as well as the impact of the United States’
foreign policies toward Nicaragua as two major factors dictating the mythmakers’
possibilities in diffusing his/her goals tbrough the invocation ofmythic speech. As
a resuit, to better grasp the essence and functions of the myth, it is necessary to
analyze the interplay between mythmakers and their mythic speech beneath the
backdrop ofthe socio-political context in which the latter is uttered.
Definition of Key Concepts: Myth, Nation, Hero and Hero Myth
Myth is understood as “a traditional narrative usually involving supematural
or imaginary imagery and ofien embodying popular ideas on natural or social
phcnomenon”6. Its validity, as a popularly held idea, derives flot from historical
accuracy but from its successful representation of a value concomitant to the value
system of a society. George Sorel writes: “Myth cannot be refuted since it is, at the
base, identical with the convictions of a group, being the expression in the
language of the movement.”7 Its truth resides along moral rather than historical
unes. “A myth is something that neyer was but aiways is”, it is believed as true,
and that is what matters for the present purpose.’8
The nation is defined by Benedict Anderson as “an irnagined political
community and imagined as both inherently and limited and sovereign”.’9 From
the fact that the nation is imagined, it is possible to infer that the nation contains a
mythical rather than a historical rendition of a specific society. Anderson,
16 Judy Pearsail and Biil Tumble, Tue Oxford English Reference Dictionaiy, 2nd cd., New York, 1996, p. 957.
17 Cited in Irving Louis Horowitz, Radicalis,n and the Revoit Against Reason, The Social Theories ofGeorge
Sorel with the Translation ofhis Essa’ on the Decomposition ofMarxism, London, Routiedge and Kegan
Paul, p.22.
Lee C. MacDonald, “Myth, Politics and Political Science”, Western Politicai Quarterly, 22 (March 1969),
p. 141-150, p. 141.
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borrowing Walter Benjamin’s theoiy of the Superstructure, reinforces this point by
demonstrating how the nation is conceived in narrative fonn through the influence
of the printed word.2° Novel and newspaper forge a sense of community founded
on the region’s vemacular to incite a growing number of people to think about
themselves in new ways; imagination and history intermingle to create an idealized
rendition of the past implicitly perceived (consciously or unconsciously) as
history. This argument is well supported by the observations of other researchers:
“Le merveilleux et le légendaire sont, en réalité, les vrais supports d’ une
civilization. Dans l’histoire l’apparence a toujours joué un rôle beacoup plus
important que la realité.”21 In other words, the natïon’s “officiaI” narrative aims to
depict “myth as history” (as opposed to “history as fact”) for elevation and
definition of a people demarcated by the national boundaries.
It is imperative to decipher the nuances between hero and hero myth for they
represent two interiningling yet distinct phases in the evolution of the
phenomenon. The title ofhero is granted at a crucial moment in time i.e., when a
society’s deprivations predisposes a need for a savior, to an individual whose
supposed feats are perceived as heroic by collective standards. 22 relates to the
historical figure that materialized (or is perceived to have materialized) a heroic
value whereas liero mytli relates to the linguistic embellishment enveloping the
historical figure in mythical language. And so, to understand the emergence of this
hero myth, it is necessary to examine the historical figure within his social and
19 Benedict Anderson, Jinagined (‘ominunities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationaiisin, New
York, Verso, p.7.
20 Walter Benjamin’s discemment ofcapitalist superstructure i.e., the “age ofmechanical reproduction”, to
deinonstrate the influence of the printed word in the conceptualization of national consciousness. Sec chapter
three, ‘The Origins of National Consciousness’ for an exhaustive rendition. Or, Walter Be,Ua,nin ‘s
Jihuninations, London, Fontana, 1973.
21 Gustave Le Bon, Psychologie des Foules, Paris, Quadrige, 1963, p.35. For more studies discussing the
interrelation between history and myth in the construction ofa national narrative, sec David Lowcnthal’s The
Heritage Cn,sade and the Spoils ofHistoiy, Carnbridge, The Cambridge University Press, 1997; Anthony D.
Srnith, Myths and Me,nories of the Nation, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999; EHc J. Hobsbawn,
Nations and Nationalisin since 1 780, Programme, Myth, Reali’, Ncw York, Cambridge University Press,
1990.
22 These two overlapping stages are the subject of the following chapter.
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political context. Moreover, to grasp the person’s transformation into a hero myth,
it is necessary to analyze the linguistic glorification that incurred from the key
spokespersons afier the heroic deed was performed.
Some Functions of the Hero Myth: a Story of Origin, an Ideoiogïcai
Component of National Discourse and a Mobilizing bol for Revoit
This section attempts to elaborate on some of the flindamental functions
related to modem day politically oriented myths. The works of Mircea Eliade,
Sacred and Profane (1959) and Myth and Reality (1963), Roland Barthes’
Mythologies (1957) and George Sorel’s Rejiections sur la Violence (1972) are
summoned and elaborated upon according to their relevance to the related
flrnction. It is important to note that this thesis does not adhere exclusively to one
of the following theoreticians, but rather applies their studies in view of the light
that they shed on the functional evolution ofthe Sandino hero rnyth. What is more,
as the hero myth can possess more than one function at once, the fundamental
principles ofthese theories sornetimes overlap.
Myth as a Story of Origin
Mircea Eliade’s Sacred and the Profane (1959) and Mvth and Reality ‘s (1963)
explanations on the contemporaneity of myth in the modem political context
provide insight on one of its basic functions in the sphere of the nation. $ince myth
is bound to ontology, its continued existence is materialized beneath the veil ofour
prevailing framework; stories of origins in primordial times are conternporaneous
to political rnyths conceming the birth of a nation.
Myth narrates a sacred History, it relates an event that took place in Primordial Time,
the fabled time of “beginning”. In other words, rnyth telis how through the deeds of
Supematural Beings, a reality cornes into existence— an island, a species of plant, a
particular kind ofhurnan behavior.23
23 Mircea Eliade, Mytiz andReatity, trans. by Wiilard R. Trask, New York, Harper and Row, 1963, P. 7. It is
important to note that Eliade’s fundamental point may be categorized as “internai”. He believes that myths are
constructed to elevate inan from the drudgedes ofeveryday life, and provide expianations about the unknown.
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Concomitantly, the origins of the nation are partly owing to the social perception
of a figure, historical or made-up, whose heroic deeds have transformed himi’her,
through heroic language, into a hero myth. Anthony D. $mith further explains that
myth serve “to recreate the heroic spirit and (heroes) that animated our “ancestors”
in some golden age; and descent is traced, not through family pedigree but through
the persistence of some kind of virtue or other distinctive cultural qualities”.24
Accordingly, the story of national heroes ofien follows novel-like sequence of
trials and tribulations. To name a few, retum from exile, supematural traits and
tragic deaths, are some familiar traits found in hero myths throughout the
centuries.25
Myth as an Ideological Component of National Discourse
The hero myth must also be understood as an essential component working
within the ideological discourse of nationalism.26 David Apter explains that myth
is past-oriented to illumine the present by revitalizing the past whereas ideology is
future-oriented to explain the future through a rational projection of events.27 Ben
Halperin’s enlightening explanation of myth and ideology in modem times further
explains:
Myth derives from (“expresses”) the will to action and functions as a spur to
action. Ideology embodies myth through grasping it intellectually, and hence
restrains and stimulates action in two ways: by its own intellectual force and by
the force of the myth stiil alive in it.28
24 Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories ofthe Nation, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 9.
Smith further explains the heroic mernories are flot immutable. Though they hearken back to a golden age, the
age may change in type i.e., a religious, artistic, a militaiy, etc, therefore engendeHng a different set ofheroes
i.e., poets, saints, soldiers.
25 See Joseph Carnpbell, The Hero with a Thousand Faces, New York, Meridian Books, 1956, for a thorough
rendition ofthe standard traits in the sequence of actions detected in hero myths throughout times and peoples.
26 Cited in Ben Halperin, “‘Myth” and “ldeology” in Modem Usage’, Historv and Theoiy, 1(2)1961, p. 129-
l49,p. 147.
27 Sec McDonald, p. 149.
28 Halperin, p. 39. In Marx’s ternis, “ideology” means the “whole system of religion, morality, and law,
whereby a mling class justifies” and upholds the social system dictated by its interests”. (148)
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Myth’s ability to “will to action” is deployed for the ideological intentions of
forging— in Althusser’s terms—”a representation of the imaginary relationship of
individuals to their real conditions of existence”29. Ideology rationalizes myths to
fit the moral basis of the prime porters of the myth, i.e. usually political figures
seeking to legitimize their power. Therefore, the prime ideologues of a nation can
be perceived as mythmakers, using mythic versions ofthe past to forge a system of
values and norms suiting their political agenda.
Roland Barthes semiological understanding of myth explains how it seeps
into the collective consciousness of a society “transforming history into nature” by
revealing the duplicity ofmyth’s signifier.3°
Myth is a value, truth is no guarantee for it; nothing prevents it from being a
perpetual alibi. It is enough that its signifier lias two sides for it, always to have an
“elsewhere” at its disposal. The meaning is always there to present the form and
the form is always there to outdistance the meaning. And there is neyer any
contradiction, conflict, or spiit between meaning and the form. They are neyer at
the same place.3’
The surreptitious juxtaposition of two meanings—a literal (meaning) and
metahistoric (forrn)—renders the myth historically viable. On the one side, myth
means exactly what it says, i.e. “Sandino is the hero ofNicaragua” whereas on the
other, the same speech is used to say sornething else, sornething related to the
political intentions of the speaker. Barthes explains that myth does flot efface
history but distorts it to say something else, all at once using “History’s” linguistic
garb as an alibi. Like the preceding authors, Barthes believes that rnyth stands for
something beyond its literal implications, an ideology that uses myth to forge a
29 Louis Aithusser, Essays on Ideo1o, London, Verso, 1984, P. 36.
30 Here I have paraphrased Barthes explanation: “Myth bides nothing and flaunts nothing; it distoris; myth is
neither a lie nor a confession : it is an infiection.” (11). Semiology refers to the general study ofsigns. The
sign refers to the inseparable union between signifier (the speech sounds or written marks composing the sign)
and the signified (the conceptual meaning ofthe sign). Sec M. H. Abrams, A Glossaiy ofLiteraiy Terms, 6th
cd. Ithaca, Comefl University, 1993, p. 104 and 275.
31 Ibid., p. 8.
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moral basis for society— one that serves to reinforce the status quo by
implementing memories based on myths rather than history.32
Myth as a Mobilizing bol against the State or Regime
Conversely, George Sorel’s Reflexions sur La Violence deduces that the
essential function of myth is to mobilize the masses into violent revoit against the
state. Myth’s objective is to promote universal strikes against the capitalist system
through the uprising of the worker: “Socialist man” must tap into his primitive
drive, where courage and action lie dormant in order to change the world order.”33
For Sorel, the dorninating bourgeois framework of reason drained the virility out
of the mass, rendering the people passive and paralyzed against their living
conditions and paving the way to the degeneration of modem man. He glorified
rnyth’s regenerative force for triggering violent (albeit moral) behavior against the
social injustices produced by the capitalist system.34
A final function underlying the previous ones relates to social perception.
Whether it is for ideological purposes or revolutionary rcvolts, one of myth’s key
functions is to legitimize the cause and image of the person who invokes it. In
relation to thc hero myth of Sandino, the utterance ofhis heroism is always related
to the goals of the speaker, who seeks to legitimize his/her political, intellectual or
even spiritual aims or predilection through a heroic version of the past.
Basic Prepositions and Hypotheses
The fundamental prepositions wielded from the precedent definitions and
functional theories ofmyth are the following:
32 See Ilene O’Malley. The Myth ofthe Revolution: Hero Cuits and the Institutionalization ofthe Mexican
State, 1920-1940. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986, fora Barthesian approach to revolutionary Mexican
hero myths. Her work demonstrates how the government’s constant invocation ofheroes serves to divert the
attention ofthe people away from the regime’s shortcomings by perniciously aligning politicians to
revolutionaiy ideals— ironically legitimizing the regime despite its neglect to put forth programs of reforni.
Sec George Sorel, Rejiexions sur la Violence, Paris, Marcel Rivière, 1972 As militant anarcho-syndicalist,
Sorel was inspired by the general strike of Mexico on July 315t, 1916.
In contrast, Barthes’analysis suggests that myth bas shed its mobilizing power to become an intergrat
element ofthe dominant ideology.Although both Sorel and Barthes aimed at contesting the hegernony ofthe
dominant class, their perspectives Iargely differed due to the political structure determining the potential for
change.
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1) Myth is a value (in the form of speech).35
2) Primordial myths of origin are contemporaneous to myths conceming the
origins ofthe nation.
3) Myths are an integral component of a nation’s ideology.
4) The nation, as an imagincd community, possesses a heroic quality personified
by hero myths.
5) Political myths have various functions, rnost notably as a narrative of origin, an
ideological component of national discourse and as an ideological component
ofmobilizing discourses against oppressive political systems.
From an understanding of these prepositions, this thesis hypothesized that the
historical figure Augusto César Sandino gradually became perceived as a hero and
subsequently as a hero rnyth ofthe Nicaraguan nation.
$econdly, from the previous definition of myth as a value cloaked in
speech, it supposes that the hero myth of Sandino has not changed in forrn, i.e.
some archetypal elernents rernain the sarne through time.36 Concurrently, an anti
heroic myth rnight take center stage to promote the needs of mythrnakers’ who
deem the heroic one menacing to their motives, consequently muting it for a
specific period in time. This type of myth is to be perceived as a separate living
entity, not to be entwined witli the heroic one but understood in coexistence to its
counterpart: one’s popularity is at the expense ofthe other’s notoriety.
Finally, from a structural and evolutionary approach to the history of
Sandino hero rnyth, this thesis hypothesizes that although the hero myth lias not
changed in essence, it has changed in function according to the social and political
structure.
Some Archetypal Characteristics of an Anti-Imperial Hero Myth
Although it is impossible to do justice to the multiplicity of thernes ernbodied
in a hero myth, a useful starting point is to decipher the value at the heart of the
This concept is borrowed ftom Roland Barihes’ Mythologies, trans. by Annette Lavers, New Yotk, Hill and
Wang, 1984, p. 1. “Speech” in Barthes’ terminology, entails ail types ofa message and is therefore not
confïned to oral speech. This tenn is used to describe mythic material throughout the thesis.
36 This hypothesis also agrees an observation made by Schroerder regarding his interviews with ex-Sandinistas
during thehighly politicized years ofthe early 1980’s; he discovered that the contemporary versions
Sandino’s life and feats did flot differ radically ftorn those propagated during Sandino’s lifetime.
“Essence” and “forrn” are the two terms used throughout this thesis to describe the archetypal characteristisc
ofthe hero myth that remain unaltered.
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narrative and consequently, deduce its major characteristics. As a nationalist who
fought for the independence of his people against U.S. domination, the value
personified by the Sandino hero myth is essentially anti-imperialistic in nature.
The following attributes are considered perennially ingrained in the narrative of
the myth.
I. David versus Golïath
A most recurrent trait shared by hero myths of the anti-imperialïst type stem
from the continuing plight of the oppressed. As long as social injustices persist,
inducing the armed confrontation of the weak against the powerful, oppressive
realities are likely to be overtumed in the mythic discourse of revolutionary
heroism. In Wellner’s words, “the greater the risk, the more extraordinary becomes
the feat in the perception of the hero’s followers”.38 Throughout the decades,
Sandino is continuously alluded to as Nicaragua’s version of David figliting
Goliath: “In Nicaragua sefiores/The mouse catches the cat”.39 He tells his people:
“No dudo que somos muy pequefios para vencer a los piratas y felones yankees,
pero tampoco podrân negar estos asesinos que nuestra decisiôn estâ basada en cl
sagrado principio de defender nuestra soberanfa.”4° Although weaker in material,
he is morally superior for his cause lias a nobler end. The balance of power
transcends for a moment in time and an etemity in fiction for the fight against a
greater power— full lmowingly to fail— renders the act heroic.
II. The Hero as the Epitome of Cleverness
The anti-imperialist hero also classifies as a “clever hero”: “A person who
bests lis rivals by wit, unexpected tricks, or hoaxes is likely to becorne a great
favorite with his people. The clever hero requires an opponent of much superior
38 Ann Ruth Wellner, The Spelibinders, Charismatic Political Leadership, New Haven, Yale University Press,
1984, P. 61.
This famous trope is well known in Nicaragua today. h is cited from Gregorio Selser, Sandino: General of
the Free, trans. CedHc Beifrage, New York, Monthly Review Press, p. 8$.
40 Pensamiento Vivo, 2nd edition, ed. Sergio Rami rez, two Volumes, Managua, Editorial Nueva Nicaragua,
1984. p. 67.
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size.”41 In relevance to Sandino, his own witty remarks reflect this attribute:
“Lâstima que sean tan grandes los piratas, porque sus uniformes no les sirven a
nuestra gente.”42 Moreover, the nature of guerilla warfare i.e., based on hit-and-run
tactics, further reinforces the leader as a persona of cunning intelligence. The
marines’ failure to capture him prompted tacit sensationalism in the headlines of
The New York Times. He is “ever elusive”, “wily,” and a “maddening problem for
the marines”: “The attempt to capture Sandino is like chasing a fox... He and his
men know the county thoroughly, while it is totally unknown to the marines.”43
Although their tricks fail in the long run, their actions render them heroic in the
perception of their admirers.
III. The Hero as the Deliverer of Oppression and Redeemer of the Poor
The wily hero overlaps with “the delivering and avenging hero” of the
poor. He is loved by the oppressed and considered a vile enemy by the oppressors.
$andino can be categorized as a textbook case of social banditry and
millenarianism that flourishes in remote regions amongst oppressed peoples—in
this case the Indian population of the Segovias.44 Hobsbawn describes the basic
characteristic of this type leader:
The point about social bandits is that they are peasant outlaws who the lord and
state regard as cnminals who remain within peasant society, and are considered
by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps
even leaders of liberation, and in any case as men to be adrnired, helped and
supported.45
Sandino’s enemies perceived him as “nothing but a common outlaw”, a ruthless
bandit to be exterminated for the good of Nicaragua. Conversely, his cohorts
overtumed the notion of banditry to grant a more honorable meaning: “Bandido
era Abdul el-Krim para los espafioles; bandidos los drusos que se sacrifican por la
41 See Orrin E. Klapp, “The Creation ofPopular Heroes”, The A,nerican Journal ofSociology, 54 (2) 1948. p.
135-141. The author defines five possible roles of mythical and popular heroes (1) the conquering hero, (2) the
Cinderella, (3) the clever hero, (4) the benefactor, and (5) the martyr, p. 135.42 Pensamiento Vivo, p. 54.
New York Times, March 22”, 1928.
‘ The social and cultural realities ofthe Segovias wilI be elaborated upon in the next chapter.
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libertad de la patria. Bandidos han sido y son y serân para losw opresores todos los
que luchan por la libertad.”46 In an interview with Sandino, Carleton Beals
recounts: “You are as much a bandit as Mr. Coolidge is a bolshevik. Tell your
people, lie retumed, there are many bandits in Nicaragua, but they are flot
necessarily Nicaraguans.”47 His self-sacrifice overtums lis deviant label thereby
strengthening the convictions of a group as well as his heroic image as redeerner
and savior of the downtrodden.
IV. The Hero as Martyr
Finally, a chief characteristic of the Nicaraguan hero myth corresponding
with the “wily” and “avenging deliverer ofthe poor” in their fight against a greater
power is his/her willingness to die for the cause at hand. Anita and Eugene Weiner
explain how martyrdom functions to reinforce a group’s convictions: “Martyrdom
sets standards for praiseworthy acts that become standards for continued group
membership.”48 The martyr’s actions taps into what Tumer calis a “root
paradigm”, the powerfully felt and deeply imbued cultural sentiments of a
society.49 In relevance to Sandino, tIc liberation of the poor from imperialism in
the narne of universal principles of freedom and sovereignty transforms Sandino’s
deviant act into honorable memories for the nation to call to mmd when the soil is
fertile. Furthermore, as promoter of his own image, Sandino diligently stated his
willingness to die throughout his entire career: “I am going to Managua, I am
going to die. I am the tmnk and you are the branches, and these branches will
someday shed their vines and grow strong and true, and they are you.”5°
Martyrdom functions as a double -edged sword, legitirnizing and strengthening the
value and the person that died in the name of it. As a resuit, the historical figure is
‘ Eric J. Hobsbawn, Bandits, New York, Delacorte Press, 1969, p. 13.
46 E! Repertorio Americano, September I 7d, 1928.
° The Nation, Februaiy 22’, 1928.
48 Eugene Weinet and Anita Weiner, The Martyr Conviction: A Sociological Anah’sis, Allanta, Scholars
Press, 1990, p. 86.
Ralph H. Tumer, (‘ollective Behavior, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1957, p. 474.
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elevated, transformed into a myth and his aura is re-invoked by future generations
seeking similar objectives.
In other words, death frees the hero from the stains entailed in the act of
living. In the eyes of ever-scrutinizing critics, living takes away the possibility of
holding in memory what is useful. Man’s fallible nature spoils the social
perception of the heroic persona—etemalized and idealized as the prime example
of ah that is good. The examples of living Nicaraguan heroes reinforce this point:
Daniel Ortega had to fight charges of child abuse against his stepdaughter whereas
Omar Cabeza was sued for swindling money from his brother.5’ To enter the
national genealogy of heroes, it is better to die like Carlos fonseca, Joaquin
Chamorro and $andino, i.e. in the hands of the traitor and in the midst of the
struggie. The death of the hero inspires rather than dispels the illusion of a utopian
tomorrow.
Organizational Structure and Sources
The chapters have been divided according to the major phases in the
nation-building development of Nicaragua, from the beginning of the myth’s
proliferation (May 1927) to the electoral loss of the $andinistas (November 1990).
Each one opens with a rendition of the social context and ensues with an analysis
of the myth. The primary sources most frequently used are the printed press and
the pohitical writings ofthe prime ideologists. It is important to note that this thesis
seeks to understand the construction and appropriation of the hero myth through
the perception of the most influential mythmakers. In the $orelian sense, this
means those seeking to topple the regime by violent means, whereas in the
Barthesian sense, it relates to those seeking to legitimize their power. Therefore,
° lES 044-2-2:4, cited from Schroederp. 16.
51 See La Prensa, June 5 1998, for sexual abuse charges against Ortega by bis adoptive daughter Zoilarnérica
Narvaez.
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mythmakers vary in type, i.e. politicïans, revolutionary leaders, inteilectuals and
poets, according to the political and social phase ofthe nation.
Chapter Two: “From Hero to Hero Myth: Exploring the Emergence of
Diffusion of the Sandino Hero Myth” delves into the social context preceding
$andino’s defiant act. Externai and internai problems, respectfuily U.$.
imperialism and chronic factional wars, are eiaborated upon to better grasp the
preconditions favoring the positive reception of the hero or, in other words, the
“root paradigm” developed throughout the last two centuries. Joim A. Booth’s
astute rendition of Nicaraguan history irnparts crucial insight bringing forth the
relevance of theories of deprivation in times of crisis situations. William J.
$chroeder’s detailed dissertation of the $egovias clarifies the nature of the
rebellion by underlining the unique social and political realities ofthis distinctively
complex and isolated region.
This section largely relies on $ydney Hook’s theoretical study The Hero in
Histoiy: A Study in Limitations Possibility (1943) as well as notions on leadership,
charisma and mass behavïor in times ofthreatening or crisis situations to delineate
him from other guerrilla leaders fighting for the sarne cause. The prime
mythmakers are the hero himself and anti-imperialists intellectuals such as Gabriel
Mistral, Froylân Turcios and José Vasconcelos. The New York Times and EÏ
Repertorio Americano (Costa Rica), along with the useful compilation of excepts
in Docuimentos Bcsicos—of articles written in Ariel and Amaïtta— and Et
Fensamiento Vivo’s assemblage of Sandino letters, testirnonies and manifestos,
serve as main sources in the propagation of the myth. Schrocrder states that most
of the myths were created during the first nine months: “Memories, stories,
symbols, songs, legends coalesced around a rapid-fire series of events occurring in
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the first nice months of the struggie”, suggesting that much of the myth’s
reassessment may be concentrated to this period.52
Chapter Three: “The Hero Myth’s Descent into Somnolence” discusses the
muting of the myth triggered by Nicaragua’s entrance into the dark dictatorial
period of the Somoza regime. Richard Millet’s judicious study of the Guardia
Nacional, $omoza’s private army, explains how military and ideological control of
the nation molded Nicaragua into Anastasio’s “personal fiefdom”.53 Somoza’s
monograph on the Rebellion, entitled Et Verdadero Sandino o e! atvario de las
Segovias (1936), is the main source analysed in this section.54
Chapter Four: “The Recuperation of the Hero Myth in Tirnes of Social
Conflict” opens with an analysis of the political conjunctures that favored
revolutionary movernents worldwide. More specifically, the national liberation
movement in Latin America, the success of the Cuban Revolution (1959) and the
declining legitimacy of Somoza regime stimulated the Nicaraguan revolution and
consequently, the hero myth’s proliferation on a wider scale. Given that numerous
studies have aptly discussed the Cuban revolution’s catalytic role in Nicaragua
revolutionary developments, as well as the Sandinistas’ appropriation of the hero
rnyth, the aim is to synopsize their major points to grant an unbroken picture ofthe
legend’s historical travels.55 Gregorio $elser’s Sandino. General of the free
(1959) and some of Carlos Fonseca’s works, namely Viva Sandino, Hora Cero
52 Micheal J. Schroeder, p. 256.
Richard Millet, Guardians ofthe Dynasty: A Histo,y ofihe US. C’reated Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua
and the Somoza Family, New York, MaryknolI, 1977, p. 7.
Schroeder explains that bis book was a culmination ofthe unrest already articulated in ail the major
newspapers ofLéon, Managua and Granada.
The major works referred to in this thesis are Mathilde Zimmermann’s Carlos fonseca and the Nicaraguan
Revohition, Durham and London, Duke University Press, 2000; Steven Palrner’s Steven “Carlos Fonseca and
the Construction ofSandinismo in Nicaragua”, Latin Ainerican Research Review, 23 (1) (1988) p. 91-109;
Donald C. Hodges’ Intellectual Foundations ofthe Nicaraguan Revohition, Austin, University ofTexas Press,
1986; and flnally, f red Judson’s “Sandinista Revolutionary Morale”, Latin A,nerican Perspective 14 (1)
(Winter 1987), p. 19-42.
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Prograrna Histôrico, are analyzed to reinforce the changing functions and
unchanging themes of the hero myth.
Chapter five: “The Fate of the Hero Myth in the Post-Revolutionary Era:
Politicization, Rupture, Recovery” discusses the hero myth’s travels throughout
the tumultuous eighties up until the loss of the Sandinistas in the 1990 elections.
The Sandinista newspaper La Barricada (pro-$andinista) and La Prensa
(Conservative) serve as prime mediums in the proliferation of the hero myth.
Political speeches, iconography and finally, the latest addition of historical
paintings of Sandino are discussed to present the latest trend in $andino’s mythical
career.
In conclusion, the first nine months of lis career and the post-revolutionary
Nicaragua (1979-1990) are analyzed more elaborately since the recuperation of the
myth from the sixties onto the seventies has been aptly discussed by
contemporaries. In the case of the somnolent period, the hero myth was eclipsed
for an anti-heroic one, considerably diminishing the amount of heroic speeches
available for analysis.
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CHAPTER TWO:
From Hero to Myth:
Exploring the Emergence and Diffusion of the Sandino Hero Myth
$idney Hook’s analysis in Hie Hero in Histoiy serves as a fruitful starting
point for its judicious combination oftwo major trends in the study of the hero: the
hero as a “maker of history” and the hero as a “product of history”. The “Great
Man” theory established in the 19th century by Thomas Carlyle’s On Heroes,
Hero- Worshtp, and the Heroic in Histoiy (1841) epitomized the popular notion of
man as the main architect ofhistorical outcomes— “who sometirnes seems to exert
an almost superhurnan control over the fate of their generation.” On the other end
of the spectrum is the more current truisrn of social detemiinistic propensity; in
Herbert Spencer’s summary phrase: “Before lie [the great man] can re-make his
society, his society must make him.”2 The hero is a product of impersonal forces,
his specific blend of humanity, of no significant importance. Hook brings both
theories together: “Event-making man finds a fork in the historical road but also,
50 to speak creates it, whereas eventful man is there at the perfect moment.”3 A
hero is a product of dual developments, the socio-political conjuncture (forked
road) and the leadership genius of a specific type of person (event-making man).
In other words, leaders ofheroic status must be studied from a structural as well as
behavioral standpoint.
Although the aim is not to criticize Hook’s work but to justify the use of
complementary studies, lis own limitations must be brought to fore. The author
regretfully stops at mentioning the hero’s necessary “extraordinary talents” for
“mastering the machine” without delving deeper into the behavioral traits of bis
CarI Gustavson, A Prefiice to Histoiy, Toronto, McGraw-Hill, 1955, p. 123.
2 Herbert Spencer, Tue Studv ofSociology, New York, Appleton, 1874, p. 35, cited in Hero Mvths, A Reader,
cd. by Robert A. Segal, Malden, Blackwell Publishers, 2000, p. 3.
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selected heroes.4 To understand the emergence of Sandino, it is important to
specify his significance as a guerrilia leader of charismatic nature.5 Ann Ruth
Wellner’s study on charisma exemplifies this point with the case of late 1 920s
Germany; afier Hitler was prohibited from public speaking, the party feli back on
Josef Goebbeis and Gregor Strasse to give speeches propagating Nazi doctrines.
Although they managed to convert some to their cause, neither generated the same
type of fanatical response, as did Hitler’s speeches.6 Hook further contends that
even if it was impossible to prevent World War II, it was flot inevitabie that Hitler
would be successflil as Chancellor: “He was victorious not merely because of the
widespread economic misery produced by the crisis. His political skill in unifying
the right, ranging for Junker to industrialist to the frightening middie class,
together with Hindenburg’s support, played an important part.”7 From a behaviorai
perspective, charisma plays a determining foie in the emergence of a heroically
perceived revoiutionary leader and consequentiy, in the construction of his/her
consequent heroic myth.
Moreover, Hook’s study deals with Hitler, Lenin and Napoleon— event
makers who “made” history on a larger scale. In the case of Sandino, as analysis of
his most influential propagandists suggests that his heroic image partly emerged
from a crafty exploitation of the media by anti-imperiaiist intellectuai writers. In
addition to the forked road and the relation forged between leader and supporters
through Sandino’s charismatic leadership, the printed word piayed a fundamental
Sidney Hook, The Hero in Histon, a Study ofLimitation and fossibility, New York, John Day Company,
1943, p. 157.
‘ Hook does note that the hero must have conviction and an uncanny perception of his/her society.
Sandino’s reputation as a charismatic leader is an established fact. Joumalists were astounded by the level of
obediencc pervading bis camp, the saintly qualities projected upon him by bis followers, and concurrently,
theirblind type offaith. Sec Ramôn de Belaustiguigoitia, Con Sandino e,? Nicaragua, Madrid, Espana-Calpe,
1934; Gustavo Alemân Bolafios, Sandino, Estudio Completo dcl Héroc de las Segovias, Mexico, D.R.:
Impresa La Repùblica, 1932; Carleton Beals, Banana Gold, Philadelphia and London, J.B. Lippincott
Company, 1932, and Sofonia Salvatierra, Sandino o la Tragedia de un Pueblo, Managua, Talleres
Litograficos Maltez, 1934. Neifl Macauley, The Sandino Affaii Durham, N.C. Duke University Press, 1985,
was one of the first historical books to reveal his ‘rabble-rousing’ talents. See p. 54. These works vi11 be
discussed in detail in chapter two.
6 Ann Ruth Wellner, The Spelibinders, Charis,natic Poiltical Leadershiv, New Havcn, Yale University Press,
1984, p. 58.
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role in the making ofthe hero’s epic image. Ail three factors will now be analyzed
to illuminate the origins of the hero and his myth.
The Socio-Political Context and the Revolutïonary Tradition of Nïcaragua
The tradition of ail dead generations weighs like an incitbus ttpon the
brain ofthe living. (Karl Marx)
La guerra de expo Ïsiôn del fihibustero nos dej6 también la herencia de
heroismo y de virtudes civicas en queflorecieron, para arrojar al intruso,
los mismos irreconciliables partidos que habian hecho possible stt
presencia en nuestra tierra.8
For a revolutionary hero to emerge there is likely a need for himfher. This need is
likeiy to be preceded by a threatening situation that foments a collective sense of
anxiety and deprivation, consequently calling the need for a savior. Eric Hoffer
writes:
There has to be an eagemess to follow and obey and an intense dissatisfaction
with things as they are before [the mass] movement and leader can make an
appearance. When conditions are not ripe, the potential leader, no matter how
gifted, and his holy cause, no matter how potent, remain without a following.9
Correspondingly, it is highly improbable that a revolutionary leader surfaces in a
society where stability and contentment reign. There is usually a conflict over
critical issues, one that the leader takes upon hirnself/herself to rationalize
according to a new set of values: “to create a new paradigm, a new social identity
expressed in the critical decisions that embrace both traditional elernents and
modem elements”.’° In countries whose sovereignty is dictated by a stronger
power, Hoffer contends, violence may be justified in the name of new paradigms
7Hook,p. 18.
8 Sofonias Salvatierra, Sandino o ta Tragedia de tin Pueblo, Managua, Talleres Litograficos Maltez, 1934, p.
10
Eric Hoffer, The True Be1ieve, Thought on the Nature ofMass Movements, New York, Harper, 1951, cited
in Andrew S. McFarland’s Power and Leadershio in Pluralist Systems, Stanford, Stanford University Press,
1969, p. 16$.
°Ibid.,p. 169.
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embracing marginalized social and/or ethnie groups; these paradigms are ofien
embodied in discourses of nationalism.11
In other words, justification for violence stemming from collective
deprivation must be politicized to induce violence: “Discontent arising from the
perception of relative deprivation is the basic instigating condition for participants
in collective violence.”12 The leader’s role, as an apt ideologist, provides the group
with a better understanding of the causes of their deprivation and/or, identifies
utopia objectives to be attained by revolt. It is by instilling political awareness and
providing an alternative to the plight of the oppressed that violent measures are
likely to be rendered justifiable. David Apter, a leading scholar of ideology in
times of distress explains that “ideology helps to make more explicit the moral
basis of action.”13 The leader as ideologist thus mobilizes the masses (in the
$orelian sense) by imbuing violent actions with moral justifications. Implicitly, he
/she uses mythic language to render his/her point more convincing
Though collective deprivation is necessary, it is flot sufficient: “Depending
on people’s perspectives on violence and politics, relative deprivation induced
discontent may be either focused or deflected by the political system.”14 for
example, when a political regime is dictatorial, and the government’s repressive
apparatus succeeds in curtailing rebellions, rebellious leaders (and their
movernents) may be easily repressed.’5 In other words, for the road to be forked,
Latin American discourses on nationalism have been noted to function as political strategies serving to
divert attention away from unresolved domestic problems and incomplete social integration. Sec Anthony D.
Smith, p.l 43-l 50; Peter Alter Nationalisrn, trans. by Stuart McKinnon-Evans, London, New York, E. Arnold,
1989, fora thorough rendition ofnationalisrn’s transformation from a tool ofernancipation to one of
diversion; Benedict Anderson, chapter 9, “The Angel ofHistoiy” which emphasizes the importance of leaders
in the construction ofconternporary national identities: “As we have seen, “officiaI nationalism” was from the
start a conscious, self-protective policy, intimately linked to the preservation ofimperial-dynastic interests.”
(159)
12 lcd Gurr, Why lien Rebel, New Haven, University ofPrinceton Press, 1970, p. 10.
‘3Apter,p. 133.
‘ Gurr, p. 159.
5 Or, in conternporary liberal states such as the United States, the nature ofthe govemment gives society the
illusion of change through social programs that overali, do not affect the system. Sec Harold D. Lasswell,
Power and Personality, New York, W.W. Norton and Company, 1948: “A great many joint activities that are
called political and that evoke programs for changing the social system, in fact perforrn a catharsis function,
since little cornes ofthe program save sorne reduction of tension among the participants.” (129)
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successfully politicized deprivation and a political system unable to deflect violent
insurgencies are crucial elements for the cultivation of revolutionary leaders and
thus, hero-making sou.
From colonial times until the changeover of power into the hands of
Anastasio Sornoza (1936), this was the case of Nicaragua. Chronic and excessive
violence was a prime characteristic of the nation’s history: “Even in a region
proverbial for internai anarchy and foreign intermissions, Nicaragua stands out as
an extreme case.”6 Afier the wars of independence, fulI-scale war from 1822 to
1857 continued on whilst sporadic rebellions persisted well into the 2O century.
The perennial absence of security caused by the inadequate control of the state
over political factionalism generated severe deprivation on a collective scale,
serving to ripen the soil for civil war, rebellion and revolution. The consequences,
Booth writes, kept “Nicaragua economically stagnant and institutionally weak
until the late 19th century”.17
It was only afier 1870 that coffee production and liberal development
initiatives stimulated growth and modernization, increasing Nicaragua’s
involvement with the world system. However, this coincided with “dollar
diplomacy” era; when Nicaragua (along with other Latin American and Caribbean
countries like Puerto Rico, Haiti, Cuba and the Dominican Republic) were
perceived by the United $tates’ governrnent “as medleys of compliant financial
protectorates beholden to U.S. capital”.’8 Moreover, the potential for constructing
a waterway, first proposed by the Spanish centuries earlier, became another source
of difflculty as Britain and the U.$ failed to negotiate a canal treaty.’9 In 1903,
16 Knut Walter, 771e Regime ofAnastasio Sonioza Garcia and State Ponnation in Nicamgua, 1936-1956,
unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University ofNorth Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1987, P. 18, cited in Schroeder, p.
40.
7 John A. Booth, The End and the Beginning ofthe Nicaraguan Revolution, 2’ edition, Boulder Colorado,
Westview Press, 1985, p. 25.
18 Lester D. Langley and Thornas Schoonover, The Banana Mea, A,nerican Mercenaries and Entrepreneurs In
CentralAmerica, 1880-1930, Lexington, Kentucky University, 1995, P. 43.
Britain’s interest in Nicaragua spanned from the early 19th centuiy. Their commercial interests were
defended by their steadily growing naval power. For more information on irnperialist expansion in Nicaragua,
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president Zelaya’s refusai to grant the United States canal-building rights, ïncited
the latter to tum to Panama for the orchestration of its “independence” from
Columbia (1903) and ultimately, lcd the signing of a treaty conceding the rights
for the building of a canal in Panama.
It is important to relate the above developments to the mountainous frontier
zone in which the rebellion exclusively took place, the department of Las
Segovias. Here, the indigenous campesinos represented eighty to ninety percent of
the area’s population. The wealthy, one or two percent, owned properties and lived
in the city whereas the farming and ranching sector comprised approximately ten
percent. Life was precarious and violence endemic due to a blending of factors.
Schroeder writes: “Political space was fragmented and fractured; power was
exercised from multiple centers; authority and law were endlessly contested by
different groups of actors. The state was too weak to effectively survey, regulate,
and dominate the populace.”2°
With the beginning of coffee exportations, indigenous groups were further
oppressed to facilitate coffee expansion. From 1877, laws were passed to stimulate
coffee production, privatize Indian lands, and exercise greater control over the
rural labor force.21 Indigenous uprisings transpired as early as 1881. Between one
to two thousand Indians were killed while more fled into the mountains; the
internai unity of the Matagalpa comztnidad consequently underwent a rapid
process of disintegratïon bringing with it, the ethnie dissolution of the Indian
community.22 In 1895, liberal dictator and staunch nationaiist José Santos Zelaya’s
reforms worked to coerce Indians to labor on plantations by transforming the
sec Héctor Pérez Brignoli, Breve Historia de Centroamérica, Madrid, Alianza EditoHal, 1999; John A. Booth
and Thomas Walker, Understanding Central America, 3rd edition, Boulder Colorado, Westview Press, 1985.
20 Sec Schroeder chapter 3: “The Segovias: HistoHcal Geography, Demography, and Political Economy in a
Mountainous frontier Zone” for a more detailed explanation ofthe Segovias region.
21 Sec Jeffrey L. Gould, To Die in This Way: Nicaraguan indians and Me Myth ofthe Mestizaje, Durham and
London, Duke University Press, 199$, for an excellent anthropological approach to the highland indigenous
communities and their forced assimilation since the 9th centuiy.
22 Schroeder, p. 101.
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capitanes de caiïada into agents of the state— further intensifying their economic
and politicai breakdown.23 This time, a native millenarian revoit empted but was
swiftly crushed by local authorities. By 1906, the Indian communities were
aboiished, distributing one-half of theïr land among Indians and ordering the sale
of the remainder to Ladinos of European descent. The extreme social, economic,
and political upheavals throughout the region, most deeply detrimentai to the rural
poor, fumished “many reasons for harboring deep felt animus against the state and
its local agents, landowners, and the dominant class in generai”.24 According to
Jeffrey Gouid, coffee and the Liberal revoiution weakened the Indian
communities’ economic base and irreversibly divided them.25
Despite bis repressive policies toward the indigenous communities,
Zeiaya’s defiance toward U.S. irnperialisrn inherited him a place in Nicaragua’s
revolutionary tradition.26 Afier Nicaragua’s loss ofthe canai project to Panama, the
president openÏy disregarded the U.S. by seeking out foreign funds from Japan and
Germany to compete with the U.S. waterway. Two American mercenaries, whose
service in foreign wars undermined their rights for protection, were executed under
Nicaraguan iaws. In retum, the U.S-supported Conservative Party toppled Zelaya’s
govemment and subsequently supervised the collection of Nicaragua’s taxes,
controlled the National Railway Company and the National bank. This cuirninated
with the signing ofthe Chamorro Pact (1914) which ceded ail rights to the United
States to build or block a canal at the cost of three million dollars—”ali of which
passed directly to the U.S banks that held Nicaragua’s debts”.27 It is interesting to
23 GoulU notes that a treaty between the Liberal governrnent and the Indians leaders contained a key proviso
“that although the capitanes would be elected by Indians and would be responsible for defending Indian
communities, the sate reserved the power to ratify their election and to exert authority over them.” (40)
24 Ibid., p. 103.
25 Gould, p. 42-43.
26 José Santos Zelaya was president ofNicaragua from 1894 to 1909. FIe fomented revolutions in neighboring
countries and tried to reestablish the Central Arnerican Federation with hirnself as head. This led to bis
reputation as a disturber of the peace. U.S. cruisers eventually overthrew him. See Thomas W. Walker,
Nicaragua, chapter 2, “Early History” in Nicaragua, Living in the Shadow ofthe Eagle, 4hI edition, Boulder,
Westview Press, 2003, for more details on Zelaya’s dictatorsbip.
27 See Booth for more information on the principal effects ofthe Charnorro Pact on Nicaragua, p. 34-41.
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note that Sandino’s father, a staunch and politically active liberal, was jailed for
protesting against the pact, suggesting that Gregorio Sandino’s confinement, along
with his political propensities may have played a role in his son’s future vocation.
According to historians, this period lias traditionally been interpreted as
one ofNicaragua’s most hurniliating hours.28 Sergïo Ramfrez lias described it quite
vividly as a time wlien “Govemment among cousins and relatives who docilely
continued tuming the nation over to foreign interests, acquiring usurious debts, and
giving more goods and resourccs as collateral”.29 It is rnatched only by the war
against filibuster William Walker (1856) who flot only plundered Granada,
established a puppet Liberal regime, declared himself president and restored
slavery, but decreed English be made the official language ofNicaragua.3°
When a group of dissenting conservatives along with Liberal insurgents
rebelled against the puppet regime of Adolfo Dfaz in 1912, a young Zelayista,
Benjamin Zeledôn took up the anti-imperial torcli. Aithougli his efforts succeeded
in seizing Leôn and neighboring cities, the U.S Marines ultimately (and easily)
crushed the revolt, the protection of American lives as their justification for brute
force. Later that year, Zeledôn was rnurdered and dragged tlirougli the streets of
Sandino’s hometown Niquinihomo— where the latter clairned to have watched the
sacrilegious parading of his hero. The U.S-backed Conservative government
trudged on despotically until, unable to appease liberal opposition, civil war broke
outin 1926.
Intensifying opposition toward the Conservative’s despotic regirne led to
the withdrawal of American forces—who feit the party no longer needed their
material support—triggered the risc of insurgent liberals months afler the first
28Marco Aurelio Navarro, Augusto César” Sandino. Messiah ofLight and Truth, New York, Syracuse
University Press, 2002, p. XX.
29Sergio Ramirez, E! Pensamiento Vivo de Sandino, cited in Booth, p. 28.
30 Walker was eventually forced to surrender in 1857; he retumed to Central Arnerica on another filibuster
mission in 1860. He vas captured by the BHtish and handed over to the Hondurans, who killcd him before a
fiHng squad.
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batch of soldiers lefi for North America.3’ Afier Emiliano Chamorro’s coup of
October 1925 ousted President Solôrzano, vice president Sacasa pursued military
action in Bluefields from his place of exile in Mexico. By December st Sacasa
landed in Puerto Cabeza and proclaimed hirnself president. Three weeks later, the
Marines came along and managed to dissipate the revolt, giving the latter four
days to evacuate. It was then, Schroeder explains, that Liberal bands began to
spring up across western Nicaragua.32 The Liberal army was highly decentralized,
with between thirty and fifty (perhaps even more) generals fighting rather
independently for each other: “General, it seems, was a titie appropriated by any
man who could raise, arm and command an “anTly” or fifly or more men.”33
Following his retiam from Mexico, Sandino eventually became one of these
generals.
As noted in the briefbiography, Sandino first found employrnent as a clerk
in the San Albino mines, located in a northern department of las Segovias. There,
he tested his rhetorical abilities and gathered lis first cohorts, and ultimately the
cmx ofhis guerilla army.
I began to work on the disposition (ànimo) of those workers, explaining to them
the system of cooperatives of other countries, and how sadly we were exploited,
and that we should find a government that would truly be interested in the peopie
so that they did flot get basely exploited by the capitalists and the great foreign
companies, for the people of the Nation, and that we should demand, as in ail the
civilized countnes in the world, that ail the companies operating in Nicaragua
have to provide to their workers medicai attention, schools, laws, and
organizations such as union of workers, and that we had none of ail that. I
explained to them that I was not communist, but socialist.34
Isolated in a region dominated by Conservatives, the lowest class of workers
suffered widespread injustices at the hands of foreign-owned mining firms. Liberal
reforms enabled foreigners to gobble up the land at the expense of mineworkers
31 There is no general histoiy on the Constitutionalist War. See Schroederp. 127-12$, fora briefrendition.
32 Ibid., p129 More specifically, the Liberal groups gained power over the Conservatives in the departments
ofLeôn, Chinandega, Esteli, and Nueva Segovia. Afier attacking, these groups would usually return to the
populace or flee to Honduras.
33 Ibid., p. 125
José Roman, tvfaldito Pajs, Managua, de El Pez y la Serpiente, 1979, p49, cited in Navarro, p. 22.
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and their families, worsening their living conditions evermore. By the time
$andino arrived, many residents had flot only lost some or ail of their lands in the
mining expansion of the previous decades, but were also unemployed or
underemployed.35
What is more, Nicaraguans and Americans alike perceived the Segoviano
campesino as racially inferior: “E! indio al que se refiere $andino es e! menos
“hispanizado”. E! pobre, e! que es tratado con desdén por la gente de la ciudad, y
visto como una bestia de carga, ignorante y estupida por los marines.”36 According
to theories of revoit and the historical data, it seems that the deep-felt discontent
harboured by the labouring poor, cornbined to a political system unable to deflect
violence, made the area ideal for the reception a talented ideologue— seeking to
politicize their discontent.
Much contention revolving the true intentions of his retum to Nicaragua
reflects the tensions between myth and reality. In his own retrospective version,
Sandino recounts a summoning to the patria resembling the archetypal hero myth
sequence of the retum to the homeland.37 Sitting with a group of friends in
Mexico, faced with Nicaragua’s state of affairs, lie decides to retum to lis country.
In those days, I used to get together with a group of Spiritualist friends, and we
commented daily on the submission of our Latin Arnerican peoples to the
hypocritical or forceful advances of the murderous yanki empire. On one occasion
I told my friends that if there were in Nicaragua a hundred men who loved their
country as much as I, our nation would recover its sovereignty, threatened as it
was by that selfsameyanki empire.38
His renditions align with Joseph Carnpbell’s heroic cycles of departure and return;
$andino is dispelled from his homeland and thrust into tlie unknown to joumey tlie
world and suffer trials and tribulations. In a letter written to lis father, lie teils him
of the dangers of debauchery as most workers spend their daily eamings at niglit,
Schroeder, p. 133.
36 Michefle Dospital, Siempre Mâs Allât ElMovimiento Sandinista en Nicaragua, 1 927-1934, Managua,
Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua, 1996, P. 146.
37See Joseph Carnpbell, ‘The Crossing ofthe Retum Threshold’, p. 217.
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on women and booze: “Ese vida no es para un hombre que desea distinguirse en
algo.”39 Self-controlled and ambitious, Sandino surrounded himself with wise men
to acquire spiritual enlightenment until he was reckoned back to his homeland for
his ultimate quest, the redemption ofhis people.
from the perspective of historians Marco Navarro and Pierre Vayssière,
Sandino’s homecoming was more likely due to the end of the statute of limitations
regarding charges against him for attempted murder.4° Conversely, Schroeder
contends that Sandino’s choice of employment in the mines of San Albino could
not have been better suited for the amassing of soldiers, as it was where deeply felt
resentment toward the U.S. was acutely marked, thus rendering his self-alleged
calling to the land plausible. Perhaps, a grain of truth may reside in the both
hypothesises; the end of the statute of limitations coincided with bis desire to fight
for his homeland.
Synopsis
This brief overview has brought forth the major converging traits of
Nicaraguan political history. Highly decentralized and plagued by factional wars,
two levels of powers violently coexisted. At one end (the cities), there was the
government and its elite, while on the other (the countryside), powerful families
and caudillos. Add to the muddle persistent foreign intervention and a ruggedly
dense geographical setting and the outcome is a country whose justification for
violence as a means to achieve ends was very likely. Chronic fighting between
factions, resistance to foreign intervention and the inability of the govemment to
deflect violence proved conducive to the emergence of revolutionary leaders and
with them, a revolutionary tradition replete with heroes (and anti-heroes), namely,
38 Eduardo Crawley, Dictators Neyer Die, A Portrait ofNicaragua and the Somoza Dynasty, New York, St
Martin’s, 1979, p. 47.
Pensarniento Vivo, p. 73-74.
40 In letters from bis father, he is urged to retum to Nicargua.
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Diriangen, Zelaya, Zeledén, Sandino, Rigoberto Lépez, Carlos Fonseca and
Joaquin Chamorro.4’ As a resuit, three of these major anti-imperialists leaders
entered the genealogical chain of national heroism by the flrst haif of the twentieth
century, Sandino crossing the threshold last.
The guerilla chief was flot the first Nicaraguan to defy imperial interests
and nor would he be the last. Nevertheless, he was the final one to achieve heroic
status in the decentralized stage ofNicaragua’s political development i.e., the last
to reverberate throughout the isthmus for the following four decades and also, the
first to lead the most successflil anti-imperial revolt in Central America up until
that tirne. The hero myth’s potency may partiy be allotted to these two
congregating positions
Determining factors in the Creation and Survival of the Hero Myth
Since the justification for violence along with the weakness of the state
provided favorable conditions for revoit, how did Sandino emerge as prime leader
amongst the swarms of liberal pouches fighting against the same enemy? This
section analyses Sandino’s historicity to uncover the major factors propelling hïs
surfacing as heroic leader and the consequent diffusion of his heroic myth. By
positioning him within the context of the Constitutionalist War (1926), an
explanation of bis catalytic impact on the political strife at hand shall establish him
as event-maker (rather than eventfiul man) on a national level as well as his heroic
aura on a transnational and international level.
In short, the determining factors that paved way to his heroic image are the
foliowing: Sandino’s primordial act of defiance, the nature of Rebellion, the
conjunction bctween his charismatic personality and the peqzteiïo ejército loco ‘s
41 Diriangen was a chieftain leader in the 16hl century. He decirnated the forces ofSpanish explorer Gil
Gônzalez De Avila, forcing him ta retreat ta Panama. Rigoberto Lôpez Pétez, a young poet from Leôn, shot
Anastasio Somoza in 1956 and vas killed in action. Joaquin Chamarra, owner of La Prensa, used bis
newspaper ta protest against Sornoza; he vas shot in the streets of Managua in 197$. According ta historians,
the impact of bis death helped trigger the revolution ofthe following year.
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five and a haif years dedication and finally, the proliferation of his heroism in the
reaim of the media that helped transcend his heroic image beyond the boundaries
ofthe mountains of Las $egovias.
I. The Heroïc Act: Manifestation of a Primordial Myth of Defiance at a
Forked Road.
Sandino’s initial act of defiance served as one of the key factor in the
creation of the hero myth by divorcing him from the “common people” and
progressively transforming him into a supematural, heroically perceived being.
The momentous act occurred on May 4th 1927, after American representative
Stimson and eager to be promoted president of Nicaragua, Liberal general
Moncada, put forth the infarnous Espino Negro Accords—entailing a North
American irnposed end to the war. A close analysis ofthe pact shows that the U.S.
carefully crafted an agreement that changed nothing in the political affairs of
Nicaragua. Whether the leading party was Conservative or Liberal did flot affect
their interests for “they controlled his regime from a number of points: the
Embassy; the Marines.. .the Guardia Nacional, with its United $tates Army
Officers; the High Commissioner of Customs; the Director of the Railway; and the
national bank”.42 Contrary to popular support, Conservative leader Diaz was
ordered to rernain president until the next elections while Liberal insurgents were
instructed to exchange their arms for a ten-dollar compensation. Most
controversially, it was agreed upon that the Yankees would supervise the elections
ofthe following year. While eleven generals unanimously accepted the accord, the
twelflh, Augusto Nicolas (later changed to César), rejected it vehemently. As it lias
been explained in the introduction, Sandino opted for the mountains with a group
42 Ra]ph Lee Woodward, Jr., Central America: A Nation Divided, New York, Oxford University Press, 1976, p.
76.
35
of twenty-nine followers and consequently led a five and a haif year long war in
the name of National Liberation.
Like Zelaya and Zeledén, Sandino refused to put up with U.$. politicians
and Nicaraguan cronies, and similar to the Bryan-Chamorro, the Espino Negro
Accord elicited a wave of dissent throughout Latin America. Schroeder’s
unearthing of a few articles proves this point:
[The Espino Negro Accords] constitutes an affront to the dignity of our homeland
and violates our national sovereignty... We prefer to live in the most extreme
poverty, as we have aiways lived, rather than surrender our national sovereignty.
Today in Nicaragua sounds the voice of protest of Hispano-America... Foreign
Intervention deals a mortal wound to National Sovereignty and is destructive of
the most beautifiil ideals.43
Although neither quote may be accredited to Sandino, both reflect the
transnational dissension triggered by the accord as well as the common anti
imperialist language used by the opposition. Where $andino seems to have
differed from his counterparts was in the alignment of his anti-imperialist rhetoric
to his actions. The leader’s willingness to act against the system, forfeiting self
preservation in the name of national honor— at a forked road in history— granted
him the sacred title of impending martyr.44
Moreover, Sandino contributed to the development of this image as hero
martyr by signing “Patria or Muerte” at the end of his letters and Manifestos and
enveloping bis rhetoric in moral overtones. Unlike Moncada and Diaz, Sandino
continuously stated that lie did flot seek personal advancement and developed a
self-sacrificing portrait; as one who demanded nothing less than the complete
retreat of American forces life for the good of the people: “No ambiciono nada,
‘ The first quote cornes from the Cornité Ejécutivo de la Federaciôn Obrera Nicaraguense to President
Coolidge, 3 June 1927, 817.00/4934; the second quote cornes frorn a motion passed by the Salvadoran
National Assembly, 19 May 1927, Caffery to Knox, 23 May 1927, 187.00/4893. Both quotes are cited from
Schroeder, p.58.
‘ Sandino’s motto, Patria or Muerte, may have been appropHated from Emiliano Zapata’s struggie a decade
earlier, Tierra o Muerte.
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sôlo la redencién de la clase obrera.”45 These moral implications distinguished his
group from the other factions whose armed violence was associated to the politïcal
ambitions of either party.46
This delineation became a central theme in the linguistic construction ofhis
mythic symbol as lie gradually came to represent Latin America’s aspirations in
hurnan shape. On March 4th 192$, El Repertorio Arnericano wrote: “Pero Sandino
era mets. Era la consciencia de su pueblo, el emblema de la libertad de América.”47
Two months later, it restated: “Augusto Sandino tiene la plena seguridad de que él
representa la conciencia de la América espafiola.”48 Sandino is constantly referred
to as the “only one”, the “exception”, producing a unique individuality loaded with
supernatural allusions: “En la bora suprema, vencido los unos por el engaflo y
seducidos los otros por halagaderas promesas sôlo Augusto Sandino no quiso
doblegarse y se dispuso a luchar por su patria.”49 Or, “En Nicaragua todos se ban
puesto de acuerdo, excepto e! irreconciable Sandino.”5° Sandino was divorced
from the common people through the linguistic embellishment of anti-imperialist
writers (including himself), establishing bis heroic status as event-maker on a
transnational level.
Paradoxically, Sandino had to struggle incessantly to maintain his image as
the ultimate leader ofthe Rebellion. Within the boundaries ofthe Segovian region,
the factions’ had difficulties communicating due to the presence of the Marine
Guardia and the mountainous quality of the land. This in tum gave bis army a
semi-autonomous quality characteristic of guerrilla warfare in general. Schroeder
explains that soldiers preferred their designated general-caudillo to the supposed
“hero”. Some generals even challenged Sandino’s headship by declaring
‘ Pensamiento Vivo, p. 52.
‘ See following section ofthis chapter for an explanation ofthe basic nature ofhis tenets.
47Repertorio Americano, June 2m1, 192$.
Ibid., Match 4th 1928.
Ibid., Februaiy 8th 1928.
50 Ibid., January 5111 192$.
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themselves as the prime leaders of the anti-imperialist cause.5’ For example, when
Sandino lefi for Mexico, Miguel Angel Ortez issued a proclamation on New
Year’s day alluding to tlie Defending Army as his own and praised Sandino witli
“no indication that he considered him subordinate to his chieftain”.52
Also, claslies between Sandino and his most popular general Pedrén,
further reinforce this point. Ex-Sandinistas Luisa Cano Arauz recounts: “Pedrôn
was not a very good friend of Sandino, they always walked separateiy, at a
distance... lie devised his own officiai seal bearing the inscription, “Pedro
Altamirano, General Libertador de la Patria”.53 Conversely, the mytliical rendition
of Sandino and Pedrôn’s relationsliip invokes a sense of unwavcring loyalty,
omitting any trace of tension between generals whereas liistorical data shows
otherwise. $ince many generals of “his” army self-proclairned exclusive authority,
it may be quite plausible that the mornentum produced by his initial lieroic act
helped presenre his status as the leading hcro ofNicaragua.
In short, $andino’s politicization of the San Albino miners deprivations,
combined to his act ofdefiance, i.e. its timing and embodirnent of Latin America’s
root paradigrn, distinguislied his version of the war. These factors delineated him
from tlie rest of tlie Liberal leaders and elevated him, in tlie perception of Latin
America anti-imperialists, as the personification of Hispanic American’s
revolutionary aspirations, thus bringing forth the emergence of tlie Sandino hero
myth.
II. The Guerilla Nature of the War
Another fundamental reason wliy Sandino evolved into a hero mytli stems
from the duration of tlie struggle. If his army had been cmshed within a week or a
‘ See Schroeder’s chapter 8, “Mapping War: An Anatomy ofRebellion, 1927-1934”.
52 For more instances of Sandino’s suppression ofother ambitions caudillos, see Macauley, p. 161 and
Schroeder, p. 368-375
Schroeder, p. 368-369, lES 03 7:3. Pedrôn Altamirano had the reputation ofbeing the most ruthless bandit as
well as the most dedicated to the cause.
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few months, the remembrance of this act may flot have been as effective as to take
center stage in the national narrative of Nicaragua’s history. The army’s survival
was primarily due to the guerilla nature of the war; it rendered the complete
breakdown of either side problematical. In turn, the consequences of guerrilla
warfare enabled Sandino’s side to endure for nearly six years— even though
statistics demonstrate that Sandino’s ejército won approximately one out of ten
battles.54
The rnilitary superiority of the Marine-Guardia fomented a series of
consequences that worked at once for and against their army. The United States’
superior technological advances, namely aircrafl and machine guns, prevented the
spread of the Rebellion by curtailing the formation of large guerrilla groupings.
Given its better stocks of material, it also developed a network of allies and spies.
The Marine-Guardia’s infiltration into the towns and villages of $egovias rendered
the moral intentions of Sandino’s Rebellion insignificant to the pcople directly
affected by the violence. To fight for or against Sandino meant persecution from
the opposite side. Consequently, the guerrilla war gradually weakened in power as
well as popularity due to the teclmological and economical advantages gained by
the opposing party. The rebels were oflen weaponless and starving, barely
scrapping enough to survive and consistently lacking in artillery. For these
reasons, armed support for Sandino neyer exceeded the boundaries of the
dispossessed and illiterate class ofthe Segovias.55
On the other hand, the presence of American airplanes loorning over the
land intensified many Nicaraguan’s hatred for the foreigners and caused the
decentralization of $andino’s army. Rebels dispersed afler every ambush, retumed
to civilian lives or retreating into the mountains. Consequently, Sandino rnanaged
See Schroeder’s compilations of 350 contacts betwecn Sandino and the Marine-Guardia. Statistics show that
Sandino won one out often batties against the MaHne-Guardia, p. 330-335.
Ibid., p. 237.
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to survive and cause substantial problems to his adversaries, forcing the American
government to invest time and money into training the Marine-Guardia for the
safeguarding of their economic interests. By 1933, the American government,
having created a supposedly non-partisan constabulary, extricated themselves from
the Rebellion due to growing criticism over their intervention— their goal of
wiping out the guerrilla dissent unaccomplished.
III. Charismafic Leadership and the Following
Along with the consequences of the guerrilla warfare tactics, the
conjunction between the charismatic leader and his subsequent followers was
another triggering factors leading to the creation of a hero myth. Max Weber
defines charisma as:
A certain quality of an individual personality by virtue which he is set apart from
ordinary men and treated as endowed with supematural, superhuman, or at least,
specifically exceptional powers and qualities. These are such as not accessible to
the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine ongin or as exemplary, and on
the basis ofthem the individual concerned is treated as a leader.56
Sandino’s charismatic legacy was transmitted through the writings of three
joumalists that visited his camp. Belaustigoigutia wrote:
Naturalmente, no estoy dispuesto a creer nada de esto; pero traigo a colacién para
dar a entender sencillamente que la reverencia de sus soldados era campo
dispuesto para dar un caricter fantastico y sobrenatural a sus general. Es decir,
que ha ilegado a inspirar una especie de fanatismo ciego a sus soldados.57
Carleton Beals, the first and only American joumalist, described a “blind loyalty”
and “fierce affection” for their leader: “Certainly Sandino’s domination over his
men did flot corne through his physical appearance; yet the lifi of his finger was
law with men knowing only lawlessness.”58
56 Max Weber, The Theo.’y ofSocial and Economic Organization, New York, Oxford University Press, 1947,
p. 35$-359.
Belaustiguigotia, p. 93.
58 Caneton Beals, Banana Gold, Philadeiphia and London, J.B. Lippincott Cornpany, 1932, p.272.
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From Beals’ interview, it is possible to infer that Sandino’s charismatic
aura was principally diffused through rumors and then, little by little, through
joumalistic writings such as in the Nation59:
The simple folk with whom we talked here were ail agoy over Sandino. He had
become ubiquitous. 11e had been seen here; he had been seen there. At night he
had gone stalking along a ridge, God of the universe. Later I found the same
mythology xvas believed everywhere I went in Nicaragua.... 11e had fired the
imagination of the humble people of Nicaragua. In every town, Sandino had his
Homer. He was of the constellation of Abdel Krim. Robin Hood, Villa, the
untamed outlaws who knew only daring and great deeds, imbued ever with the
tireless persistence to overcome insurmountable odds and confront successftilly
overwhelming power. His epos will grow- in Nicaragua, in Latin America, the
wide world over. for heroes grow ever more heroic with time.6°
His charisma worked on two levels. On one, it amassed followers whom without
warfare could flot have occuned; on the other, the recordings of his charisma, by
the mentioned authors, leaked out into the presses, further inspiring a worldwide
perception ofhis heroic aura.
This last quote indicates the principal factors leading to a charismatic
perception, mentioned by Wellner, which are 1) the assimilation of a leader to one
of more of the dominant myths of lis society and culture, 2) The performance of
what appears to be an extraordinary feat, 3) The projection of the possession of
qualities with an uncanny or powerful aura and finally, 4) an outstanding rhetorical
ability, which will now be discussed.
Sandino’s Rhetoric
To be perceived as a charismatic leader, a necessary factor, as it lias been
already noted in the first section of this chapter, is to possess a convincing, almost
hypnotic rhetoric. Although it is impossible to detect the exact traits that render
one’s discourse charismatic, it is nonetheless recognizable by the high amount of
attraction it receives. Wellner further explains that this type of discourse originates
from the combination of specific personality traits and the content of the message
Beals wrote four articles for the Nation that appeared on weekly basis from February 22nd until March 28t9
60 Beals, Banana Gold, p. 276-277.
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and thus, how the message itself is transmitted through the living medium. In fact,
the author explains that the source of charisma stems primarily the individual in
question. However, since studies on the physical attributes of charismatic leaders
remain debatable, it is necessary to reiy on the joumaiistic writings that have
established his charismatic leadership. Beals described: “lis utterance is
remarkably fluid, precise, evenly modulated; his enunciation is absolutely clear,
his voice rarely changes pitch, even when he is visibly intent upon the subject
matter.”6’ And as a consequence, concentrate on the message itseif, how and why
it affected Sandino’s followers.62
It has been well recognized that the ieader’s years in exile played a crucial
foie fl the development ofhis political doctrines.63 “Bendiga la hora que emigré a
un pais donde apagué mi sed de enseflayos, bebiendo en nuevas ideas, templé mi
espfrito acrisolândolo en el sentimiento de amor partriota.”64 As a breeding ground
for avant-garde ideas, post-revolutionary Mexico endowed Sandino with
revolutionary theories and philosophical concepts to spread back to Nicaragua. “Le
meneur a d’abord été hypnotisé par l’idée dont il est ensuite devenu l’apôtre.”65
from his first stay (1923), he acquired an interest in anarcho-syndicalisrn- a
variant of anarchism based on organized labor and the beiief in a general strike
that would paralyse the state and replace it with a governrnent of syndicates and
trade unions. Hodge states: “Sandino thought the “Constitutionalist Army” were
61Carleton Beals, 77,e Nation, March 281h, 1928.
62This theory stands in opposition to the psychological explanation of charisma. for the latter, the prime
precipitant of political charisma is the people who, in severe deprivation, endow the leader with supematural
powers. See Irvine Schiffer, Charisina: A Psychoanalytic Look at Mass Societv, Toronto, University of
Toronto Press, 1973, for more infonnation. Conversely, Wellner defends ber point by exposing the absence of
severe crisis’ in Cuba and India, where respectively, Castro and Ghandi emerged as charismatic leaders;
relative deprivation is conducive but flot necessary. Although this paper aligns with Wellner, severe
deprivation was in fact rampant in the case of Sandino, thus settling the theoretical dilemma for now.
63 Sec Donald C. Hodge’s Intellectual foundations ofthe Nicaraguan Revolution, University ofTexas Press,
Austin, 1986 fora thorough andjudicious explanation ofSandino’s experience in Mexico.
64 Pensa,niento Vivo, p. 20.
65 Le Bon, p. 67.
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about to make a revolution like the Mexicans that would be anti-oligarchie and
anti-imperialist.”66
The strong antï-clerical mood of the period also enticed a rejection of faith
in a personal God. As a substitute, Sandino believed in a predetermined destiny
chosen for each person by a supposediy conscious force behind ail natural and
human history. Zoroaster’s teachings, freemasonry and Joaquin Trincado’s
Magnetic-Spiritual school greatly influenced his religious and ideological
thinking.67 Hodge notes that these beliefs, although strange in our times, were
aligned with other leaders such as Emiliano Zapata and Pancho Villa: “The
absence of historical conditions for developing a theology of liberation within the
established churcli induced a religious substitute side it.”68 Jeffrey Klaiber’s study
The C’hurch, DictatorsÏitp ‘s and Democracy in Latin Arnerica (199$) further
explains this lcd to the rising of caudillos as spokespersons for the popular classes.
“Zapata, Raya de la Torre and Eva Perrôn ail used religious symbols to legitimize
themselves in the eyes of their followers.”69 Likewise, ail through the rebeliion
Sandino’s letters and manifestos were couched in a mystical rhetoric, serving to
discredit the prevailing political institution and provide much needed faith in the
hearts of the dispossessed: “Tengamos fe, Dios nos protege, porque hasta la fecha,
mi Ejército jarnâs ha sufrido una derrota, asi sostengalo Ud. ante e! mundo
civilizado. Fortalecido por mi creencia en e! ser Supremo.”7° A multifarious array
of beiief systems comrningled, namely Christianity and Theosophy, to elevate and
sanctify his political struggle.
66 Hodge, p. 7.
67 Trincado’s Los Cinco A mores argued that the recent discoveries associated with electricity laid bare ail the
mysteries ofthe natural word; his objective vas to promote the pursuit ofa spirituai iife based on the
brothcrhood ofman and a Hispanic world purified ofsin. As a member of the Magnetic-Spiritual Schooi of
the Universal Commune, the 49e’ cathedra was established in Nicaragua by Sandino. See Hodge p. 42.
681bid., p. 22.
69 Jefftey Kiaiber, The Chtirch, Dictatorships and Democracv in Latin Ainerica, New York, Orbis Books,
1998, p. 5.
70 Pensainiento Vivo, p. 66. Religious allusions pervade neariy every page of Sandino’s wTitings, the themes of
rcdemption and seif-sacri1ce iooming most large. See Navarro’s millenarian work on Sandino for a deeper
anaiysis ofreligious themes in Sandino’s speeches and manifestos.
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Jeffrey Gould notes that $andino enlaced himself in the prominent rhetoric
of indohispanisrnb, a discourse of mestïzaje that became widely accepted in Latin
American shortly afler it had become the officiai ideoiogy of post-revolutionary
Mexico. By September 192$, Sandino fully entrenched himself in his hybrid
identity, uniting Nicaragua’s ethnic groups against the U.S.: “Soy nicaragtense y
me siento orgulloso de que en mis venas circula mâs que todo, la sangre india que
por atavismo encierra el misterio de ser patriota, leal y sincero.”71 This language,
Gould contends, was elastic enough to include Spaniards and Indians: “It was so
by necessity, and any questioning of the primordial value of mestizaje threatened
the racial unity in the face of Anglo-Saxon imperialism.”72 It elevated him from
his counterparts, granting him the right to fight against the enemy: “el vinculo de
nacionalidad me da el derecho de asumir la responsabilidad de mis actos, sin
importarrne que los pesimistas y los cobardes me den cl titulo que a sus calidad
eunucos rnéts les acomode”.73
It is imperative to note that one of the most useful devices for the
construction and legitimization of a heroic perception is the metaphorical usage of
past heroes. Sandino writes: “Los hombres dignos de la América Latina...
debemos imitar a Bolivar, Hidalgo, San Martmn, y a los nifios mexicanos que cl 13
de septiembre de 1 $47 cayeron acribillados por las balas.”74 The leader as
ideologist used the past to promote his aims by juxtaposing heroically perceived
cultural myths to lis image and cause. In E! Flan de Realizaciôn ciel Supremo
Sueio de Boljvar (1929), Sandino carnes on the dream of Hispanoamerica unida
by blatantly aligning himself with the latter as “hijo de Bolivar”75. The universality
of this device is substantiated by its persistence in regards to Sandino heroic
trajectory as well as other hcro myths observed throughout this present study.
E! Repertorio Ainericcmo, Februaiy I 8h’, 1928.
72 Gould p. 157.
Pensamiento Vivo, p. 42.
74Jbid., p. 165.
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Another general tactic for the creation of a following is the creation of a
viable enemy: “Hatred of a common enemy is the most powerful known agency
for producing group unity.”76 In relevance to Sandino, there is no doubt that a deep
felt detestation toward American intervention was well-established before
Sandino’s involvement. Only, his presence served to accentuate this hatred by
aggiomerating ail of Nicaragua’s troubles under one source of evil. from a first
reading ofEl Fensarniento Vivo, Sandino’s hatred for U.$. imperialism stands out
beyond ah other matters. “La foule n’étant impressionnée que par des sentiments
excessifs, l’orateur qui veut la séduire doit abuser des affirmations violentes.
Exagérer, affirmer, répéter, et ne jamais tenter de rien démontrer par un
raisonement.”77 They are “jparasitos nocivos “, “coloso bârbaro ciel norte “,
‘piratas “, “cobardes “, “gallos “, ‘fellones” and perhaps the rnost wittily
acrimonious “bestias rubias “. These words permeate every pages of Sergio
Ramirez’s compilations, rendering the creation of the enemy perhaps the most
forceful rhetorical tool as well as the most ubiquitous in Sandino’s writings.
This hatred is only equaled by his extreme loathing for the quintessential
vende-patrias Moncada and Diaz: “Parece que el movirniento constitucionalista,
encabezado por Moncada, ha quedadao despachado, habiendo quedado el pueblo
victima de la imposiciôn yankee y de la irresolucién de sus principales cabezas.”78
In fact, at the early stage of Sandino’s campaign, his desire to defy the Espino
Negro Accord stemmed partly from a personal grudge toward Moncada. During
the Constitutional War, the latter had noticed that Sandino’s men wore “black and
red banners with crossed bones and a skuhl” and ordered him to get rid of them, for
fear that Americans would perceive this as a display of Bolshevism. Although
Sandino refused Moncada’s direct order, lie was forced to acquiesce. This
751b1d., p. 157. f irst published in E! Repertorio Ainericano in June, 1928.
76 Lyford P. Edward, The Natural Histon’ ofRevohition, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1927, p. 55, cited
in Gurr, p. 206.
Le Bon, p. 23.
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humiliation fueied a passionate rivalry affecting the politicai course ofNicaragua’s
history. Somoza notes that Sandino broke down in tears of rage.79 In fact, Augusto
César’s first Manifesto in 1927, read more like a public defiance toward Moncada:
“Aparte de esto, desaflo al proprio Moncada a que concrete otros cargos: no estoy
bajo las érdenes de ning1in jefe extranjero ni mucho menos militan conrnigo
personas de extrafia nacionalidad. Ud. no puede decir b rnismo”.80 The latter’s
name is invoked ten times within the two page-long Manifesto.
Where Sandino distinguished himseif from bis anti-irnperialist counterparts
was in bis graduai development into a millenarian figure. According to millenarian
theory, deflation serves to reinforce the leader’s sense of divinity. Navarro traces
$andino’s development from guerrilla leader to spiritual redeemer ofNicaragua by
focusing on his responses toward defeat, stemming primarily for his first
humiliation by Moncada and culminating with his rnaitreatrnent during bis second
visit to Mexico. He traveled there clandestinely in the hopes of receiving funds
from the Mexican govemment to pursue bis Rebellion but instead, Sandino was
forced into intemal exile at Mérida and accused by the Communists of stealing
money.81 During bis hapless sojoum, he entrenched hirnself deeply in theosophy
and began to believe that missionary spirits under the leadership ofAdam and Eve
were directing bis arrny. His struggle for national liberation gradually transformed
into a spiritual fight for the redemption of Nicaragua.82 The religious appeal of bis
doctrines represents an important reason enticing soldiers to volunteer in bis army.
78 Pensarniento Vivo, p. 32.
Anastasio G. Somoza’s E! Verdadero Sandino o e! Calvario de las Segovias, Managua, Tipografla Robelo,
1936, cited in Marco Navarro, p. 29.
80 Pensamiento Vivo, p. 47, Manifesto to Nicaragua Compatriots, circa JuIy 14, 1927.
81 In millenaHan theoiy, deflation serves to reinforce the Ieader’s divine calling. Moncada’s hurniliating
treatrnent of Sandino, which cause the latter to fali down and cry in tears of frustrations, represents the flrst of
Sandino’s many deflationary experiences that paved way to his developrnent into a fuII-fledged millenarian.
Until 1928, Moncada tvas consistently denounced in the rnajoHty of his writings.
82 Wellner, p. 61.
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The Following
Schroeder’s interviews with ex-Sandinistas of the Rebellion explain that
Sandino’s followers appropriated their leader’s words to mean something relating
to their regional conditions rather than his philosophical values:
Exploitation? Oh you mean thefi, working so hard and getting paid so littie.
Homeland? Oh, you mean our land, here, around us. The riches of Nicaragua? Oh,
you mean the tons of rock we dig daily out of that hill over there. The nation? Oh,
you mean us, here, the people—”the people are the nation”, as Sandino recalled
himself saying.83
Eudiviges Herrera Sues stated: “No, no, I didn’t know what la patria meant at the
time”, whereas Sabas Rodriguez Cantarero recalled: “I remember many words at
that time I barely understood, as I was a young man then, with little culture.”84
Gurr’s research supports Schroerder’s discovery by explaining that participants
usually do not fully understand their leader’s ideological thinking: “Subtleties of
justification articulated by revolutionary leaders penetrate to many of their
followers in a congeries of phrases, vague ideas, and symbols.”85 And so, though
meagre and mangled, overpowered and constantly overpowered by the marines,
the conjunction between the charismatic leader and his consequent following
played an important role in the validation and propagation of the hero’s cause.
What is more, it indirectly assisted in prompting the myth’s re-emergence and
regeneration for a pressing purpose of similar nature.
IV. Mythmakers: Latin American Anti-imperïalist Intellectuals and the
Media
It is now necessary to move outside of the reaims of Sandino’s sphere of
followers as well as the rest of the country’s weariness toward his cause to delve
into an analysis of his supranational aura. As a product of his age, Sandino’s
political views and philosophical beliefs were clearly inscribed in a wider semantic
83 Schroeder, p. 140.
84lnstituto de Estudio del Sandinismo (1986), p. 26, cited in Schroeder, p. 141.
85Gurr,p. 195.
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field produced by the social and political events throughout Latin America. The
hero myth’s proliferation throughout the region confirms Barilies’ elucidating
point: “A myth npens because it spreads. It lias a history— the unes, which limit
the social region where it is spoken.”86 Language along with geography thus plays
a determining role in the spread of heroic memories. Both factors granted
Sandino’s myth a place in the larger genealogical chain of heroism encompassing
Spanisli Latin America as a whole—even leading to the positive reception of bis
heroic endeavors worldwide.87
Neili Macaulay explains: “While Chinese communist guerillas were
winning their first victories over the troops of Chiang Kai-Shek, Sandino was
demonstrating tliat a “people’s army” could successfully resist the military forces
of a modem state power.”88 Macauley fiirtlier explains that anti-irnperialist troops
of the Kuoming-tong marched into Peking carrying a huge portrait of Sandino and
even named of their units afier him. In New York, anti-imperialist rallies collected
medical supplies to send to Sandino’s army. The World Congress of the
Cominterm, in Moscow, sent fratemal greetings to the workers and peasants of
Nicaragua, and the heroic army of national emancipation of General Sandino.89 In
other words, bis writings and deeds aligned with the anti-imperial intellectuals of
the time ever more than with his own following— as the latter appropriated his
words to mean something else.
Interestingly, historical time and mythical time do flot necessarily coincide
for $andino’s act did not reverberate througliout the isthmus instantaneously nor
did it travel consistently at the same intensity. Although Schroeder notes that most
86 Barthes, p. 20. This point is held by nurnerous social scientists, namely in the works of Benedict Anderson,
Inzagined (‘o7n,nunities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread ofNationalism, New York, Verso, 1 99 1;
Anthony D. Smith, Mvths and Me,nories ofthe Nation, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999, and David
Lowenthal, The Heritage 0-usade anci die Spoils ofHistorv, New York, Cambddge University Press, 1997.
87 This is not to say that the myth solely proliferated within the boundaHes of Hispanic AmeHea. As we have
already seen in chapter one, his hero image prospered in the United States, Europe and Asia as well.
88 Macaulcy p. 267.
89 Ibid., p. 115.
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of the myths were created within the first fine months, it is clear from this study’s
newspaper analysis that the media did not foresee the impact of his nationalistic
crusade right away.9° Legends and rumors only became known eight months into
the Rebellion— aimost a year later (1928). In fact, during the year ofhis heroic act
(1927), E! Repertorio Americano dedicated one article to lis cause whereas
approximateiy tweive were devoted to his revolutionary efforts in the foliowing
year.91 By the end of 1928, the United States demanded Central American
governments to censor ail pro-$andinista materiais from being pubiished.92 Also,
Sandino’s most important propagandist Honduran Froylân Turcios broke with him
in early January 1929. This spiit further impaired the gueriila leader’s cause by
ending the publication of Turcios’ anti-imperial editorial Ariel.93 Sandino’s
popularity only resurged afier his assassination in february 1934. In short, the hero
myth took popular flight in the early months of 1928, gradually faded out of the
media by the end early 1929 and then, shortly resurfaced afler his death.
Richard Salisbury expiains that Costa Rica’s newspaper Et Repertorio
Arnericano was the only Latin American newspaper unhampered by officiai
censorship, rendering it the prime source for the present analysis along with the
New York Times and the Nation. Regarding The New York Tirnes, the progression
of terms used to describe Sandino suggested the ever-growing influence of
Sandino’s leadership on United States’s interpretation of the Rebeliion. Sandino
° Schroeder, p. 256.The major battles ofthis period stili reside in the popular memory ofNicaragua’s
collective consciousncss: From May 1927 to Januaiy 1928, $andino minted coins, seized control ofthe wom
Et Jicaro and renamed it Sandino City. In early July, he attacked the Town ofOcotal and suffered heavy
casualties. The irnaginary hidden fortress “El Chipote” was consequently created as a protective base. Finally,
the rnost sacred myth stems from Moncada’s betrayal at Tipitapa: the signing ofthc Espino Negro Accord.
° After 1928, the number of articles on Sandino in E! Repertorio gradually diminished to approxirnately one
ortwoperyearfrom 1930to 1933.
92 See Richard V. Salisbuiy, Anti—Irnperialism ami International Competition in Central America, 1 920—] 929,
Wilmington Delaware, A Scholarly Resources Imprint, 1989. Anti-irnperialist cHticism was articulated
prirnarily at the “private and unofficial leveF’ hecause most Latin Amedcan govemments refiised to go on
record against U.S. policies, p. 99.
Aftcr Moncada was elected president in 1928, Sandino decided to continue his struggie by preparing a new
junta strategv to topple the Liberal govemment. He also proposed that Turcios be thejunta’s representative.
The latter did not agree with Sandino’s plans and so, afier sorne attempts (o negotiate with the caudillo,
Turcios offered his resignation as the chief s representative by the end ofDecember 1928. See Marco Navarro
for more details, p. 52-57.
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first entered the joumalistic scene on May l4, 1927 under the anonymous titie of
“chief dissident” in the heading: “Stimson Reports to the State Department that the
Liberais Accepted Term. Only One ChieJDissident. Dispatch $ays Moncada and
Eleven Generals Agree to Surrender Arms”.94 His defiance was mentioned but
disregarded until July of the same year—after Sandino seized and pillaged an
American Mine. This time, he was associated with Mexican “bandit” Pancho Villa
and perceived as “nothing but a common outlaw”.
Even so, the New York Times aptly documented anti-imperiai dissent to
provide diverse assessments of his struggie and took note of his rising popuiarity.
For example, one article reported the signing of a letter praising Sandino and his
followers for their bravery by 500 Guatemalan women: “Generai Sandino!
Victorious or defeated, you are great, you are a hero!... If you die tomorrow you
will be the symbol of the honor of Nicaragua, its soiemn silence will teach future
generations to defend national integrity.”95 In 192$, mentions of his abstemious
behavior made headway: “Sandino himselfdid not attend tthe celebration] because
lie does not drink according to the owner of a coffee plantation” and the marines’
failure to capture or defeat him provoked tacit sensationalism.96 He was gradualiy
depicted as “ever elusive”, “a maddening probiem for the marines”.97
Tlie stigma of bandity was gradually shed: “General Augusto César
Sandino, the Nicaraguan who is troubling Marines, has been termed rebel, bandit,
patriot, but tlie Marine Corps have officially dubbed him gueriila.”98 He was
increasingly depicted as an insurgent chief— sometimes winning batties and other
times losing them. On the whole, the New York Times’ representation offered the
most objective rendition of Sandino—one that (like ail the other writings about lis
leadership and cause) set him apart as a challenging problem to be reckoned with.
Neiv York Times, May 1927.
Ibid., February 14th 1928
96 Ibid., Februaiy 22nd 1928.
97Ibid., March 22, 1928.
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On the other hand, Repertorio Americano feigned no allusion to
joumalistic objectivity for its fundamental aspiration was to promote and diffuse
the intellectual tradition of Latin America as well as educate the concepts of
prominent philosophers and writers throughout the hemisphere. Maria Salvadora
Ortiz writes that the paper offered “especia de encuentro que trasciende las
distancias y nos permite reconocer, dentro de cualquier grado de diversidad, los
rasgos de un conjunto compartidos de problemas... para construir una conciencia
histôria latinoarnericana”.99 Clearly the historical conscience promoted in Et
Repertorio corresponded to the moral and intellectual objectives of its editors. The
paper constructed a utopian version of Spanish America’s cultural past by
glorifying ah its heroes and abnegating its villains.
Froylân Turcios and José Marittégui editorials, respectïvely ArieÏ and
Amauta, essentially performed the same political act of glorification. As Sandino’s
first propagandist, Turcios’s ardent distaste of American imperialism lcd his
penmanship to $andino’s cause. Marco Navarro states: “His propagandizing work
was so effective that Sandino became famous around the world and many wished
to be associated with lis narne.”0° He was named “Sandino’s official
representative of Latin America” for the diligent propaganda he propelled
throughout Latin America, the United States and Europe through Ariet and
consistently portrayed the latter as “el héroe de la raza”:
La hazafia de Sandino es bâsica, substancial y trascendete, de significacién
generosa, de resultados eficaces y constructivos. Es una formidable pureza de viril
perseverancia y de abdnegado sacrificio por su patria y por su raza, sin ningiin fin
de vanidad utiliaria; un estfmulo fecundo, un esfuerzo sobrehumano que abrirâ
nuevas rutas al espiritu en su continua ascensién hacia los ideales etemos.101
98]bid., March3td, 1928.
Maria Salvadora Ortiz, La Utopia en E! Repertorio Americano, San José, C.R., Ediciones Guayac!in, 1995,
p. 6.
100 Navarro, p. 53.
A rie!, May 1928, cited from fi Sandinismo, Doctimentos &isicos. Managua, Editorial Nueva Nicaragua,
1984, p. 220.
51
Again, Sandino is distinguished from the ordinary; he is the ideal man, purged of
the any reprehensibie traits of vanity and egocentricity.
Consequentiy, mythmaking propagandists passed on similar messages,
nameiy Haya de la Torre, Gabriela Mistral, José Vasconcelos, Max Griilo and
Henri Barbusse. In essence, each of these individuais possessed the same politicai
convictions as Sandino. Like Turcios, their writings incorporated the basic topicai
elements aiready established: assimilation to past figures, delineation from rivais
through specific wordings, protestation against imperialism and glorification ofthe
indohispanic race.
Sandino! Bolivar! Cuauntemoc
Grita mi grita,
Com mis dos manos infinitas
como un clarin en la garganta de mi vida
Tu vida es la piedra de David, tu honda tiene el calor de veinte patrias,
Pero Goliath es fuerte,
Capitin,
Entretiene dôlares, e! hombre de la muerte’°2
In the same vein, Gabriela Mistral wrote: “Sin esperanza alguna de que él venza,
por un destino de David hondero, que ya no aparece, con la esperanza unicamente
de que alarge b màs posible la resistencia y postergue la entrega del territorio
rebelde, a fin de que se vea hasta dônde llega la crueldad norteamericana, hija de la
lujuria de poseer.”°3 The Christian myth of David, recurring throughout the
decades, enveiops forthcoming heroes in similar mythic narration.’04
Sandino’s death by assassination served as one of the most influential
factors in the survival and proliferation of the hero myth. The New York Tirnes
referrcd to him as “leader of lost causes”. Vasconcelos wrote: “Sin duda el mayor
102 E! Repertorio A,nericano, September l71, 1929. The poem vas written by Alberto Guillén.
103 Gabriela Mistral, Esctitos Politicos, Se!ecciôn, Prôlogo y notas de Jaime Ouezada, México, Tierra Firme,
1994, p. 231. This excerpt stems from an article first published in Ariel, March, 1928.
104 ChHstian symbolism becomes more pronounced with the aUvent ofChristian Liberation movemdnt, see
chapter four ofthis these for a detai]ed analysis.
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héroe de los tiempo que corren!”°5 Farabundo Marti’s last words, before his own
assassination, were reprinted to discharge Sandino of false allegations:
Doy testimonio ahora de la entereza moral, de la pureza absoluta del general
Sandino. Me consta que en México recibié ofertas repitidas de considerables
sumas de dinero, con tal que abandonase la lucha en las Segovias, y que las
ofertas fueron rechazadas por el general con la ms noble indignacién.. Tengo
interés en que se aclaren estos puntos para establecer la verdad histérica. Y ya
para morir, a dos pasos de la ejecucién, declaro solemnemente que el general
Sandino es el primer gran patriota del mundo.’°6
Death by assassination cleared him of any lingering accusations. This point is
further reinforced by the contrast between two articles by Juan del Camino,
respectively published in february 1933 and 1934. Afler Sandino signed the peace
treaty, Camino wrote in El Repertorio: “Nadie pensé que quien proclamada con
tanto varonilidad e! amor y libertad tenia muy cercano el término de su capacidad
para empresa de tanta magnitud” whereas two years later, lie depicted Sandino as
“la esencia misma de América Latina”.107 Ris death rendered his image as a hero
more believable, flot to mention less threatening, and provided future generations
with the inspiration needed for the continuation ofthe anti-imperialist struggle.
It is clear that Sandino’s supporters wrote in an anti-imperialist mindset,
neglecting the bad at the expense of historical precision for the promotion of
author’s political aims and ideals. The veil of objectivity was transparent if not
invisible and the portrait of Sandino, unabashedly saintly. Theïr renditions
revolved around the diametrical opposition between $andino’s righteousness and
the American’s downright wickedness; the latter are portrayed as “baby killers”
whereas his Sandino’s anny is pure and blameless. Belausteguigotia even drew
parallels between Nicaragua’s Indians and Spain’s Basques to promote the
revolutionary efforts within his own homeland.
105 Repertorio Arnericano, Februaiy 23w, 1 934.
106 Sandino and Marti spit during their sojourn in Mexico. Most historians believe the rift sternmed from their
differing political views. As a staunch comrnunist, the latter tbund Sandino’s shifting ideological stances, flot
to mention his mystical propensities, unacceptable and left the cause in 1929.
‘°7See, Juan dcl Camino’s article in El Repertorio, respectivc]y, February 1933 and February 1935.
lnterestingly, the former was the only found featuring Sandino that year.
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What is more, Sandino’s faults are touched upon in passing. $alvatierra
mentioned his unswayable stubbom nature but quickly defended it with allusions
to his supreme wisdom. Joumalist Rarnôn de Belaustiguigotia referred to bis
eclectic blend of spiritualism with a subtle tinge of mockery yet overrode it with
endless pages of heroic glorification. Beals admitted to Sandino’s tendency to
exaggerate bis successes but in spite of that, insisted on propagating an impeccable
image of the hero: “Fie is a man utterly without vices, with an unequivocal sense
of justice, or keen eye for the welfare of the humblest soldier.”108 These spotless
renditions were carried over into the second generation of anti-irnperialist writers
as anecdotes from the mentioned authors resurfaced throughout the times.’°9 They
will be examined in the next chapters to reinforce the unchanging nature of the
hero myth’s essential trait. Also, they vi1l be set beneath the background of the
changing socio-political context to better understand the people’s changing
perception ofthe myth as well as the myth’s shifting functions.
Conclusion
This chapter bas attempted to explain the interrelation of the major
determining factors that led to the ernergence of Sandino as a hero and
consequently, the dissemination of the hero myth that ensued. Despite the fact that
Sandino had to ding to his title as leader, that bis soldiers lost most oftheir batties,
and that deserters were ample due to the human and material losses the war
brought about, Sandino’s initial deed touched a cord in Latin America’s
revolutionary and anti-imperialist consciousness. In tum, the historical figure was
gradually transformed into a hero myth for indeed having made manifest a heroic
108 Beals, p. 265. The Arnerican joumalist tvas the only American joumalist to reach Sandino. The Nation sent
him; four consecutive articles were puNished on a weekly basis, each one defending Sandino’s cause and
condemning U.S. foreign policies.
109 For instance, bis temperance. even noted in The Nen’ York Ti,nes i.e., he does not drink but pray, while the
peasants celebrate the laiest victoly by the guerrilla aniy, persists throughout following works. Another
distinguishable re-occurring rurnor repeated throughout Sandino’s biographical works is Sandino’s unyielding
mercilessness for rapists. Any man convicted, despite bis revolutionary sacrifices, tvas sentenced to death
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act at a crucial moment in time. An analysis of the mythic data exposes general
characteristics and linguistic forms associated with the creation of a hero: the
insistence of his uniqueness, his supematural qualities as well as the metaphoric
usage of past heroes helped construct a heroic image. These linguistic devices, like
the central themes of the hero myth, reoccur in the succeeding renditions of the
hero myth.
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CUAPTER 3:
The Hero Myth in Somnolence:
Somoza’s Institutionalization of the Anti-hero Sandino Myth
If the travels of Sandino’s hero myth were studied within the first decade
foïlowing his assassination, social scientists would have emphasized the contrast
between its wide —albeit waning— popularity outside of Nicaragua versus its ah
but total silencing from within the nation. Changes in the social and political
conjuncture, particularly in relation to the United States’ shifi in foreign policy,
considerably affected Nicaragua’s political regime. More specifically, the Good
Neighbor policy, based on non-intervention and consultation with Latin American
countries, paved the way to Anastasio $omoza’s 19 year- long dictatorship. This
chapter analyses the political conjunctures that made possible $omoza’s dictatorial
ascent and as a result, his ideological influence on the construction of the nation’s
popular memory— one that depicted Sandino in diametrical opposition to the hero
myth presented in the previous chapter.
Social and Polïtical Context
The Marines’ failure to defeat Sandino’s forces, beneath the backdrop of
the deteriorating world situation and the Great Depression, provoked increasing
criticism in the United States, which the State department and the Rooseveit
Administration had trouble explaining and justifying. Gordon Connell-Smith
affirms that “Nicaragua was, in fact, a tuming point in the history of inter
American relations, for it brought the first attempts by the United States to rethink
the intervention issue.”1 Millet notes that the Americans’ original concept of
creating a supposedly non-partisan army that would dissuade political violence and
Gordon Connell-Srnith, The Inter-A merican Systenz, London, New York, Oxford University Press, 1966, p.
76.
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thus ensure stability within the area failed to take into account Nicaragua’s social
and political temperament: “Any attempt to create an honest, nonpolitical military
force without changing the nation’s basic social and economic situation was
probably impossible. Nicaragua suffered from econornic underdeveiopment,
concentration of wealth, mass iiiiteracy, strong regionalism, and weak
nationalism.”2 As the war against Sandino lagged on without avail, the United
States attempted to rectiBy its mistakes by calling for an end to U.S. interference in
the internai affairs of nations through a more cooperative approach to the Monroe
Doctrine. Consequently, the U.$ puiled out their soldiers by January 1933, leaving
the government in the hands of Juan Sacasa and the latter, at the mercy of the
supposedly non-partisan National Guardia and its rnthless General Anastasio
Debayle Somoza.
AÏthough this tactic quenched anti-Arnerican sentiment in some Latin
American countries, it served to satiate Somoza’s desire for power by preventing
U.S. involvement at a time when Nicaraguans might weil have welcomed it. Once
the presence of the Guardia overlapped with the Good Neighbor policy, it
functioned to channel already concentrated wealth into the hands of one man’s
family. As the general of the most powerfui and well-equipped army the nation
had ever known, Somoza used his authority to transform the supposedly non-
partisan armed forces into bis personal army, toppling Sacasa’s govemment and
remaining in power for 19 years.
Somoza’s successful takeover of power stemmed prirnarily from three
main strategies weii explained by historian Thomas Walker as “to maintain the
support of the Guardia, cultivate the Americans and co-opt important power
contenders”.3 In relation to bis soldiers, Somoza reinforced the army’s
collaboration by granting them the long hoped for order to kiil Sandino. Although
2MilIct,p. 183.
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he knew this command would tamish his image in the outside world, it won him
the respect of soldiers that harbored intense hatred toward the guerilla leader. This
was foÏiowed by a mop-up operation that slaughtered over 300 of Sandino’s
followers—women and chiidren included—at a camp in Wiwiii. Furthermore,
Somoza transformed the Guardia into his personai arrny by isolating them from
civilian population, encouraging exploitation and corruption and guaranteeing
them total irnrnunity. One of his tactics to keep opponents off the street was to
stage a riot in a town or city, then move in with the Guardia under the pretext of
establishing peace and order, placing the local government under military control.4
Walker notes that “citizens soon leamed that in order to engage in any of a variety
of activities—legal or flot— it was necessary to pay bribes or kickbacks to guard
offices or soldiers”.5 By 1938, Somoza increased their salary from 50% for
privates to 30% for higher officers.6
To stave off politicai contenders, the president generaiiy bought off
Conservative nominees. When his term came to an end in 1944, he ratified the
Constitution to be able to run again. When this second term came to its close, he
reluctantly allowed Liberals to norninate his rival, Dr. Leonardo Argiiello, only to
conduct a coup against him afier he was elected president. Eventually, the latter
took refuge in Mexico and the puppet Congress accused Argiiello of attempting to
mie as dictator by endeavoring to dissolve the Guardia. A provisional president
took Argtello’s place until Somoza replaced him with none other than himself.7
In the reaims of foreign affairs, the General’s rule of thumb was to ingratiate
himself to the United States by consistently backing ail of its foreign policies, be it
toward the Axis powers or communism. In fact, the United States built military
Walker, p. 26.
‘ See Eduardo Crawley, Dictators Neyer Die: A Portrait ofNicaragua and the Somoza Dt’nasty, New York,
St-Martin’s Press, 1979, for more details on Somoza’s military strategies.
5lbid.,p.26.
6 Millet, p. 192.
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bases in Nicaragua during the Second World War and used the country as a
training area for the CIA-organized counterrevolution in Guatemala, against
Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. Despite accusations toward consciously permitting the
surfacing of oppressive regimes, namely in Nicaragua, Cuba and the Dominican
Republic, the Good Neighbor policy benefitted from Somoza’s unremitting
support of U.S. efforts of building up security in the isthmus. In other words, the
political and social changes induced another fork in Nicaragua’s road, this time
conducive to the successful emergence of a dictator and on a mythical level, the
embodiment ofthe nation’s anti-hero.
$omoza’s control of the oppressive and ideological apparatus brought forth
the centralization of the political regime, deflecting violence and consequently,
stomping out the initial attempts of the hero myth’s re-emergence as a symbol of
dissent. A few cases illustrate this point: In 1937, Pedrôn continued his rebellious
activities by ransacking a coffee plantation and briefly seizing the small town of
Palpunta on the Coco River. The Guardia managed to have him killed by tricking
him into spending the night with a prostitute, an informant of the army. Millet
explains that the elirnination of Pedrôn meant that there was virtually no active
fighting in the nation.8 Afier the Arge1lo fiasco, opposition parties refusing to
cooperate with Somoza lcd to a plot by Emiliano Charnorro to overthrow the
government. The plans were discovered; Chamorro lefi for Mexico under the
protection of the American Embassy and hundreds of other leaders were arrested
“in an impressive show of Somoza’s strength”.9 Another event occurred in the
summer of 1944 when, owing to the momentum built up by the fali of the
dictatorships in El Salvador and Guatemala, students and opposition groups
Once in power, the new]y eleeted presidcnt tHed to curb Somoza’s power by tiying to force him to resign as
Generai ofthe Guardia.
Millet, p. loi.
Ibid., p. 211
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peacefully demonstrated in the streets of Managua against $omoza’s regime.’° To
suppress the movement, the President closed down the National University and
tried in vain to enlist American support by announcing a parade in honor the
United States to be staged on the 4th of July. A few days later, Somoza’s opponents
attempted to launch a general strike but were countered by an order “announcing
that any establishment that closed its doors would be seized, have its goods sold,
and be denied the right again to engage in business”.’1
0f more direct relevance to the present study, the dernonstration coincided
with the re-ernergence of the myth as a symbol of dissent, or in Sorel’s terms, as a
forceful activator ofbeliefs serving to mobilize the masse against the miing class.
Enrique Navarro explains: “A exactos diez afios y medio del asesinato del General
Sandino, correspondiô a esto movimiento estudiantil revindicar la figura del héroe
de las Segovias publicando en su ôrgano de prensa Et Universitario y por primera
vez, sus fotografias hasta entonces.”2 Growing dissent toward the regime
triggered the revitalization of the past for ideological (future-oriented) goals. From
the forties onward, prominent Nicaraguan figures such as Pedro Joaqufn Chamorro
and poet Ernesto Cardenal popuÏarized Sandino’s histoiy by means of their
penmanship, respectively through the newspaper La Prensa and a collection of
poems entitled Hora Cero.’3 At this stage of the myth’s history, its pressing yet
feeble resurfacing reflected the impact of the Guardia’s ability to crush dissent as
well as the persistent quality of the hero rnyth’s nature
Mythmaker and Speech: Anastasio Somoza and the Anti-Hero Myth of
Sandîno
From 1937 until 1959, the major and almost undisputed ideologue of the
nation was none other than Somoza himself. As the one who ordered Sandino’s
Also, the Partido Liberal Judependiente vas forrned 10 protest the dictator’s imminent re-election
‘ Millet, p. 201. Also any foreigner caught striking would be subject to deportation.
12 Navarro, p. 63
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death, it is quite obvious that he had no use of the hero myth. As a matter of fact,
he quickly overtumed the tale on the year of his coup (1937) by publishing his
own rendition of the Rebellion in a 500 page work entitled Et Verdadero Sandino
o E! CaÏvario de las Segovias. Here, the storyline is reversed; Americans and the
Guardias are portrayed as righteous defenders of Nicaragua whereas the
Sandinistas are depicted as the embodiment of ail that is evii. To name just one
example, Sandino’s well-lmown proclamation “No ambiciono nada, sôlo la
redenciôn de la clase obrera” vas countered by incorporating a newspaper excerpt
from La Noticia:
Se estâ haciendo mucho bombo, interesado o desinteresado al “desinterés” de
Augusto Sandino. Se dice y se repite que NO PIDE NADA PARA EL, sino para
LA PATRIA. Asi debiera ser. Pero no es asi. Y la idea falsa, diseminada, coloca
al Gobiemo en una posiciôn falsa. Si el Gobiemo tuviera verdaderos elementos
que velasen por é!, ya se habrian apresurado a exponer la verdad para que el
pûbiico no se extraviara. La verdad es que, SI SANUINO NO PDE NADA PAR
EL en concepto de dinero idea rechaza en cambio si, hay de su parte otras
exigencias, por medio de las cuales, el Gobiemo de Nicaragua pagarâ la paz con
Sandino, al precio de compromisos, con carâcter de imposicién)4
Somoza’s book sought to expose Sandino as a ruthiess leader, concealing his
ambitious motives ofbecoming president by means of bis seif-righteous rhetoric.
The monograph conveyed a sense of authenticity through a manipulation of
historical data and forcefully repetitive style of writing. Schroeder explains: “The
book is essentially a compendium of carefully selected and ofien deceptively
edited captured Sandinista correspondence, interspersed with a text which paints
Sandino and his followers unambiguously as crazed killers, rapists, thieves and
cuttbroats.”5 This fallacious sense of accuracy is communicated through the
insertion of countless pictures of Sandino’s alleged victims taken during funeral
13 See La fatria de Pedro: E! Pensainiento nicaragiiense de Pedro ]oaqtiin Chamorto, 2” cd.. Managua,
1981 and Emesto Cardenal, La Hora O, Montevideo, Aqui Poesia, 1966.
14 Anastasio Garcia.Sornoza, E! Verdadero Sanclino o e! C’alvario de las Sega vias. Managua, Tipografia
Robelo, 1936, p. 435.This excerpt dates from January 27t1,, 1933, during the peace talks between the Sacasa’s
governrnent and Sandino.
15 Schrocder, p. 499.
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processions. Every photo is accompanied by a short elegiac biography such as the
foliowing:
Presentamos al lector la fotografia del joven Hemn Espinosa, honrado y
apreciable ciudadano quien en momentos en que se hablaba de paz era decapitado
por un grupo de Sandinistas, en las cercanias del pueble Esquipulas,
Departamento de Matagalpa, terminando con la existencia de un hombre, que
apenas contaba con 23 aflos.’6
Photostats of Sandino’s correspondences, most inciuding the signature of the
Defending Army’s officiai stamp, i.e. a Sandinista about to slash off the head of
his enemy with a machete, are combined with photographs of supposed victims
serve to remind the reader of the work’s historical authenticity.
Interestingiy, $chroeder’s research of lES testimonies and records of the
Marine-Guardia aptly prove that mucli of Sornoza’s anti-heroic myth was indeed
based on facts. Since the National liberation rebellion emerged out of regional and
national strife, it was also inherently a civil war. Therefore, both groups resorted to
tactics of war characteristic of local traditionai violence.’7 At one side, the
Sandinistas demanded peopie to contribute to their cause, on the other, the Guardia
insisted that no food be provided. Since Sandino’s anny was weaker in size, it
needed the support of the Segovian populace in order to survive and consequently,
iegitimated its demands under the banner of a “Free Nicaragua”. If someone
refused to comply with the Sandinista orders, severe punishrnent incurred, as
Pedro Altamirano’s standard letter to property owners exemplifies:
If you do not help the cause which we defend, you will be obiiged to abandon
your property as you will de deciared an enemy of the Army, in which case you
will lose ail guarantees for yourself and your family and will be subjected to
whatever punislirnent from us that you ment as a traitor to your country... Ail
orders which this Headquarters issues which are not complied with obligate me to
have them complied with by blood and tire.... Think carefully and well, because
if you do not feel inclined to help us, only God will keep you and your family
from falling into my hands and your properties from being left in ashes.18
16 Somoza, p. 428.
See Schroeder, chapter five “b Induce a Sense ofTerror”: The language and practice ofpolitics in the
Segovias after the Civil War; and, “Horse Thieves ta Rebels to Dogs, Political Gang Violence and the State of
Western Segovias, Nicaragua in the lime of Sandino, 1926-1934”, Journal ofLatin Ainerican Studies 28 (2)
p. 383-434.
18 Rcprinted in J.C. Smith, et al., p.250, cited in Schroeder, p. 486.
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Punishment usually meant the buming of one’s properties and/or death by torture,
with ample evidence substantiating this point. Lieutenant W. Davies reported: “On
the moming of the 18th, a body of a native was brought in to Jicaro who had been
murdered by the bandits... the body had been badly mutilated with machetes and
apparently the man had been tortured before his death.”9 Sandino justified his
army’s violent practices himself, in one ofhis well-known aphorisms: “Liberty is
not won with flowers but with bullets, and for this reason we have been impelled
to use the cortes de chaleco, de cumbo y de blumers.”2° The “chaleco” referred to
a eut to the waist from the body, the “cumbo” was one on the top of the head
exposing the brain and the “blumers” referred siashes of both hands and legs,
leaving the victim to bleed to death. Both factions blamed each other for having
instigated these torture tactics; Somoza wrote:
El fatal “Corte de Chaleco”, inventado por Pedrôn, y del que muchas veces se
hablarâ en esta obra, habfa encontrado un hermano espeluznante en “Corte de
Cumbo”, invencién de los Centeno, familia sandinista del Calle de Namanji, de
Dpto. De Matagalpa, quienes b ensayaron en la persona del Sr. Estanislao
Altamirano.. 21
Consequently, many campesinos joined the Rebellion or the Guardia by necessity,
to protect themselves against violent retributions ofthe opposing side.
Since the war was essentially limited to the region of the Segovias, most
newspapers of the major cities portrayed Sandino and his followers as ruthless
bandits. One quote suffices to embody the major themes ofthe anti-heroic version:
Sandino is flot a patriot but a bandit... his so-called “Movement for the Defense of
the National Sovereignty” is not only dedicated to expelling the Mannes, but has
attacked, sacked, and bumed towns and killed their inhabitants, rnost of them
Nicaraguans.22
19 Patrol Report, W. Davies, Jicaro, 23 September 1930, NA 127/202/10, cited in Schrocdet p. 507.
This is surnrnarized in Sornoza, p. 279-280. Sometirnes, the “traitor’s” penis tvas cut and placed in the
rnouths oftheir victims as they bled to death.
2! Somoza, p. 153.
22E/ Centroamericano, June 21st 1931, cited in Schroeder, p. 486.
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Somoza’s depiction of Sandino as a bandit resonated harmoniously with the social
perception of the majority of Nicaraguans. In the Barthesian sense, the anti-hero
myth served to legitimize president’s image and regime.
In contrast to the hero rnyth, which more ofien than not centered on the
hero myth alone, many of the anti-heroic quotes time and again lined Sandino up
to his followers. He was not divorced from his band but linguistically placed side
by side it: “The days of Sandino and his so-called Rebellion are among the darkest
in ail of Nicaraguan history.”23 This alignrnent could be read as a device aimed at
diminishing him, rendering the perception of his leadership ordinary rather than
supematural. Another recurring attribute ofthe anti-heroïc myth was the rejection
of the pequeiio ejército as a product of Nicaragua: “The so-called Generai Sandino
is foliowed by a bunch of bandits, most of them Honduran half-wits whose only
real activity has been to protect the profits of their banditry.”24 The presentation of
Sandino’s aniiy as foreign likely served to undermine the noble perception of this
cause.
Mythmakers and Speech: The Persistence of the Sandino Hero Myth through
Poetry
from 1937 until 1960, poets becarne the prime carriers of the hero myth,
the sporadic appearance of their elegiac poems serving as dirges to Latin American
revoiutionary heroes rather than a political weapon for social mobilization. Pierre
Vayssière explains that national literature began to develop between 1940-1946
with approximately a dozen or so works dedicated to the subject ofthe Sandino’s
struggie against U.S. intervention.25 Most notably, Ernesto Cardenal’s revivified
the hero myth through a poetic re-interpretation of the legends surrounding the
history of the Rebellion in his collection of poems Hora Cero. Key events, namely
the Tipitapa Agreement, $andino’s decision to fight against the U.S. and of course,
23 Interview by Schroeder with Dr. Ernilio Gutiérrez, Ocotal, October 1990, p. 486.
24 GN-2 Note No. I of 5 February 1929, Mjr. Bleasedale GN, NA 127/209/1 and 2, cited in Schroeder, p. 498
25 Sec Paul Vayssière, Augusto César $andino:ou t ‘envers d’un mythe, Toulouse, Centre National de
Recherches Scientifiques, 1985, p. 222-226.
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his assassination, are retold in an elegiac and poetic tone. Cardenal depicted
Sandino’s ejercitô as a utopic brotherhood ofrnen: “El abrazo es el saludo de todos
nosotros/ y nadie ha abrazado como él”.26 Also, bis followers are glorified for their
willingness to sacrifice themselves for the sake of the nation:
Un ejército descaizo o con caites y casi sin armas que no tenia ni disciplina ni
desorden y donde ni los jefes ni la tropa ganaban paga pero no se obligaban a
pelear a nadie y tenianjerquia militar pero todos cran iguales.27
Moreover, the poem endows Moncada and Somoza with their own speech; the
latter’s subservience to the United States is conveyed tbrough bis English
discourse: “I did it” dijo después $omozal I did it, for the good of Nicaragua”.28
Although this protest literature did flot affect Sornoza’s regime directly, the
retrieval and diffusion of Sandino’s historical influence granted future insurgents
with an inspirational myth, or in Gurr’s terminology “normative justification” for
political violence in their upcoming mission.
And so, Cardenal’s poem suggests that the hero myth diffused anti-$omoza
writers of the forties did not alter much ftom those that emerged during the years
of the rebellion. Historical facts, such as his troops well-known criminality, were
impoverished for a mythic version of the past. Since the revolution, “Liberty is flot
won with flowers but with bullets” has been ingrained in Nicaragua’s national
rnernory, while the other half of the clause has fittingly been omitted—
exemplifying the selective use of data for the construction of a hero myth. In the
Barthesian sense, the historical facts, i.e. literal meaning, were weakened and
overshadowed by the purported imminence of the hero and an idealized version of
the past.
26 Ernesto Cardenal, La [Jota O, Montevideo, Aqui Poesia, 1966, p. 17.
27Ibid., p. 16-17.
28 Ibid., p24.
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The Death of Anastasïo, the Birth of the Hero
In 1956, the growing illegitimacy of the dictator’s image culminated with
the assassination of the dictator by a young poet named Rigoberto Lôpez. The
latter infiltrated a ceremony held in honor of Anastasio Somoza and shot five
bullets into his chest. Lôpez was then shot and killed instantaneously by the
former’s bodyguards. In a letter to his mother, he explained: “What I have done is
a duty that any Nicaraguan who truly loves his county should have done a long
time ago.”29 Sixteen years later, Carlos Fonseca hailed him as “the legitimate son
of Sandino”. following the revolution, his picture was erected alongside $andino’s
and Fonseca’s during national celebrations.3° His martyrdom re-sparked the
national revolutionary flame, granting him a place next to past heroes in the
genealogical tree of anti-imperialist Nicaraguan martyrs.
However, Somoza’s passing did not produce the vacuum of power
anticipated: “The personalist ruler’s removal by death, incapacity or even
retirement does flot necessarily open the way for a transition to democracy.”31 He
had taken steps to assure the transition of mie to his sons, Anastasio and Luis. The
latter was constitutionally made president following his father’s assassination
whereas Anastasio had been made leader of the National Guard in 1 95532
Furthermore, Luis rounded up hundreds of students suspected of conspiring
against the govemirient, notably future $andinista leader Tomts Borge, and
imprisoned some ofthem for up to several years.
29 Rigoberto Lôpez Pérez as quote in Mayo Antonio Simchez, Nicaragua Ao Ccm, México, Editorial Diana,
1979, P. 96, cited from Walker, p. 28. Somoza was campaigning for election to a fourth terni ofprcsidcncy.
30
‘Notes on the Testimonial Letter of Rigoberto Lôpez Pérez’, in Obras, vol, 1, Bajo de la bandera de!
Sandinismo, Editorial Nueva Nicaragua, 1982, p. 396, cited from Zimmerniann, p. 43.
31 Paul Brooker, Non-Democractic Reginies: Theoiy, Govenunent, and Politics, New York, St-Martin’s Press,
2000, p. 189.
32 Both Sons were educated in the United States. Luis tvas a graduate ofLouisiana State University and was
President ofthe Nicaraguan Congress al the time of the assassination. Anastasio Jr. graduated from West Point
and vas Acting Director of the Guard and the Commander ofthe Nicaraguan Air Force.
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Conclusion
Although Somoza’s counter-myth of Sandino significantly stifled the
propagation of the hero myth, it neyer managed to eradicate it entirely. The advent
of opposition parties and the dissent of students in the streets of Managua (1944)
officially brought forth its resurrection as well as its mobilizing function. The
escalating discontent of the middle classes— throughout the post war era— set in
motion the formation ofcrosscutting alliances in the common aim ofoverthrowing
Somoza’s dictatorship. Consequently from the late fiflies and onward, political
education played a crucial function in the mobilization of the masses against the
authoritarian regirne. A new generation of revolutionaries appropriated the hero
rnyth for a pressing purpose of similar nature— one group in particular named
itself the Frente Sandinista de Liberacién Nacional. Their recuperation of the myth
is discussed in the following chapter.
67
CHAPTER 4
Recuperation of the Hero Myth in Times of Social Conftict
“The tirne had corne to take ztp again the rifles oJ$andino.
This chapter seeks to relate the major determining causes that brought forth
the re-emergence of Sandino’s liero rnyth and subsequently, comprehend how the
social and political moment affected the mythrnakers’ use of it. Since it is through
Nicaragua’s mass insurrection of 197$-79 that the hero rnyth eventually attained
its highest point of popularity, an amenable starting point for the study of the re
emergence of the myth stems from theories of social revolution. More particularly,
Theda Skocpol’s study State and Social RevoÏzitions, a C’omparative Analysis of
france, Russia and China (1979) lias put forth three necessary variables from
which social revolutions are likely to transpire: 1) international conjuncture, 2)
discontented bourgeoisie and 3) leaders proficient in mobilization (and along with
them, revolutionary myths).2 It is interesting to note that in the case of Sandino’s
rebellion, the second variable lacked in the revolutionary equation; the
bourgeoisie’s alignment with the regirne prornpted a social perception of his cause
— within Nicaragua— centered on the premise ofbanditry rather than revolutionary
heroism. The interplay of these factors, throughout the sixties onto the late
seventies, paved the way to toppling of the Somoza dictatorship and shall now be
revised to expose their effects on the hero myth’s travels throughout the post-war
era.
Speech by Tomhs Borge, “The Second Anniversary ofthe Sandinista Revolution”, Managua July 19, 1981,
from Sandinistas Speak, Speeches, Writings, and Interviews with Leade ofthe Nicaraguan Revolution, ed.
by Bruce Marcus,New York, Pathfinder Prcss, 1982, p. 128.
2 See Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions. A (‘omparative Analysis offrance, Russia and Ozina,
CambHdge, CarnbHdge University Press, 1999.
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The Socio-Political Context
As the end of the World War H brought forth the weakening of Europe’s
colonial powers and the emergence of United States and the Soviet Union as the
world’s superpowers, the bipolar era triggered— broadly speaking— proxy wars
and de-colonization movements lasting through the fiflies onto the early nineties.
From Algeria to China, revolutions of ail types swept over the globe. Notably,
Nasser seized power in Egypt, Vietnarn rose against france and African countries
such as Congo, Senegal, Nigeria, Rwanda and Niger became independent.3 In the
United States, the civil rights movement brought to the forefront social and
political injustices as well as plans to solve them while in Latin America, Castro
and Che’s guerilla war toppled Batista’s regime (1959) and two years later,
Dominican Rafael Trujillo was assassinated. Indubitably, the emancipation of
dozens of countries throughout Asia and Africa combined to the international anti
imperialist and cultural revolutionary mood must have aroused nationalist
sentiment throughout Latin America— especially in those countries suffering from
dictatorial regimes allied with U.S. interests. In short, the international political
conjuncture fertilized the soil for revolts in Third World countries.
In regards to United States’ interests, the threat of international
communism triggered the necessity to harmonize regional issues with the world
system, producing a significant shifi in their foreign policies. Concerning Latin
America, the Good Neighbor policy was discarded in favor of communist
containment. This was due in great part to the success of the Cuban revolution,
which brought about new tactics aimed at assuaging Latin Arnerica’s
dissatisfaction toward the United States’ foreign policy.
For an exhaustive chronology ofevents, see G.S.P. Freernan-Greenville, C’hronology of World Historp. A
Calendar ofPrincipal Eventsfrorn 3000 BC b AD 1973. London, Rex Collings. 1975, p. 604 to 643.
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During the Second World War, Latin America had sold their products to
the United States at controlled prices whereas afler the war, the free market forced
them to use dollars they had received to buy manufactured goods at uncontrolled
inflated prices. Once the threat of communism materialized with the success of the
Cuban revolution, flot to mention overlapping with growing dissatisfaction toward
U.S. economic treatment of Latin American countries, Kennedy’s administration
adopted a project entitled the Alliance for Progress. Its aim was “to transform the
1960’s into a historic decade of democratic progress” by combining financial aid
to a cooperative approach to social and economic development. From 1960 until
1970, Robert A. Pastor notes that Nicaragua received “on the average about the
same as each of its Central American neighbors: 92.5 million in economic aid
(bans, grants, PL 480-II) and 11 million in rnilitary aid”.5
For Nicaragua, the project also called for a more honest approach to the
electoral procedure. Luis abided by these new demands by principally amending
the constitutional article prohibiting reelection of relatives and loosening the
regime’s grip on press coverage by allowing the publication of opposition pieces.6
Although he was the only Somoza to somewhat slacken the family’s control over
the nation, 4 out of 5 years of his presidency were conducted under Martial Law.
Also, the Constitutional amendrnent regarding the electoral process did not
impinge its fraudulent character; when the conservative nominee Agieffo
demanded that the OA$ supervise the election, lie was dismissed and put under
house arrest for attempting to violate national sovereignty. Consequently, a hand
picked crony of the Somozas, René Schick, was imposed as liberal president in
1963. lis administration enjoyed reasonable peace due its acquiescence to the
4Gordon Connell-Smith, p. 175.
Robert A. Pastor, The United States and Nicaragua, Not C’ondemned to Repetition, second edition, Boulder,
Westview Press, 2002, P. 37. These numbers have been cited ftorn the U.S. Agency for International
Developrnent, US. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1 945-September 30, 1978, p. 56.
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United States’ demands— which in tum, bequeathed the regime with the iatter’s
financial support.
Luis Somoza unequivocally denounced ail communist activities in Central
America and aided the United States in their attempts to suppress its spread. As it
has been noted, Anastasio supported the CIA coup d’état against Arbenz
government and as early as 1959, lis son Luis charged Cuba for supporting the
overthrow of bis own regime. In effect, Cuba’s revolutionaiy unraveling prompted
an increase in revoits against Somoza, principally in the Matagalpa region.
Consequently, Luis backed the Bay of Pigs Invasion by granting U.$. troops
armed bases in Nicaragua from which the U.S. could launch their attack. In
exchange, Nicaragua received U.S. aid in the form of miiitary equipment; the
presence of both American Anny and Air Force missions developed Nicaragua’s
forces and granted its soldiers important training. Millet explains: “The effect of
this equipment build-up combined with severe defeat that the Young Frente
Sandinista had suffered at the hands of the Guardia in 1963 heiped ensure relative
tranquility for most of Schick’s tenure in office.”7 Despite growing dissatisfaction
toward the Sornocista regime, the ongoing relationship between U.S. and
Nicaragua’s dictatorship deflected ail types ofpolitical violence geared toward the
dictatorship.
Ail at once, the momentum of the Cuban revolution played a flindamental
role in the rethinking of Nicaragua’s political philosophy and military tactics,
considerably affecting its revolutionary course on multiple levels. The successful
materialization of a revolutionary myth, i.e. the triumph of a David versus a
Goliath by means of wily guerrilla tactics and in the name of redemption of the
poor, touched a cord in Nicaragua’s revolutionary consciousness. In fact, Hodge
6 Millet notes that freedorn ofthe press enabled the appearance of opposition articles in l’ue Revista
C’onservadora and, even books depicting General Sornoza’s murderous tactics were permitte, such as Dr.
Clcrnente’s Guido’s Noches de Tortura. See p. 224-225.
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notes that although Cuba’s brand of Marxist-Leninism found adherents throughout
Latin America, “only in Nicaragua did it become rooted in an indigenous
movement capable ofmaking a successfiil revolution”.8
Afier Cuba’s victory, Fonseca broke with the PSN and adopted this new
brand of Marxism. The PSN’s non-violent approach to socialist revolution,
combined to its subservience to a Russian interpretation of Central America’s
social and political problems, was replaced for Marxist-Leninist interpretation that
put precedence on practice rather than theory. Essentially based on $orel,
Mariâtegui and Gramsci’s theories of revolution, Castro and Che’s New Marxism
rejected the positivist and rational approach to political violence and believed
instead in the power of human passion in willing to action a revolutionary
consciousness. This view was epitomized by Che’sfoco theory, which discounted
the importance of a favorable social and political conjuncture for the making of a
revolution. As an alternative method, Castro and Clic believed that a small
guerrilla force might propel the overthrow of the governmcnt through the graduaI
dissemination of its anti-imperial cause and guerilla warfare. In tum, the fLSN
irnplernented this tactic from 1962 to 1967, yet as it only yielded gross defeats due
the Guardia’s superior military equipmcnt and well-developed information system
it was given up by the late sixties.9
At the same time, New Marxism ideology overlapped with another major
social movement within Latin America that grew out of the church’s direct
involvernent with both the rural and urban poor during the fiflies and onto the
Millet p. 226: ‘TV-2 jet trainers wcrc purchased from the U.S., giving Nicaragua the largest force ofjet
aircraft in Central AmeHca’.
8 Hodge, p.1 79.
Sec Walker p. 40.The lastfoco confrontation occurrcd in Pacasuin, 1967. The Guardia surroundcd the foco
and killed sorne ofthe FSLN’s best cadres. As a resuli, the clandestine group opted for the quiet ainassing of
forces through political education until their successful hostage holding ofprominent politicians in 1974.
tnterestingly, their lastfoco attempt in Pancasiin (1967) vas commemorated in September 1979. Tomuis
Borge, Minister ofinterior, elevated the nature of the evcnt as an cxemplary moment ofNicaragua’s heroic
predi]ection in a speech covcrcd in La Barricada.
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eighties: Liberation Theology.’° Growing deprivations spurred by the unjust
distribution of wealth spurred a radical rereading of the bible. It accentuated the
revolutionary nature of Christ to promote the uprising of the impoverished against
the status quo. Priests such as Emesto Cardenal took on active roles as political
teachers for the revolutionary education of the masses.11 In effect, the success of
the revolution was owed in great part to the coalition of Christian based groups
and Marxist-oriented members of the FLSN. Walker explaïns: “By 1978, the
progressive Catholics and the F$LN were essentially working in tandem ‘iù
expanding grassroots organizations and preparing for the final insurrection.”2
$andinista ideology fused Marxist-Leninist thought with Christian
Liberation theory, rendering their principles more attractive to a greater number of
people. Roger Lancaster’s judicious study ofthe Sandinista praxis explains:
It is a form of Christian praxis not in the sense of being a subset of theology, but
in the sense that it embodies a religious notion of the sacred and the profane,
appropriated, perhaps consciously, perhaps unconsciously, from the popular
Christian culture.13
This rereading of the Bible suggested that the path to salvation be through an
imitation of Christ. In more direct relevance to our present study, Sandino was
linked to Che Guevara’s notion of the “New Man” who essentially takes the path
of Christ by liberating himself from his egotism and sacrificing his life for the
salvation of the poor. On the 46 anniversary of Sandino’s death, Tomés Borge
declared:
A Sandinista is one who concems himself more for the people’s well-being than
his own, who does everything possible to overcome egoism, the aversion to work
10 Liberation Theology grew out ofthe second Latin American Bishops Conference held at Medellin,
Columbia in 1968. These bishops produced a document that condemned the social and political structure in
Latin Arnerica for its mistreatment of the poor classes. Clerics were urged to found Christian Base
Communities (CEB’s) to teach a revolutionized version ofChHst’s message, one that incited political and
social activism. CEB’s played a crucial role in organizing and mobilizing the masses.
After Anastasio Somoza conspired to remain president for a second tenu, the Archibishop issued a
statement denying the Church’s sanction. From then on, he played an important role in Nicaragua’s politics.
12 Walker, p. 79.
13 Roger Lancaster, Thanks to God ami the Revohition, Popukir Religion and Class (‘onsciousness in the New
Nicaragna, New York, Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 13$.
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and a domineering attitude. . . he must be an example in eveiything: They must
have a superior morality to be the Sons of Sandino.”4
In short, Latin America’s anti-imperialist and religious character developed
according to the social and political changes. Anarcho-syndicalism and theosophy
of the twenties, embodied in Sandino’s thought, developed into Liberation
theology whereas the Marxist-Leninist ideology, once associated more closely to
the Soviet Union’s strand, cultivated its humanist leanings. The confluence of
these movements merged to become integral elements of Sandinismo and in tum,
was fused into the hero myth of Sandino; new layers were added and older ones
were disregarded.
Mythmakers and Speech: Bayo, Lôpez, Castro, Che and Selser
Before revising the influence of Cuba’s revolution on the leadership of
fonseca, more specifically in relation to his ideological appropriation of the past, it
is crucial to expose the hero myth’s disseminating quality by looking at its travels
in neighboring nations. As we have already seen, Sandino’s hero myth was widely
accepted by Latin American anti-imperial intellectuals during his time, enabling it
to subsequently enthuse guerrilla leaders of future generations even before it was
developed by the Nicaraguan leaders ofthe Frente Sandinista.
As the principal military advisor to the radical revolutionary groups
collectively known as the Caribbean Legion, Colonel Alberto Bayo was the first to
make known Sandino’s feats. Hodge explains: “It was Bayo who transmitted the
oral traditions of Sandino’s struggie, the stories told by the survivors of his
defending army who had escaped to Costa Rica, where the legionnaires were being
trained.”5 This quote exposes the necessity of survivors for the continued
existence of Sandino’s mythe legacy, corroborating with Weiner and Weiner’s
14 Hodgep. 258, cited from Patria Libre, Match 1980, p. 26-30.
‘5lbid., p168.
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point: “There must also be a leader left alive afier the martyrdom to elicit
involvernent and engage in the activity of group formation.”6 As a soldier ofthe
Defending Army, Colonel Santos Lopéz’s direct involvement with the Caribbean
Legions’ guerrilla teachings reinforces this last point. By the early sixties, he went
on to advise leaders ofthe fLSN and partook in its attacks.’7
To retum to Bayo’s significant impact on the Nicaraguan hero rnyth, lis
manual 150 Questions for a GïterilÏa put Sandino on the forefront by dedicating it
to the “glorious guerillas ofthe immortal school of Sandino, hero ofthe world”.’8
In tum, his star pupil Che Guevara— highly indebted to his master’s manual—
subsequently wrote La Guerra de Gtterillas (1967), thus becorning another
transmitter of $andino’s legacy. f inally, Hodge notes that Guevara had read
Gregorio Selser’s Sandino. General ofthe free (1959) and more significantly, that
it was the first book pubÏished in Cuba’s revolutionary press.
Selser’s historical work dernonstrates, once again, the persistence of the
hero myth’s essential traits or in other words, the recunent hagiographic overtones
in the historymaking of Sandino’s rebellion. Once again, the tone of the book is
moralizing and Sandino is portrayed as an immaculate hero whereas Americans
are depicted in diametrical opposition to his moral superiority. Mythical anecdotes,
namely his compassion for penitent traitors or mercilessness for rapists, are retold:
“Maraboto explains that Sandino thought it is useless cruelty to bum the wounded
and ordered the fire put out so that they could be picked up, because in spite of it
alT, they are my brothers.”9 Analogous to the maxim “In Nicaragua, sefiores, the
mouse catches the cat”, the author entitles chapter six “The Ant Confronts the
16 \Veiner and Weiner, p. 24.
17 After the tevolution, Santos Lôpez published Memotias dcl Corolle! Santos Lôpez, Managua, Secreataria de
Propaganda y Educaci5n Politico FLSN, 1979 or 1980. Also, another veteran from Sandino’s army was
Ramôn Raudales. He continued organizing guerrilla campaigns up until bis death in combat in 195$.
8 Hodge, p168, cited from Robert K. Brown’s Preface b Alberto Bayo’s 150 Questionsfora Guerilla,
Boulder, Colo., Panther Publications, p. ii-xvi.
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Elephant” and as in Cardenal’s Hora Cero, Selser continuously accents the initial
act that elevated Sandino (and his men) from the mass. He writes: “Twenty fine
men stepped from the ranks, with himself made thirty. A fine army- writes
Belausteguigotia- to take on the Yankees!”2° The physically weaker yet morally
stronger fight character of the struggle re-emerges as necessary ingredient for the
social perception of the act as heroic.
Also, wily methods of war are repeatedly glorified for their ability to
dispirit the enemy: “A slingshot may flot kil! it but it can take out eye, and a pliant
tree branch can take its toll, throwing a column of soldiers into sufficient
confusion for hidden sharpsticks to take aim.”211n other words, Selser reloaded the
historical rendition of the Rebellion with mythic overtones to imbue the past with
the value of heroism characteristic of Latin Arnerican tradition. Clearly, this past
accorded to authors political convictions of the moment. However, due to Selser’s
astute representation of Nicaragua’s diplomatic history—albeit his condemning
tone toward U.S. foreign policy—the work renders the differentiation between
“history as fact” and “history as memory” evermore elusive.
The hero rnyth’s supranational dissemination re-afflrrns that the value at
heart of the narration corresponded to Latin America’s value system as a whole.
Lôpez, Bayo, Che, Castro and Selser found in the history of $andino a guerrilla
war mode! to recover, follow and perfect. Finally, this spreading of the hero myth
reflects the bearing of historical hero rnyths for revolutionary leaders seeking to
19 Gregorio Selser, Sandino: General ofthe Free, trans. by Cedric Beifrage, New York, Monthly Review
Press, New York, 1981, 105. This story is also found in the works ofworks ofSalvatierra, Bolafios and
Belausteguigotia.
20 Ibid., p. 75. Also, the maxim “In Nicaragua, The Mouse Catches the Cat” is the titie Selser’s chapter 7.
21Ibid., p. 75. For instance, he continued to state: “Let us go back for a moment to the time when this
legendary David was beginning his battie with Goliath... He teaches them the importance of the angle ofthe
sum, the speed and direction ofthe winds, the art ofcamouflaging a position- how to take advantage ofeveiy
tree, eveiy gully, and eveiy fold of grain for the entrenchment, very swamp for trapping the enemy... No
military school had taught Sandino any ofthis. It comes from his profound knowledge ofthe land that bore
him, from games played as a child, from his acquaintance with the ways ofthe Niquirano Indians, who had
their special methods of communication, perfected over centuries, in mountainous terrain.” (75)
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attain (and subsequently legitimize) power and their role in the construction and
reconstruction of national ideologies.
Mythmaker and Speech: Carlos Fonseca
In relation to this last point, the author most forceful and committed to the
recuperation of the hero myth in Nicaragua was none other than the leader of the
FSLN, Carlos fonseca.22 Fidel Castro’s persistent invocation and elevation ofJosé
Marti as well as the Cuban revolution’s admiration of Sandino incited Fonseca to
project upon Nicaraguans a sense of mission based on the unfinished noble
endeavors of a cultural hero, one fittingly murdered on Anastasio Somoza Senior’s
orders.23 In fact, Fonseca persuaded his fellow rebels to name the organization
afler Sandino, thus establishing a preliminary mnemonic connection between the
clandestine group and the past hero. Up until bis death, lie steeped himself in the
study ofthe hero, writing five texts on the subject from 1970 to 1975.24
As established in the theoretical framework, the leader concocts or
recuperates myths to justify their own superiority and natural fitness to mie. These
myths are trimmed and tweaked for a harmonious aligmitent with a present— in
this case, one that was largely affected by two major movements: anti-imperialist
guerrilla war and Liberation Theology. In relation to the rnyth’s new Marxist
overtones, Zimmerman writes: “There was nothing acadernic about Fonseca’s
22 This fact has been welI established by the works of Palmer, Hodge, Zimmerman and Fred Judson’s
“Sandinista Revolutionaiy Morale”, Latin Arnerican Perspective 14 (1) (Wintcr, 1987), P. 19-42.23 Emesto “Che” Guevara, “Apologia de Marti”, E! Cairnén Barbudo, 2 (12), 1967, p. 127-147, cited in John
M. Kirk, “From ‘Inadaptado Sublime to Lider Revolucionario’: Some Further Thoughts on the Presentation of
José Marti”, Latin A,nerican Research Review, 15 (3), 1980, p. 135.
24 The first work was a pamphlet entitled Sandino: Proletarian Guerrilla and was first published in the Cuban
magazine Tricontinental in late 1971, then clandestinely in Leôn, 1972. It was followed by Poiltical Ideology
ofGeneralSandino, published again in Cuba, 1977. This work consists ofa compilation ofquotations
arranged under thernes exploring bis major political significance i.e., as a national anti-irnperialist symbol, the
worker and peasant basis ofthe movernent, the corruption ofthe bourgeois class etc. The three final works,
Chrono!ogy ofSandinista Resistence, From the Ivfonroe Doctrine 1823 to anti—iinperiaiist Tricontinental
Coiference in 1966, the book length Secret Chronicle: Augusto César Sandino C’o,fivnts lus Betrayer (neyer
published entirely) and Viva Sandino, were finished between the end of 1974 and early 1975, yet were only
published after the revolution. Zimmerniann explains that Vivo Sandino vas published in several editions and
represented the culmination of bis thought regarding the lessons to be drawn ftom the Defending Army and its
leader. Sec Zimmermann, chapter 7, The Sandino Writings “, for a detailed rendition ofthese works.
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interest in Sandino. He emphasized the class-oriented and nationalist context ofhis
mentor’s writings and ignored the reiigious mysticism he considered irrelevant to
$andino’s political role.”25 Fonseca depicted Sandino as a “path to follow” and by
doing so, invoked a distinctive revolutionary trajectory characteristic of the
Nicaragua people, one that Fonseca tried to imbue with Marxist-Leninist
connotations.
Two important works written in the sixties became integral ideological
elements in the FLSN’s regime: Fonseca’s famous essay Hora Cero opened and
ended with the history of Sandino’s war to expand on Nicaragua’s tradition of
rebellion and in tum justified the recourse to violence for the struggie against
Somoza.
Peaceful changes between different factions of the revolutionary classes, which
have been rather frequent in other Latin American countries, have flot taken place
in Nicaragua. This traditional expenence predisposed the Nicaraguan people
against electoral faces and in favor of armed struggie. There is no doubt, then, that
the Nicaraguan people have a rich tradition of rebellion.26
The Frograma Histôrico, a proposai of solutions to the nation’s problems, becarne
the program of demands under which the FLSN led their revolution in 1979.
Within its introduction, Fonseca inserted “six or seven quotations from his heroes,
Augusto César Sandino and Emesto Che Guevara”, exposing once more the
importance ofheroic memories from the promulgation ofa social movement.27
This last quote aiso reflects the general mythmaking tactic of aligning
sirnilar hero myths to the speaker in question. This time around, the cult figure
most associated with Sandino was the latest hero-martyr in the genealogical chain
of Latin America revolutionaries, Che Guevara. The opening of Fonseca’s oath in
Hora Cero exemplifies this point:
Before the image of Augusto César Sandino and Ernesto Che Guevara, before the
memory of the heroes and martyrs of Nicaragua, Latin America, and humanity...
25 Zirnrnerrnann, p. 145.
26 Hora Cero, cited from Sandinistas Speak, p. 29.
27 Zimrnerniann, p. 119.
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I swear to defend the national honor with arms in hand and to fight for the
redemption ofthe oppressed and exploited in Nicaragua and the world.28
In Sandino GuerritÏero Proletario, Fonseca again promoted Latin America’s
revolutionary tradition through the invocation of his two favorite heroes: “Che”
Guevara ahora, Augusto César Sandino ayer, marcan con heroismo la
indispensable ruta guerrillera que habré de conducir a los pueblos vfctimas del
imperialismo a la posicién de sus proprios destinos.”29 Whereas Caneton Beals
and other proponents of $andino’s cause invoked the narne of past and present
heroes, namely Simon Bolivar and Abdel-Krim in the twenties, the Marxist
Lenïnist movement of the sixties brought forth Sandino’s association with Castro,
Marti and Lenin. Like Selser and his literati predecessors, Fonseca also made use
ofthe recurring anecdotes surrounding $andino’s moral superiority.3°
Fonseca’s recuperation of the Sandino demonstrates the revolutionary
leader’s role as ideologist, juxtaposing the past to present for future-oriented aims:
“He (the leader) does flot implant new ideas as such as he summarizes them in an
especially coherent and appealing way; lie simplifies complexity.”3’ The moral
statute ofthc guerrilla general, the bankruptcy of the bourgeois parties, the leader’s
international appeal and finally, the reasons for the failure of lis movement were
emphasized whereas Sandino’s millenarian propensities—anachronistic in the
social and political settings of the sixties and seventies—were purposely
disregarded.
Interestingly, Fonseca was flot the only one in Nicaragua to seek the past
hero for the toppling of the dictatorship, as various anti-Somoza groups within
28Hora Ceto. reprinted in Sandinistas Speak, p. 41.
Carlos Fonseca, introduction to Sandino Guerrillero Prok’tario, 1971, cited from the FCSN’s officiai
website, http://www.fsln-nicaragua.com. Consulted throughout Januaiy 2004.
30 for instance, the ]deario contains Sandino’s account of bis decision flot to tire on bouse in which marines
were hiding, because of the pleas of the poor farnihes who owned the bouses: “That’s why I forfeited a batt]e
and let a whole bunch ofthose pigs go on living, because I put the interest ofmy fellow citizens ahead ofthe
gioiy ofmy horneland”, cited in Zimmermann, p. 153.
31Thomas H. Greene, Comparative Revolutionan’ Movements, Englewood Cliffs Ni., Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1974, p. 28.
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Nicaragua sought legitimize their cause (as well as their group) by invoking
Sandino’s legacy ever since the forties.32 Nonetheless, it was Fonseca’s version
that managed to delineate the FLSN as the legitimate heirs of Sandino. The main
reasons for this, Palmer asserts, is that “neither Cardenal nor Chamorro built up
coherent bodies of thought around the figure of Sandino, nor did they engage in
prolonged and persistent armed struggie against the dictator on the basis of a
structural ideology.”33 From this statement it is possible to infer that one of the
fundarnental factors determining Fonseca’s successful appropriation of $andino’s
heroic myth, apart from his vociferous manipulation of the past, partly stemmed
from the leader’s willingness to sacrifice himself, like his mentor, in the name of a
free Nicaragua. The fact that fonseca was killed in the midst of the struggle by the
same adversary and for the same cause further legitimized the Sandinistas’ heroic
image as well their revolutionary struggie. In other words, Fonseca seems to have
touched the foot paradigm more deeply than other leading anti-Somocista figures.
The other reason, lis “more coherent body of thought” (again partly due to
his prolific writings on the subject) might also have been rendered more appealing
to the people due to his growing reputation as a charismatic leader. Like his
mentor, Fonseca acquired a supematural-like aura through his leadership skills and
clandestine activities.34 This point reinforces once more the interrelationship
between charismatic leaders and their subsequent heroic image during the
persistence of a specific cause. Weiner and Weiner explain: “What is interesting is
that in many of these situations of cooperation between two leaders is that the
martyrdom of the first helps the consolidating follower to achieve integration of
32 See Zirnmermann, chapter 3, “The Cuban Revolution
Palmer, p. 94.
Unlike bis mentor, the projection ofFonseca’s charisma sternmed primarily from rumors alone. He did flot
inhent Sandino’s “rabble-roussing” talents. This substantiates Irvine Schiffer’s emphasis on collective
projection ofcharisrna in the unfolding ofa charismatic personality without contradicting Wellner’s position
either i.e. that the prime proponent ofcharisrna resides in flic character ofthe individual. A comparison ofboth
cases simply reflects the vast and complex set of factors surrounding the phenomenon. Sec chapter 2, footnote,
for the initial discussion on charisma.
80
the social movement.”35 The relationship between speaker and speech was
symbiotic, promoting at once the heroic image of the past and the present leader
through a masterful manipulation ofhistory.
A comparison of Fonseca and Sandino’s hero myths exposes a striking
likeness in style, particularly in the usage of metaphor and allusions to former
heroes to express a supematural quality of the hero. for example, member of the
FLSN Hugo Torres’ description of lis first impression of fonseca resembles
Carleton’s depiction of Sandino. Here are two excerpts in respective order:
There in front of us, with no postunng or pretense, without even introducing
himself was Carlos, the legend, Zorro, one of the Three Musketeers, Kadir the
Arab, the Invisible Man, the one who escaped under the very nose of Guardia, the
one who mocked his jailers with his strength and contempt for death, the one who
entered his wife Haydeé’s house in Leân without ever arousing the suspicions of
the enemy standing guard outside, and even left her pregnant escaping again, the
one who died and came back to life, the one who just for the fun of it and as an
example of popular creativity made Somoza and bis cronies look like idiots,
showing the superiority of the popular masses, which he personified , over their
oppressors.36
The simple folk with whom we talked here were ail agoy over Sandïno. He had
become ubiquitous. He had been seen here; lie liad been seen there. At night lie
had gone staiking along a ridge, God of tlie universe. Later I found the sarne
mythology vas believed everywhere I went in Nicaragua.... 11e had fired the
imagination of the humble people of Nicaragua. In every town, Sandino had his
Homer. 11e was of the constellation of Abdel Krim, Robin Hood, Villa, the
untamed outlaws who knew only daring and great deeds, imbued ever witli the
tireless persistence to overcome insurmountable odds and confront successfully
overwhelming power. His epos will grow- in Nicaragua, in Latin America, the
wide world over. For heroes grow ever more heroic with time.37
Amongst the wide array of themes (narnely overt machismo, i.e. for impregnating
bis wife in fonseca’s case) wily performances, incredible feats and martyrdom
(fearlessness of death) intermingle to differentiate fonseca as well as Sandino
from tIc mass as the redeemers of the poor. Both were compared to popular hero
figures crosscutting in cultures and tirnes, reinforcing once more the metaphorical
n Weiner and Weiner, p. 24.
‘6Hugo Torres, Se,nbianza de una Leyenda llainada Carias Fonseca”, La Barricada, November 8, 1988,
cited from Zimrnermann, p. 111.
Beals, p. 276-277.
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usage of past hero myths for the promotion of emerging ones or protection of
established ones.
Furthermore, Fonseca ami Sandino shared similar upbringings, enticing
Salman Rushdie to ask: “So what’s the connection between bastards and
revolutions? I asked, but they laughed nervously. It wasn’t done to joke about
saints.”38 Both were raised by downtrodden single mothers plagued by poverty and
frequent pregnancies, and each one received emotional and financial support
(especially afler their early adolescence) from their respective wealthy fathers.39
Interestingly, Fonseca redefined the notion of legitimacy by making Rigoberto
Lôpez the “legitimate son” of Sandino, characterizing the descent of Nicaragua’s
ancestry through the persistence of a cultural quality, i.e. anti
imperialist/nationalistic martyrdom rather than marnage. Finally, neither Sandino
nor fonseca drank alcohol nor did they partake in festive celebrations.
Zimmermann notes that Fonseca also copied Sandino’s rhetorical approach, using
similar uncomplicated words to transmit political awareness to the peasants. In
short, fonseca’s leadership role in the clandestine activities, lis superior ability to
tap into the collective consciousness and the social perception of his supernatural
aura resembling in form that of Sandino’s, served as initial factors in cultivating
their association as well as Fonseca’s version of the past. Today their portraits
stand alongside each other in commemoration ceremonies, arguably as
Nicaragua’s two greatest heroes.
Discontented bourgeoisie
Although collective discontent emerged duning from the post-war years,
engendering coups, guerrilla attacks and anti-Somoza protests under the banner
Salman Rushdie, The Jaguar Smile, A Nicaragua Journey, New York, Viking, 1987, p. $0.
It is interesting to note that their fathers were political men, Socrates Sandino tvas a fervent liberal, jailed for
protesting the murder ofZeledôn whereas Fonseca’s father was a staunch supporter ofSornoza.
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Sandino, it was only when increasing discontent arose amongst the middle and
upper classes that the FLSN gradually gained ground and consequently, the hero
myth took flight. This dissatisfaction toward the regime arose from two
interrelated factors: the economic growth of the nation and the increasingly
dïsproportionate distribution ofthe newfound nation’s wealth.
From 1960 to 1967, the annual rate of growth of Nicaragua was the
highest in Latin America at 7%. This was due to a substantiai increase in cattie
production followed by, in the next decade, a sharp increase in the export of sugar,
seafood, tobacco, and bananas.4° Booth expiains: “The economic boom had given
rise to the expansion of landless agriculturai wage laborers, urban sub-proietarians,
proletarians, and while-collar sectors such as commercial and public employees.”4’
Moreover, it triggered a rise ofexpectations within the bourgeois class, which was
met with an increasingly skewed distribution of the weaith— provoking discontent
amongst “would-be competing dites” as well as swelling deprivations amongst
poorer classes.
The rise of deprivations and expectations coincided with the reign
Anastasio Jr. (i9721979).42 Walker bas fittingly described the period as “the
Beginning of the End” for the dictator’s refusai to respond reasonably to the
demands of the peopie culminated with the revolution of 1979. As general of the
Guardia as well, bis leadership style resembled that of Anastasio Sr. He used the
army to control the nation and increase his wealth, encouraging his soldiers to be
corrupt and promising them irnpunity. Quite quickly, his administration vas iii
perceived from within the Liberal party as weii as from the opposition, especially
after Anastasio Jr. began expressing his resolve to stay on as president bcyond the
expiration ofhis term.
40 Zirnrnerrnann, p. 232.
41 John Booth, “Socioeconornic and Political Rools of Nation Revolts in Central America”, Latin Anierican
Research Review, 26(1), 1991, p. 33-73, p. 36.
$3
The regime’s image as being illegitimate reached its first of a few peaks
following the earthquake of 1972, which shook the capital to rubble and took with
it 8000 to 10, 000 lives. For Somoza, the natural disaster was transformed into a
profitable oppormnity for the growth of his personal wealth. lnstead of distributing
international relief funds to the dispossessed, he channeled it into the hands of his
associates and himself while at the same time the Guardia plundered the city with
the aid of its arrny trucks. Walker explains “that much of what they did was
technically legal— the self-awarding of govemment contracts and the purchasing
of land, industries, and so on that they knew would figure lucratively in the
reconstruction— but littie ofit was ethically or morally uplifling”.43 Consequently,
Somoza’s actions were greeted with rabid international criticisrn, inciting him to
tighten bis hold on the press. The Guardia’s image was considerably damaged and
many of Nicaragua’s elites, infuriated by the new ernergency taxes they had to pay
whilst Somoza gobbled relief funds, no longer supported the president. As a resuit,
students of dite background joined the fLSN ranks and some sectors of the
business community began offering financial support.
The “Wily” Raid of 1974: The Sandinista Re-Awakening of the Hero Myth
Aller years of withdrawal from guerrilla warfare, for the silent
accumulation of power, the FLSN sneaked into a party at a mansion held for the
U.S. ambassador and successfully held hostage important govemment officials
until the regime acquiesced to the guerrilla’s demands. In exchange for their
release, the clandestine group demanded a large ransom, the release and
transportation of fourteen prisoners (as well as themselves) to Cuba and the
broadcasting of two communiqués over national radio.
42 Anastasio irnposed hirnself as president after ihe unexpected death of Schick.
‘ Walker, p. 31.
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In relevance to the hero myth, the second communiqué, which was diffiised
through ail the major radio stations, was entitled “Augusto César Sandino:
General de Nombres Libres”. For one, this communication triggered yet another
regeneration of the historical figure, one that captured for the first time in
Nicaragua’s history, a wider range ofreceivers due to its promulgation through the
media. Sandino reached viewers through the television and radio, refiecting yet
another major medium of diffusion of the myth connected to the technological
advances of the time
Secondly, Palmer’s analysis of the communiqué exposes the hero myth’s
virtual alignment to the FLSN’s revolutionary ideology. Sandino and Lépez are
glorified for their righteous convictions and martyrdom to implicitly inspire
Nicaraguans to follow the present path traced by the Sandinistas: “Historically, the
emergence of a homogenous force and vanguard that synthesizes the restlessness
and desires ofthe people has been necessary. That force is the Frente Sandinista de
Liberaciôn Nacional... [and] is today the only legitimate vanguard.”44 from
thereon, its revolutionary efforts no longer went unknown. Sandino and Lôpez,
integrated as members of the fLSN through the interrelationship between the
uttering and the uttered, were made allies ofthe revolutionary group.
Afler 1974, Somoza imposed Martial Law, ordered the imprisonrnent of
suspected dissenters, summary executions and extensive pillaging of the
countryside. The illegitimacy of the regirne in the perception of the people
rnounted evermore when these repressive methods were rampant, thus leading to
the increase of discontent and deprivation.45 In tum, the appeal to join grassroot
movements increased as they provided convincing normative justifications for
N Palmer, p. 103, cited ftom “Mensaje no. 2, “frente Sandinistas: Diciembre Victorioso ‘ cornpiled by Jaime
Wheelock Rbman, Mexico, Editorial Diégenes, 1976, p. 98-1 00.
‘ Booth’s comparative study ofthe socioeconomic and political roots of national revoits in Central America
discovered that regimes which responded with violent tactics ofrepression were more IikeÎy to undergo
revoits i.e., 11 Salvador. Guatemala and Nicaragua as opposed to Costa Rica and Honduras which underwent
rclatively peaceful socioeconornic developments
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mass revoit. That same year, the fL$N spiit into three factions over a dispute
about revoiutionary tactics but reunited in 1977 to organize the mass mobilization
that was underway.46
Major Events leading to the Revolution
As the goal is flot to recount the victorious Revolution of ‘79, it would
seem inappropriate to omit the major events that paved way to its victory,
especially since it heralded yet another phase in the travels of the hero myth.
However, as numerous studies have already analyzed and explained the
Nicaraguan revolution, only the major triggering factors shah now be divulged for
the sake of coherence. More specifically the impact of the Carter’s administration,
the assassination ofJoaqumn Chamorro, the “Group of 12”s officiai support ofthe
Sandinistas and at last, the FLSN’s takeover ofthe National Palace.
Altliough Nicaragua was not initiaily on the forefront of the United State’s
foreign affairs in Latin America, Carter’s anti-dictatoriai approach to Latin
America represented a significant shift in the United States foreign poiicies, one
that aided the Nicaraguans’ revolutionary by weakening its support of the
regime.47 The main tactic was to refashion human rights poiicies by standing
behind governments that protected individual freedom and withdrawing economic
support to dictatorial ones that engaged in repressive practices. Somoza is
observed to have confided to U.S. Congressman John (Jack) Murphy that he
“knew that lie was in deep trouble five days afler the Carter administration took
office because it cancelled export licenses for the sale of ammunition for sporting
46 Fora thorough breakdown ofthe each tendencies ideological predilection, see David Nolan’s The Jdeology
ofthe Sandinistas and the Nicaragnan Revoïntion, Miami, Institute oflnterarnerican Studies, 1984. The
consequences ofthe FLSN’s subsequent pobtica reunification on the travels ofihe hero myth are discussed
in the following chapter.
See Micheal J.Kiyzanek, U.S. Latin Ainerican Relations, third cd., Westport Conn., Praeger, 1996, for more
inforniation on Carter’s policies toward Latin America:’Partly because of bis own personal convictions and
partly as a reaction to past Republican policies, President Carter tvas conscious ofthe fact that the United
States had to reestablish its credibility in the hemisphere.” (82)
$6
arms. That was a message ... [that Somoza] was out of favor with the United
States.”48 Clearly, the shift in foreign policy weakened the dictatorship’s military
support to consequently facilitate the FLSN’s insurrectionary organization and
attacks against the Guardia.
Another triggering factor was the death of well-known and beloved
joumalist Joaqun Chamorro on January 9 1978 whule walking from home from
La Prensa. His death served as the catalyst that paved the way to the revolution by
stimulating Nicaraguans as well as neighboring countries to rally against
Somoza.49 Thousands marched in the funeral procession and the business sector
decided to spiit with the dictator. Two weeks following his murder, the president
of the major business association COSEP (Superior Council of Private Enterprise)
organized a general strike lasting until the first week of February that demanded
the resignation of Sornoza.
In October of that sarne year, a group of twelve important Nicaraguan
businessmen, lawyers, priests and educators were asked by Sergio Ramirez to
organize “an alliance with the democratic sector of the national bourgeoisie.”5°
They issued a statement in San José and Washington D.C. that declared their
support to the FLSN and traveled throughout the world to make known their cause
and solicit donations.51 In short, “Las Doces” represented the most radicalized
faction from within the bourgeoisie, one that believed that only mass insurrection
could bring Somoza’s downfall and solve Nicaragua’s problems. It is important to
note that the Sandinistas party alienated members of this group when it became
48 Pastor, p. 44. From WGBH interview with John Murphy, May 15, 1984, Danbuiy, Connecticut. It must be
noted that though Carter was reluctant to provide aid to Somoza, the Sandinistas’ inclination toward Marxism
posed a problem to bis human rights policies. Consequently the adminitration seemed to back sides at points.
Also, to restrain the Sandinistas from taking power, Carter attempted to set up a democratic govemment and
sent a peacekeeping troop to Nicaragua.
Chamorro’s killer stili remains unknown.
50 Robert A. Pastor, p. 47.
s Sergio Rarnirez is one ofNicaragua’s most recognized writers. Pastor explains that it vas Umberto and
Daniel Ortega that had asked him to organize this alliance.
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clear that the bourgeoisie was flot going to lead the govemment. Consequently,
they became some ofits most vociferous opponents.52
On August 22m1, twenty-five fLSN guerrillas dressed up as Guardia
soldiers entered the national palace and took hostage more than fifteen hundred
bureaucrats. The stint granted the FLSN radio air time and press coverage,
$500,000â in ransom and the guarantee of the safe passage out of Nicaragua for
fifiy-nine political prisoners and guerrillas. Walker notes that: “Thousands cheered
the new national heroes on the way to the airport as they departed.”53 The
operation’s success triggered a wave of attacks throughout the nation as a whole,
namely Masaya, Matagalpa, Managua, Chinandega, Leôn, Jinotepe, Diriamba, and
Esteli. By March 1979, the three factions of the FLSN reunited to prepare for the
final offensive throughout the following months. These events served as
determining factors that greatly contnbuted to the triumph of July 1979, triggering
along with it another phase in the travels ofthe hero myth.
Conclusion
The socio-political conjunctures of the post-war era paved the way to
revolutionary openings for underdeveloped countries seeking liberation from
imperial involvement. Cuba’s victory clarified and substantiated Nicaragua’s
revolutionary aspirations and from 1960 until 1979, the hero myth’s popularity
waxed as Somoza’s carefully constructed counter-memory waned. Moreover,
concepts of the Christian Liberation movement as well as of Marxist ideology
were fused into the hero myth whereas historical facts perceived as anachronistic,
sucli as bis eclectic blend oftheosophy and anarcho-syndicalism, were deliberately
overlooked.
52 See John A. Booth, The End and The Begiuning ofthe Nicaraguan Revohition, p. 208-215, for a detailed
rendition ofthe extemal and domestic opposition forces.
Walker, p. 37.
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As John Gunther has explained: “nation and revolution are indissolubly
one.”54 The successful alliance of a great number of people crosscutting in classes
in violent warfare against a common enemy works to reshape national
consciousness. In effect, the recuperation of the hero myth by Carlos Fonseca
transcended it from its Segovian boundaries to be converted into a national
revolutionary myth, i.e. a collective symbol of heroism shared by Nicaraguans of
all creeds and classes. The ernerging political party then consolidated
revolutionary symbols to gain political legitirnacy, thus recreating an a new
version of the Nicaraguan nation, as an imagined community, wherein at the heart
lied historical heroes—mythified. This political appropriation of the Sandino hero
rnyth by the Sandinistas party is the subject of the final chapter.
John Gunther, Inside Latin A,nerica, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1940, p. 55, cited in Thomas
Benjarnin’s La Revoh,ciôn, Mexico s Great Revolution as Meinoiy, Myth and Histoiy, p .22.
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Chapter Five
The Fate of the Hero Myth in the Post-Revolutionary Era:
Politicization, Rupture, Recovery
Folitical domination invoïves historicaÏ definition.
This chapter seeks to understand the hero myth’s evolution during
Nicaragua’s post-revolutionary setting of the eighties, from the revolutionary
victory of 1979 to the defeat of the Sandinista party in the February elections of
1990. With Somoza out ofthe country and the Guardia dismantled, the vacuum of
power was fihled by a nine-men National Directorate who, in their haste to
transforrn the structure, adopted new policies aïmed pnrnarily at redistributing the
nation’s wealth and bettering the conditions ofthe poor.2
This rebuilding of the social and econornic structure necessarily entailed
the ideological redefinition of the past in order to align it with the party’s present
goals or, for the latest ideologues to forge, in Althusser’s words, “a representation
of the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence”.3
In other words, new Nicaragua needed to institutionalize its ideology for three
overlapping political purposes: to legitirnize the party in the perception of the
people, consolidate it through the passage of govemmental policies and, once the
threat of opposition matenalized, re-mobilize the masses against the CIA
sponsored counter-revolutionaries. And so, the gueriil a-leaders-tumed politicians
deployed traditional rnyths for the creation of a Sandinista version of the past.4 In
relevance to the present subject, the hero myth of Augusto César Sandino reached
Popular Mernoiy Groups: ‘Popular Mernory, Theoiy, Politics, Method” in PopularMemorL’ Group and
Making Hisioiy, p.2 13, cited in Ihornas Benjanin, p. 68.
2 Fora concise account ofthc Sandinistas’ goals in govemment, see Booth’s 77îe End and The Beginning,
p. 185-20$; and Walker’s Living in the Shctdoiv ofthe Eagle, p. 42-58.
Althusser,p. 36.
After their reunification, the Sandinistas’s three tendencies were each granted equal representation in
governrnent. Tornâs Borge, Bayardo Arec and Henry Louis represented the GNP, Jairne Wheelock, Luis
CarHôn and Carlos Nuijez the Proletarios, and Daniel and Humberto Ortega and Victor Tirado Lopez
represented the Terceristas.
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the apex of its popularity as one of the nation’s chief symbols of anti-imperial
heroism, rendering the memory of Sandino ubiquitous in every walk of
Nicaraguan life. Since it is impossible to do justice to the rnultiplicity of ;nythic
themes assocïated with the hero myth of Sandino in post-revolutionary Nicaragua,
a few illuminating premises establishcd by leading scholars on the nature of the
Sandinista ideology will offer a useful starting point by enabling an unscrambling
of the mythic data.
from Andres Pérez’s work on the fundamental probiems at the core of the
Sandinistas’ leadership, the party’s inability to translate its pure ideology into a
practical one suggests that their ideological stance lacked practicality, if not
coherence.5 He expiains that the “Sandinistas couid agree only to an officiai set of
goals expressed as a vague commitrnent to socialism”..., that it “was and still is a
vague, contradictory, and confusing set of nationalistic slogans and proverbs”.6
This point corroborates with Carlos M. Vilas’ comrnentary on the fail of the
Sandinistas. His work suggests that the party’s extreme hoid on the ideological
apparatus led to a highly idealized projection of the national patriotism—one that
the Directorate felt would kecp Nicaraguans from voting against a party
conspicuously aligned with the United States.7
Finally, in une with Vilas and Pérez’s studies, Adam Joncs’ analysis of the
Sandinista newspaper La Barricada— from 1979 until 1998— exposes the
growing tension between the Sandinista leaders overarching insistence on
upholding the paper’s “mobilizing imperative” versus the growing articulation for
Andres Pérez, “The FLSN after the Debacle: The Struggle for Definition of Sandinismo”, Journal of
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 3 (1), 1992, p. il l-139. He borrows Franz Schunnann’s terrns of
pure and practical ideology to explains that the fonner ideology relates to a set ofideas designed to give the
individual a unified and conscious world view, whereas practical ideology refers to “a set ofideas designed to
give the individual rational instruments for action”. Sec page 113-114 for more details. The repercussions of
the FLSN’s failure to transcend their pure ideology shah be discussed luter in this chapter.
6]bid.,p. 120.
Sec Carias M. Vilas, “What Went Wrong”, NACLA: Report on die Americans, 24 (1) (June 1990), p. 10-18.
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more professional autonomy voiced by its joumalists.8 Highly influenced by
Lenin’s view of the press as a revolutionary apparatus along with the violent
presence of opposition forces, the Directorate felt justified in sustaining their
mobilizing imperative. Gabriela Selser, a former joumalist of the newspaper
explains:
I think that one of the greatest mistakes was to try to show the Patriotic Military
Service as a great big “fight for love”. Without tiying to evaluate how it uprooted
families, the fear of combatants, the fear of dying, the danger, normal natural
things... There were even stories that would say things like: “He’s lost an eye,
he’s lost a leg, he’s an orphan, but stiil he’s going to do military work.9
for the moment, these observations suggest that the National Directorate’s pure
ideology was exaggerated, unremitting and, to a reasonable degree, uniformly
spread throughout the decade. In turn, they enabie a trimming down of the
historical data to important periods such as the rnonths following the revoiutionary
victory, the weeks before elections and specific commemoration anniversaries.10
Concerning the variety of primary sources of mythicai nature, this section
remains grounded on Walter Benjamin’s theory of the printed word as an
influential tool in the conceptualization of national consciousness. As the officiai
instrument of the FLSN, La Barricada provides a most condensed channel of
ideological communications due to its encapsulation of a wide range of mythic
speeches, namely commemoration ceremonies, political discourses, heroic
imagery and announcements of newly erected monuments. Jones’ interviews
8 Adams Joncs, Beyond the Barricades. Nicaragua and the Stnigglefor the Sandinista Press, 19 79-1998,
Athens, Ohio University, 2002. The term “mobilizing imperative”, dubbed by the author, represents the
paper’s two basic functions put forth by the editor-in-chiefCarlos Femando Chamorro (son ofJoaqun
Chamorro). The functions were the following “1) To be a vehicle of mass information ofthc FLSN for the
divulging of its political une, an instrument of support for the mobilization ofthe masses around the tasks of
the revolution, and to convert itselfinto an effective medium of communication between the masses and the
FLSN. 2) To contribute to the formation of bases committees, members, activists ofthe FLSN to wage the
ideological struggie, arming them with arguments and revolutionaiy conceptions, and to be a vehicle of
support for the organization of ideological work at the base.” (4)
9lbid., p.4I.
10 Articles on Sandino, which are most frequent during the days preceding the anniversary ofassassination,
between Februaiy 20th to the 23rd have been looked at more closely throughout this chapter.
° In addition, La Barricada also played a substantial role as a supplier ofeducational books for primary and
secondary schools. Jones explains: “Some 2,3 10,000 volumes —between 1980 and 1987—and also produced
tens ofthousands of copies ofhigher educational texts. It prepared millions of pamphlets, cards and various
educational mateHals for FLSN activists, mass organizations and amied forces.” (26)
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with ex-joumalists explain that this paper was the only one untrammeied by
censorship laws but even so, opposition groups enjoyed a reasonable amount of
freedom and were able to voice their dissent tbrough the La Frensa and Et Nuevo
Diario.’2 In fact, the former served as a mouthpiece of Conservative dissent and
deveioped an antagonistic relationship to La Barricada
— one that consequently
mirrored the fractious relationship between the two parties. To be sure, the
mobilizing imperative of the nation’s major papers, in their ideological battie for
political iegitimacy, makes them useful sources for the analysis ofthe hero myth.
Major Characteristics of the Sandinistas’ Interpretation of the Sandino Hero
Myth
Having said ail this, it is now necessary to sort out the endless allusions to
Sandino by delineating some of the chief characteristics of the Sandinistas pure
ideoiogy. Firstly, the juxtaposition of the Sandinistas to $andino initiated by
Carlos Fonseca was institutionalizcd and so, surreptitiously naturalized, to promote
a teleological rendition of the past based on the unflnished heroic deeds of a
national hero that, in due course, were fulflhied by his “sons” and “daughters”. Just
like Sandino referred to himself as a “hijo de Bolivar”, Sandinistas referred to
themselves (and Nicaraguans in general) as the chiidren and even puppies of “El
Padre de la Soberanfa Nicaragiiense”. La Barricada affinus: “Corno es sabido, cl
Generai de Hombres Libres flic particularmente un hombre de acciôn, pero de su
ejemplo surgiô la herencia que permitié a sus cachorros rescatar la soberania y cl
decoro nacional.”3 These patemai allusions substantiate Mircea Eliade’s
definition of myth as a story that retells “how through the deeds of a Supematural
Being, a reality comes into existence—an island, a species of plant, a particular
kind of human behavior.”14 In this case, the particular reality relates to post
12 It should be noted that La Prensa was occasionally banned, with the longest one follotving occurring in
early and lasting until in June 1986.
“ La Barricada, Februaiy 19rn, 1985.
14 Mircea Eliade, p. 7.
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revolutionary Sandinista Nicaragua. Borge’ s retelling of Sandino ‘s historical
significance exemplifies this point: “His war explains the existence of Sandinismo,
which on May 4, 1927, gave rise to what Sandino called “war of liberators to end
the war of the oppressed.”5 Sandino represents the essential founder of sovereign
Nicaragua, the supematural being as originator of a “cosmos” due to the
perception ofhim as the initial (and therefore supreme) maker ofheroic deeds.
Another example illustrative of Eliade’s point was the reification of
Sandino’s original act of deflance, i.e. the refusal of the Espino Negro Accord on
May 4th into a day of remembrance called Dja de la Dignidad. This reification
reinforced the significance of the initial act as one of the triggering factors in the
transition of the leader to a hero and eventually, from historical hero to national
hero myth. Also, it is possible to infer from the preceding data that though fonseca
was the one to doggedly instigate the study of Sandino for his groups’
revolutionary purposes, it was the National Directorate that directly affected the
hero myth’s fate in the post-revolutionary setting. Again, the importance of
survivors for the perpetuation of the hero myth reflects the symbiotic relationship
between martyr leaders and surviving followers in the propagation of mernories
that serve the cause in question.
Furthermore, more recent hero myths were added to the genealogy of national
heroes for having adopted their mentor’s path. Pegged “el Continuador de
$andino”, Carlos Fonseca was indubitably one of the party’s most employed hero
myth. To name only a few examples, his portrait hung along with his mentor’s in
front of the National Palace days following the revolution, the anniversary of his
death was comrncmorated each year and an etemal flarne was kept over his tomb
up until the takeover of lINO extinguished it. Moreover, Fonseca was consistently
5 This quote is from a speech by Daniel Ortega to the plenary session ofthe 6th summit Conference of Non
Aligned countries on September 3-9, 1 979.Cited from Sandinistas Speak Speeches, Writings and Interviews
with Leaders ofihe Nicaraguan Reeolution, cd. by Bmce Marcus, New York, Pathfinder Press, 1982, p. 47.
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depicted as the essential protagonist of the revolution, “el Jefe de la Revoluciôn”.
On the sixth anniversary of the revolution’s victoiy, Minister of Interior Tomés
Borge explained in a long interview printed in La Barricada: “$in aquella base
visional y responsable de la estrategia revolucionaria de Carlos, no hubiese sido
posible todo b demés.”6 What is more, fonseca’s legacy is connected to his
rediscovery of Sandino, i.e. “Carlos aprendiô de Sandino, b que aprendimos de
Carlos”, to give credit to the former as the discoverer of the nation’s father
figure.’7
Despite the fact that Rigoberto Lépez Peréz acted independently from any
political group, he may be perceived as one of the most celebrated heroes afler
Sandino and fonseca. Pictures and articles on his martyrdom portray him as the
quintessential “New Man” in La Barricada as well as during commemoration
ceremonies. He is depicted as the one who broke the silence and brought justice to
Sandino’s murderer— the link between $andino’s Rebellion and Fonseca’s
revolution. Carlos characterization of him as the “son of $andino” was passed on
in the post-revolutionary rhetoric of the Sandinista leaders.’8 Borge wrote: “He
was a man of concrete acts, a rebel whom Prometheus would have admired.”19 His
heroic act reinforced the importance of sacrifice for the liberation of the people
and thus, re-enchanted the struggie ofthe oppressed against the oppressor. In short,
Fonseca and Lépez, and other less famous martyrs were depicted as descendants of
Sandino as well as heroes in their own rights for ernbodying the classic attributes
ofthe ideal Latin American revolutionary hero.2°
16La Barricada, June 15th 1985.
‘7lbid., June ,5th1985
8 See website, “Pigina Oficial del frente Sandinista de Liberacién Nacionai, www.fsln-nicaragua.com,
consuited in March 2004. Under the rubric “Nuestros Héroes and Mrtires”, the portrait of six revoiutionary
heroes aiong with their biographies represent prime figures ofNicaraguan hagiography. Rigoberto figures
arnongst them whiie Sandino, Camilo Ortega Saavedra, Leonel Rugama, Carlos Fonseca and Gasparo Garcia
Laviana (ail heroes ftom the sixties ontvard) are the other five.
19 Borge, Patience Impatience, p. 77.
20 Less known martyrs were assiduousiy commemorated by the FLSN with monuments erected in their honor,
and their biographies appearing in La Barricada. For example, the two soldiers who dieU along with Fonseca,
Crecencio Aguilar and Benito Carvajai, were invoked through speeches and articles on the anniversary oftheir
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George Black has aptly summarized another major and overlapping attribute of
the FLSN’s ideology as an attempt to forge a sense ofperpetual revolution.21 This
ideological tactic reinforced the sense that national membership was acquirable
through the manifestation of a persistent cultural value, i.e. anti-imperialist
martyrdom for the liberation of the nation. Exemplary of this strategy was the
myth-riddled rnasthead of La Barricada where, on the top right corner resided the
imprint of Augusto César’s portrait while on the lefi loomed a guerilla soldier in
combat. The visual juxtaposition promoted a sense of continuity between the
rebellion of 1927-33 and the revolution of 1979; positioned on the first page ofthe
newspaper, the mythe symbols also served as a daily reminder of Nicaragua’s
revolutionary tradition.
Another method was the endless application ofpatriotic slogans. Perhaps one
ofthe most common was and remains “Sandino Vive” for its continued permeation
in everything from the walls of buildings to children’s textbooks. It is imperative
to note that this slogan surfaced in the forties during the peaceful protest of 1944
and from thereon, consistently re-ernerged as a catchphrase of dissent. Clearly, the
drastic changes incurred by the post-revolutionary setting of the eighties caused
the slogan to take on a new role as a promoter of revolutionary continuity. In the
same mood, Minister of Interior Tomâs Borge appropriated a biblical text to
formulate: “Sandino Yesterday, Sandino Today, Sandino Always”.22 This
sanctification of the profane reflects once more the manipulation of the nation’s
religious convictions, i.e. by means of its combination to revered heroes, for the
legitimization ofthe party’s image.
deaths. A]so Maria Luisa Espinoza, the trst fernale FLSN member to be killed by the Guardia,was
commemorated and AMNLAE (Luisa Arnanda Espinosa Association ofNicaraguan Women)was named afier
her.
21 George Black, Triumph ofihe People. London, Zed Press, 1981. His precisc words are “to make the spirit of
the revolutionary war permanent”.
22 This quote pervades the pages of La Barricada and isa spin off of Sacred Text Hebrews 13:8.
96
This sense of continuity was also appÏied to bis heroic counterparts. In one
instance, La Bal7icada ‘s published a photo of Rigoberto Lépez’s corpse—taken
afler lie was murdered by the Guardias- along with a heartfelt article retelling the
marvels of bis deed, with a title that read: “Rigoberto Lôpez Pérez, Es de los
Muertos que Nunca Mueren”.23 In tandem, the same slogan was employed to
describe fonseca’s death, again by Borge: “Carlos is one of the dead who neyer
die.”24 Both quotes aligned with Emesto Cardenal’s memorable and consoling
verse conceming Sandino’s assassination: “Pero cuando muere un héroe, no se
muere sino que un héroe renace en una Nacién” or the just as famous: “Te mataron
y no nos dijeron dônde enterraron tu cuerpo, pero desde entonces todo e! territorio
nacional es tu sepulcro.”25
The first page of La Barricada, on 17th of July 1980, provides a
quintessential example of the major of the multifarious ideological strategies
deployed by the paper. It stated “En Nicaragua Siempre Serâ 19 de Julio” to
announce the upcoming commemoration ceremony celebrating the first
anniversary of the revolution. On the same page, there are pictures of Sandino and
Fonseca, the slogan “Sandino Ayer, Sandino Hoy and Sandino Siempre” and an
article featuring progress made in education and agrarian reforrn since the victory.
In relation to the actual event, 600,000 persons attended the celebration (one
quarter of the population). Black reports: “They lined up behind the portrait of
Sandino and fonseca, the red and black flags ofthe fLSN and the banners oftheir
mass organizations, which by now had grown to represent more than halfa million
members.”26
La Barricada, September I 5, 1979.
24 Tomhs Borge, 77ie Patient Impatience. Fmm Bovhood ta Guerilla: o Peona1 Narrative ofNicaragua
StruggieforLiberation, trans. by Russe]1 Bartley, Connecticut, 1991, p. 450.
25 The flrst quote by Cardenal can be found Hora Cciv, p. 27; the second can be found in the work of Pierre
Vayssière Auguste ‘ésar Sandino: ou Ï ‘Envers d ‘un Mythe, p. 223. Both recur in La Barricada, for instance,
see cover page on Febmaiy 20t6, 1994.
26 Black, p. 190.
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The invocation of hero figures to promote a sense of revolutionary
perpetuity and for the legitimization and consolidation of the party also worked
simultaneously to mobilize the people against opposition groups, namely the
Catholic Church hierarchy, COSEP, La Prensa and the United States’ forces. As
early as $eptember 1979, the front-page cover of La Barricada read: “En la Tierra
de Sandino, no Queremos Asesinos” and was accompanied by a picture of
peasants holding up banners of Sandino to denounce the presence of Somocista
forces in the Western Nicaraguan area. Moreover, by 1985, the growing
deterioration of social and econornic conditions along with the capsizing of
programs aimed at helping the poor, induced a substantial increase in the
mobilizing function of the hero. The sense of revolutionary continuity did flot
abate as Daniel Ortega announced afier winning the 1984 elections to La
Barricada and the people of Nicaragua: “E! nueve gobinete revolucionario es una
continuaciôn del triunfo de 19 de Julio de 1 979•27 Nonetheless, the threat of the
Contras reloaded the meaning ofhis words with mobilizing insinuations.
In fact, Jones’ periodization of La Barricada ‘s three main phases shows
that an “overlapping and eventually overriding emphasis on national defence”
marked the years 1984 to 1988.28 This was due in part to the announcement of
Reagan’s embargo on Nicaragua and the Sandinistas’ passing of a law that made
conscription obligatory. An article in La Barricada entitled “A los yanques les
Damos la Misma Respuesta de Sandino” exernplified the need to legitimize the
continuance of the anti-imperialist strnggle by means of the heroic past. It wrote:
“Cardenal llamô a los participantes a no dejar que el imperialismo yanque siga
tratando de destruir al pueblo nicaragiiense, y les recordô que “en estas trincheras
27 La Barricada, Januaiy 8th, 1985.
28 Jones, p. 10. The first phase focuscd more on reconstruction and state building whereas the third phase
shifted toward economic damage and political conciliation. These phases do flot contradict the fact that La
Barricada’s ideological propensity vas inflationary and unremitting but suggests the fluctuation ofthe hero
myth’s functions according to the socio- political realities at hand.
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ni nos vendemos ni nos rendimos.”29 Here, Cardenal defended the war by invoking
Sandino’s mantra “Patria Libre o Morir” as the necessary response to give the
United $tates, using Sandino’s precise phrasing to reinforce once more the
usefiulness of the heroic syrmbols for the propagation of the prime ideologists’
political purposes.
Interestingly, Joaquin Chamorro, the perpetual anti-Somocista who
struggled to bring down the dictatorship through arms in the forties and fuies and
with his pen up until his death, the one whose assassination triggered mass
mobilization, was deliberately excluded from the genealogical chain of national
heroes constructed by the party. La Barricada made no mention of him, nor was
he remembered, like other heroes, on the anniversary of his dcath. from this
omission, it is possible to infer that had the victory of ‘79 paved way to the taking
over of power by the Social Democrats, the official history would have be written
quite differently. Zimmermann noted that “Fonseca had a particular dislike for
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro. Emesto Cardenal, a friend of both men, bas said that
Fonseca made much harsher public and private staternent about Chamorro than the
newspaper editor ever made about the younger rebel.”3° In other words, fonseca’s
determination to delineate the FLSN as the natural descendants of Sandino, along
with the subsequent takeover of power by the 9-men directorate induced a
rewriting of history that ignored recognized heroes perceived as political
opponents. And so, a fundamental reason that helped delineate the FLSN as the
legitimate heirs of Sandino, more than fonseca’s charismatic leadership and
prolific body of work (as seen in the previous chapter), was quite likely the fact
that the insurgent leaders ofthe FLSN took over the regime in July 1979.
29 La Barricada, February 19th 1985.
Zimmeniiann, p.I 56. This anirnosity partly sternmed from Fonseca’s belief in violent insurrection. For him,
Chamono’s bourgeois rhetoHc would only pass on the power into the hands ofthe Conservatives rather than
into a Marxist-oriented revolution.
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Nonetheless, the Conservative newspaper La Frensa instilled Charnorro’s
hero myth by consistently glorifying him as a central hero of the revolution.
Essays were devoted to his feats and excerpts of his political writings were
published to reinforce his revolutionary fervor. La Frensa venerated him on the
day ofhis assassination and challenged the fLSN’s ownership ofthe hero myth by
making known Chamorro’s longtime interest and admiration of the historical
figure.
Y dicen sus detractores que Sandino maté y quemé casas y fincas. Pero bien,
decimos nosotros, y el que asesino a Sandino, consumando la mâs negra de las
traiciones, podrt acaso arrojar la primera piedra, ya no digamos contra el General
de Hombres Libres, pero ni siquiera contra cualquiera de sus subaltemos.31
In an ideological vein resembling Fonseca’s, Chamorro’s writings vindicated the
counter-myth of $andino’s as a bandit. Instead, bis works ernphasized the moral
aim of his struggle rather than the means he xvas required to use. Finally, drawings
incorporating Chamorro and $andino, as early as 1978, provided another strategy
for the integration of Chamorro in the national heritage. In one particular
illustration, Sandino, Chamorro and Fonseca are arranged under the banner
“Unidad!” to promote the celebration day of national unity, suggesting that though
the Conservatives accepted fonseca as a national hero, the Sandinistas cornpletely
disregarded Charnorro.32
From La Frensa ‘s (as well as El Diario s) appropriation of these hero
myths, it is possible to infer that Sandino’s anti-hero myth was further pushed into
the realms of “un-useful” history. The fail of Somoza regime along with the
takeover of power of the $andinistas enabled the hero myth to transcend its
clandestine sphere of influence and subsequently, opened its way into the political
arena where opposing parties argued their versions of the past through the symbol
of $andino. An article in La Frensa that rebuked a statement made by Daniel
31 La Prensa, January 10111 1980.
32 It must be noted that La Prensa ‘s allusions to Fonseca diminished as the ideological struggie with La
Barricada became tiercer.
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Ortega to Madrid’s newspaper El Pais exemplifies this fact The latter proclaimed
that Sandino contained “algo de la revoluciôn mexicana y otro poco de la
bolchevique”.33 In retort, La Prensa published an article entitled “No, Sandino No
Era Comunista”, in which $andino’s supposed ties to Bolshevism was discredited
with compelling historical evidence regarding the Cominterm’s dissatisfaction
with the guerilla leader for flot adhering to their codes of conduct.34 Clearly, the
paper’s defense of the hero myth against Marxist insinuations exposes how each
side promoted a historical version that coincided with their political views.
Interestingly, this same phenomenon occurred during $andino’s time as opposing
groups accused or proclaimed him as a Communist according to their political
penchant; in some ways, the evolution of Marxist thought in 20th century Latin
Arnerica may be inferable through layers ofmyth added to Sandino’s hero myth.
The appropriation of Darlo in post-revolutionary Nicaragua reflected but
one more of the major heroic historical figures (this time cultural in type) whose
past was rewritten to align with the fLSN’s political vision. Sergio Ramfrez,
novelist and Vice-President, is noted to have loathed the bourgeoisie’s depiction of
Dario as an ethereal de-politicized bohemian, and made it the task of the
revolutionary party to “rescue” his past by imbuing it with political overtones of
revolutionary, if flot leflist, propensity. Likewise, Emesto Cardenal, Minister of
Culture, “proclaimed categorically that Dario was an anti-imperialist and a
revolutionary who anticipated the Sandinista Revolution in his song”, that lie had
inspired Sandino whom in tum became the mentor of Fonseca.35 Similarly to
Sandino’s Dia de Dignidad, the date of Darfo’s birth becarne Dia de
Independencia CzdturaÏ. Moreover, at the opening of the Darlo museum, Carlos
It is important to note that Ortega’s Marxist rhetoric oscillated according to the USSR’s support and the
intensity of the war. However, no statemdnt to my knowledge ever blatantly descHbed Sandino as Comrnunist,
albeit indirect allusions such as the precedent one were ofien uttered
La Prensa, February 23rd 1985. The paper quotes Sandino to reinforce their point: “De qué manera puedo
ser traidor a un partido, al que nunca he pertenecido.”
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Nufiez stated: “We are placing him on the altar of the country, beside our General
ofthe free Men Augusto César Sandino.”36
The third and last major attribute of the hero myth’s fate relates to the
caliber of diffusion in which the same legends were retold and new modes of
diffusion were propelled. The revolution’s success along with the advent ofpower
by FLSN transformed him into a popular celebrity, enabling the myth to seep into
the consciousness of the people through the transmission of past legends— true or
false—ofthe guerrilla leader and “padre de la revolucién”. To briefly name a few
more examples, the day of his assassination was converted into a national holiday
with the papers urging the people to join in celebration. Aimouncements in the La
Barricada read, three days in advance: “Sâbado 23 a las 3 de la Tarde Todos con
Sandino a La Plaza de la Revolucién”.37
To promote the international appeal of his deeds, the paper included
numerous excerpts by prominent Latin American anti-imperialists such as Esteban
Pavletich, Gabriela Mistral, Gregorio Selser and farabundo Marti highlighting his
heroic deeds and in tum, (once again) exposing the international prominence ofhis
personage. There was even an excerpt written in German with a communication on
the bottom reading: “La resonancia mundial de la lucha del General Sandino se
proyectaba en todos los idiomas. La universalidad del Héroe de las Segovias y de
su gesta, asj como la solidaridad de las fuerzas progresivas siempre estuvo
presente.”38 On the second anniversary of the revolution, Borge reinforced this
point before a crowd ofhaïfa million people:
Our revolution lias always been intemationalist, ever since Sandino fought in the
Segovias. There were intemationalists from ah over the world who fought
alongside Sandino, men from Venezuela, Mexico, Peru. Another who fought
35Cited from David E. Whisnant, “Ruben Dario as a Focal Cuitural Figure in Nicaragua, The Ideological Uses
ofCultural Capital”, Latin American Research Review, vol. 27(3)1992, p. 7-49, p. 36.
36 Ibid., p. 37.
37La Barricada., February 2Oth, 1980.
38 These excepts are ail from the first anniversaiy of bis Sandino’s death, under the fLSN govemment, on
Februaiy 23rd 1980.
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alongside $andino was the great hero of the Salvadoran people named farabundo
Martf.39
Another one of the manifold legend re-hashed for general knowledge was General
Altamirano’s undying devotion to Sandino (proven to be untrue by Schroeder’s
interviews) through the publication of a personal letter: “Pues entre nosotros no
existe ninguna rivalidad, ni creo existirâ nunca; supuesto de que Ud. es uno de los
Elementos mâs importantes que tiene nuestro Ejército, segtn b ha demostrado y b
estâ demostrando con sus grandes actividades.”4° Essentially, the hero myth of
Sandino and his pequeflo ejército lôco, which had circulated since the beginning of
the Rebelbion, differed more substantially in the level ofpopularization rather than
in the essence ofthe begends.
Also, interviews with Sandino’s only daughter Blanca and grandchildren were
published to spark (as webl as to satiate) the peopbe’s interest in their national hero.
The mystery over the lieu ofhis remains made first page headiines and even comic
strips retelling the major events of his battie were published in the Sandinista
newspaper as well as in educational textbooks for children.4’ From the national
radio station to the airport, the park of Granada to the streets of Managua,
museums to monuments, a wide range of public institutions took on his name.
In the Barthesian sense, the glorification of$andino as the fundamental hero of
the nation served to promote the new party in power. fittingly, revolutionary
leaders-tumed-politicians figured between massive icons of heroism to
ostentatiously ebevate their image as the legitimate descendants of these national
heroes; they too were separated from the crowd through the constant visual
juxtaposition of past heroes and present political leaders. The portrait of Christ,
Che Guevara and Pham Van Dong figured amongst the erected heroes partaking in
Torns Borge’s speech “The Second Anniversaty of the Sandinista Revolution, Managua, July 9th 1981,
cited from Sandinistas Speak, p. 132.
«Ibid., La Barricada. By 1981, the arnount of details transrnitted on the day of bis assassination substantially
dirninished to a few articles a year.
103
commemoration ceremonies.42 In the literai sense, the hero myth of Sandino,
fonseca and Lôpez embodied essential values of the Nicaragua’s foot paradigm,
eaming them a place in the officiai history of the nation. On the metahistorical
level, the mythmakers appropriated hero myths to promote themselves as the
nation’s essential leaders. Yet again, past and present revolutionary martyrs were
juxtaposed for the symbiotic legitimization of speakers and their subjects.
In reiteration to the general point regarding the style of language, the
delineation of the heroes from the masses through allusions to their differences
helped create a supematurai-like quaiity characteristic of hero myths, one that
divorced the hero as weli as the speaker from the crowd. Borge writes:
Among the people I know, the one who most remind me of him is Bayardo Arce,
just as the one who most reminds me of Francisco Moreno is René Nufiez. Carlos
Fonseca doesn’t remind me of anybody and nobody reminds me of Carlos
Fonseca, because he wasn’t like anyone else, and yet he was like everyone.43
Like Sandino, Fonseca is linguistically enveloped in heroic overtones by
insinuating his uniqueness. At the same time, he is “like everyone”, enabling the
readers to ally themseives with their national hero for sharing common ancestral
traits embedded in Nicaragua’s revolutionary tradition.
The Socio-Political Context: Failures and Successes of the Hero Myth
How did the hero myth succeed and how did the hero myth fail in relation
to the ideological aims of the party in power? Until now, this chapter has
understood the myth’s functional character as a promoter of revolutionary
continuity for the legitimization, consolidation and mobilization of the Sandinista
regime. To better understand how it succeeded and failed to accomplish its
lTlythmakers’ goals, the hero myth shah be posited against the drastic social and
41 This fate distinguished him from conternporary hero myths such as Pancho Villa and Zapata whose bodies
serve as political weapons arnongst the poorer classes oftoday.
420n September 15, 1985, Van Pham Dong vas honored with a celebration in Managua. La Barricada
positioned pictures of Sandino and Che besides Pham Van Dong throughout the article; photographs taken at
the opening cerernony (Managua) also included portraits oftheseheroes.
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political events that affected the post-revolutionary period. For the sake of
coherence, this section lias been broadly divided in two phases demarcated by
Nicaragua’s first democratic elections on November 4th 1984, when Ortega
ernerged as president and in response, Reagan announced the United States’
embargo on Nicaragua, which remained in effect until Mardi of 1990. Phase one
discusses the party’s ideological naturalization of the FLSN as the legitimate
descendants of Sandino through the social and economic reforms established by
the party. Phase two explains how the growing discrepancy between the $andinista
ideology and the deteriorating standard of living led to de-naturalization of the
FLSN as the natural inheritors of Sandino’s legacy and in tum, the myth’s
transcendence from Sandinista party’s political control.
Phase One
During the first two yèars of FLSN’s administration, the Sandinistas were
able to consolidate their power due in great part to the unanimity of the people
against the $omoza regime. This type of mass accord, Max Weber has explained,
ofien arises in the early stages following a revolution due to the subordinate
groups’ acceptance of the new commands as valid norrns.44 Walker explains that
the victory had been unconditional; the National Guard was dismantled and mass
organizations had formed grass root groups that supported the new regime and
consequently, truncated rival groups. Another factor of prime importance working
in favor of the new regime was Carter’s continued policy of non-intervention in
Latin American affairs. Although lis administration did not approve ofthe party’s
Communist rhetoric and the growing presence of Cuban and Soviet advisors, a 60
million dollars aid package was nevertheless sent “in the hopes of manipulating
43Borge, p. 238.
° Sce Frank Parkin, Max Wehe, A Revised Edition, New York, Routledge, 2002, for more details.
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the Sandinistas in a direction acceptable to conservative Washington”.45 The
president’s unwillingness to intervene militarily in Nicaragua facilitated the
National Directorate in achieving some of its chief goals, namely the confiscation
of properties owned by Somoza’s family (whiie respecting the rest of the private
sector), the reorganization of the Sandinista arrned forces and the forniation of
grass foot rOU5.
These grassroots organization included the Sandinista Defense Committees
(CDS), the Sandinista women’s organization (AMNLAE), the Sandinista Youth
(JS-19), the Association of Rural Workers (ATC), the Sandinista Worker Central
(CST), and the National Union of (Small) farmers and Cattiemen (UNAG) and
were geared at promoting the sectorai interests of the people. More importantiy for
this present purpose, they served a crucial role in the reconstruction of an imagined
community sovereign in perception by “transmitting a common body of common
knowledge and attitudes toward national history, heroes, values, and principles”.46
The regime’s biggest success concemed its Literary Campaign, winning
Nicaragua the 1980 award of the United Nations Educationai, $cientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). It not only reduced illiteracy to an
unprecedented degree (by 1982, total enrolirnent of all levels of education was
approximateiy twice that of 1978) but also, it helped construct a Sandinista version
of history by imbuing its texts with national and revolutionary messages. Bayardo
Arce described it as “a strategic task to consolidate our Revolution” and George
Black explains that of ail the mediums of political education, the crusade was
without a doubt the most important in the early years.47
Walker, p.45. However, when signs that the new government was fostering revolution in El Salvador
emcrged, Kryzanek explains that the Carter administration moved further away from its conciliatory approach
and started to consider a militaiy containment policy. See p. 86-88.
46 For a concise explanation of the Sandinist Social Program’s major goals, sec Walker, p. 119-130; Booth, p.
193-195; and Black, p. 265-280.
This quote is cited from Black, p. 311. Sec p. 311-315 for a thorough breakdown of the primer E?
Ainanecer de? Pueb?o as an example of the ideological overtones in the educational sector.
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And so, up until Reagan’s administration, the Sandinistas’ political
ideology of a befter tomorrow beheld no blatant contradictions with the social and
economic changes. Despite the growing fear of war, the relatively non
interventionist nature of Carter’s administration combined with the unconditional
defeat of the dictatorship helped synchronize $andinista ideology with Sandinista
policy. This considerably legitimized the party in the eyes of the people and
brought about their re-election in 1 9$4—notwithstanding the growing enmity
caused by war and conscription.
Phase Two
Before continuing, it is important to discuss the most likely outcome of
leffist social revolutions. Qualitative and quantitative analyses have shown that
leffist movements—following a successful takeover of power— rarely attain their
goals of total reconstruction.48 Thomas Green explains:
Regime access is least charactenstic of leftist revolutionary movements and most
characteristic of bourgeois revolutionary movements. This in tum helps to explain
the greater emphasis on organization by lefiist revolutionary leaders, and their
haste to replace existing political institutions with revolutionary forms of
government as soon as the movement captures power. Lacking regime access and
weak organizational structure, no revolutionary movement should expect success
regardless ofthe personal talents of ideological resolve ofits leaders.
In this excerpt we find three characteristics of post-revolutionary leflist movernent
fomenting their downfall: lack of regime access, lack of organizational structure
and consequently, haste to replace political institutions with revolutionary forms of
government. These factors, along with the persistent intervention of the United
States added to the opposition force within Nicaragua to impair most of their social
reformation plans and policies. They shall be now revised to expose the impact of
the revolution’s failure on the perception of the myth.
48 For instance, see Thornas Greene, Comparative Revolutionaiy Move,nents, Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey,
Prentice-Hall, 1974; The Politics of Violence, Revolution in the Modem Word, cd. by Cari Leiden and Karl
Schmitt, Ncw Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1967; AS. Cohan, Theories ofRevohition, An Introduction, Sheffield,
Nelson, 1975.
Greene, p. 32. Clearly, there are exceptions to these principles such as Cuba.
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Firstly, lack of regime access stemmed from the new party’s inability to
satisfy the demands and expectations of their major adversaries: bourgeois and
élites groups who found their privileges threatened by the social and economic
reforms administered by the new regime. As early as 1980, Conservatives on the
Junta resigned due to the fact that the organizations representing their class’
interests was relegated to a minority representation on the new Council of State.
Two of the new regime’s most strident opponents, the right-wing business
organization COSEP and the Church hierarchy leU by Cardinal Obando y Bravo,
publicly backed the Contras and squarely blamed the Sandinistas for the econornic
and social problems plaguing the country.5° This privileged rninority, as we have
already seen, found their voice in the conservative newspaper La Frensa and an
ally in the president of the United States.
Afier taking power in November 1980, Ronald Reagan drastically
overtumed Carter’s policies toward Latin America. The new administration’s
prime concem was to put an end to the “Communist Reign of Terror” that was
supposedly sweeping over Latin America. Kryzanek explains:
Jnstead of stressing human rights, Reagan chose to cnticize the terrorism of leftist
guerrillas; instead of breaking ties with authoritanan regimes, Reagan made
overtures to countries like Brazil, Chue, and Guatemala and offered restored aid;
instead of normalizing relations with Cuba, Reagan Iambasted Castro and talked
in a manner that suggested a retum to the days of confrontation.51
Regarding Nicaragua, Reagan was determined to undermine the consolidation of
the $andinista regime by means of military support and economic pressures. In
1981, he authorized 19 million dollars for a 500 men Nicaraguan arrned force to
drive out the Cuban infrastructure within Nicaragua — known to be training and
50 Two ofthe major contra groups were the Fuerza Democn’iticas NicaragLienses (FDN) and the Fuerzas
Armadas Revolutionarias Nicaragiienses (fARN). The former vas composed of cx- officers ofSomoza’s
National Guard and was headed by Alfonso Callejas, an ex-president of Sornoza and Adolfo Calero, ex
president of Coca-Cola. hie latter group was leU by Femando Charnorro and also included a wing ofthe
Miskito group (MISOURA). In response to Contra activity near the Rio Coco area, the Sandinistas forced
some 8,500 to 10,000 Miskito Indians to evacuate their homes, causing them to side with the Contras and
Nicaragua’s upper classes. Sec Booth, p. 209-2 14 for more information.
Kryzanek, p. 91.
108
supplying arms to the $alvadoran guerrillas. In 1983, the United $tates sharply
reduced Nicaragua’s sugar quota and by 1984, aid to the Contras, mostly miiitary,
mounted to over 72 -100 million dollars. Pastor states that “the Reagan support for
the contras was unprecedented in its scale, duration and openness”.52
Consequently, Nicaragua’s economic growth of the first few years leveled off by
the mid-eighties and gradually plummeted thereafter.
Afier 1985, and largeiy as a resuit of Reagan’s iow intensity war and
economic strangulation methods, war-related expenditures consumed haif of the
nation’s budget, consequently weakening if not totally depriving social programs
of badly needed funds. The new educational and health care programs came to a
hait and the initial aims of grass root organization’s were superseded for ones
aimed at mobilizing the masses against the opposition forces, i.e. such as recruiting
drafiees and performing vigilance tasks against counterrevolutionary attacks. In
other words, these organizations, once impelled to serve the interests of the people,
became party-dominated instruments empioyed in the political vein of directorate
in question. Consequently, as the standard of living depreciated, membership
gradually decreased owing to a lack of spare time as well as an overali
dissatisfaction toward the organizations overt party-oriented motives.
Decision-making problems further arose owing to the directorate’s
representation ofthree divergent political tendencies. George R. Vickers explains:
Although the FLSN criticized the “caudillo style” of personalistic politics which
typified political systems throughout Central America from the 1930’s onward,
and prided themselves on their collective leadership, the fact is that the different
ministries tended to be fiefdoms for the individual ministers as well as strongholds
for the different tendencies.53
Even though the Sandinistas moved quickly to consolidate and expand their
support by building organizations representing sectors of their constituencies,
52 Pastor, p. 210. Ironically, at the same time the Contras were complaining of lack of funds, the Iran-Contra
fiasco showed that they had received over 100 million dollars of US. aid by 1986.
George R. Vickers, “A Spiders Web”, NACLA: Report on theAmericas, 24(1) (June 1990), p.19-28, p. 22.
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leaders approached issues separateÏy. For instance, while ex-Tercerista Victor
Tirado tried to reassure the private sector about Sandinista commitment to a mixed
economy, ex-Proletario Jaime Wheelock wrote with a “downright threatening”
language into the agrarian reform statute. Although, they were successful at
mobilizing people, i.e. 400,000 tumed up in Managua four days before the
election, they failed at organizing their followers through coherent and consistent
political approaches to social and economic issues.
What is more, to appease opposition groups and gain the support of the
discontented bourgeoisie, the Sandinistas made broad economic concessions to
large private farmers at the expense of the poor. Subsidies were granted to the
rniddle and wealthy entrepreneurs by cutting back the consumption and income of
the revolution’s base of support. To make matters worse, from 1988 onward, the
dernands of teachcrs and health workers for higher pay and those of construction
and automotive workers were accused of siding with the United $tates by the
leaders of the FL$N.54 The party’s goals, once bent on restructuring the state to
benefit the poor, were overtumed for its political desire to access the regime. As
their policies could no longer rneet the dernands of the poor and their initial
successes were reversed, their increasing backing of the upper classes
disenchanted many of the fLSN’s poorest supporters.
The lack of regime access, domestic and foreign opposition along with the
leaders’ contradicting political tactics combined to underrnine their revolutionary
goals as well their political legitimacy. By the time Election Day arrived
(November 1990), the Nicaraguan people had grown weary of the contradictions
within the party and more importantly, of the grievous living conditions brought
See Carlos M. Vilas, “What Went Wrong”, NA CLA: Report on the Americans, 24 (1) (June 1990), p. 10-18,
for more details on political mistakes made by the National Directorate.
110
on by civil war.55 Approximately 30 000 (0.9%) of the population had perished,
and the economy was worst off than ever before in its history.56 And so, to the
surprise of the FLSN, 55% of the population voted for Violeta Chamorro. So
ended the post-revolutionary era of the Sandinistas and with it, their ideological
control ofNicaragua’s past.
The Failure of the Revolution on the Perception of the Hcro Myth
The FL$N’s loss to the liNO reinforces the point that rnyth’s potentiality,
in relation to the aims of its subjects, is limited to the social and political
conditions guiding its course. During their 1990 carnpaign, the Sandinistas
continued to deploy their brand of national and anti-irnperialist propaganda on an
inflationary and unremitting level despite the gross asymmetry between the
ideological rendition of reality and the miserable conditions of daily life. In fact,
La Barricada worked in great part as a travel journal for the electoral campaign,
with huge pictures of Sergio Ramirez and Daniel Ortega permeating its pages
beneath the backdrop of Fonseca and $andino’s portraits, and articles expressing
the pre-imminence ofthe FLSN victory.57 Vilas purports:
The Sandinistas and their supporters believed that patnotism would keep the
people from voting for a candidate openly identified with the aggressor onto an
electorate that was much more concemed with the concrete and specific issues of
living conditions on which the revolution had been unable to deliver.58
Although the party’s ideology was believable during the general euphorie mood of
the early eighties, it grew to be perceived as redundant when the heroic tone no
longer corresponded to the living conditions of the people. It could flot compensate
for deprivations brought on by a decade of civil war; Reagan and Violeta
By 1988, international pressures for a peace agreement- especially amongst Central Arnerican leaders
criticisrn over the United States intervention and the USSR’s incapability to provide the Sandinistas with
ammunition impelled the fLSN’s to hold up a democratic election.
56 Although the austerity program set in motion since 198$ had decreased inflation from 33,602% to 1,690%,
foreign debt stiil amounted to 7.5 billion and gross dornestic product declined 11.7%.
‘ It must be noted that portraits of Fonseca flgured more prominently in these pieces ofwriting.
58 Carlos M. Vilas, p. 9.
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Charnorro’s alternative solutions overrode the revolutionary sentiment of the
people.59
The failure of the revolution on the perception of the myth brought forth a
rupture between the fLSN’s ideology and the Sandino hero myth. Just days afier
the elections, perhaps more aware of the limitations ofmythic speeches as political
tools, La Barricada removed the Sandino logo from the front page (along with the
drawing of a guerrilla soldier) for a more professional imperative.6° Furthermore,
from the time of lier electoral campaign, Chamorro is noted to have said that
“Sandino le pertenece a todos los nicaragtienses”. Her words foreshadowed the
upcoming officiai denaturalization of the Sandinistas as the only children of
$andino as well as the new status of the hero myth as a common denorninator for
all political parties’ to deploy.
The takeover of the UNO engendered a desandinisation campaign that
called forth, on an ideological level, for the destruction of revolutionary murals
and rewriting of school textbooks. David Kunzle’s work on Nicaragua’s
Revolutionary murais shows that the U.S Agency for International Developrnent
spent 6 million dollars to reduce the presence of revolutionary graffiti throughout
the nation. New civic textbooks took on a religious agenda, opening with the Ten
Commandments and calling “divorce a disgrace” and even failing to mention
Augusto César Sandino and Carlos Fonseca in the chapter of national heroes.6’
Moreover, Sandino’s name was stripped off from the airport, Fonseca’s flame was
extinguished and later on, bis tomb was bombed. Once again, official history took
following in Reagan’s footsteps, Bush’s administration took advantage ofthe situation by pumping “12
million dollars ofelectorai assistance to Chamorro and the State Department, CIA, the National endowrnent
for Dcmocracy”.59 He also promised an end to the embargo and millions of dollars ofeconomic assistance if
the people voted for Chamorro. With regards to UNO, the party made use of the memory of ber late husband,
Joaquin Chamorro (as weli as Violeta’s maternai image) with posters ofthe martyr trailing behind ber during
marches and rallies and La Prensa publishing pictures ofthe happy couple. Articles consistentiy stated: “El
cambio que ofrece la UNO es cl cambio que Joaquin quiso. Que Nicaragua volviera a ser Repiiblica.”
60 Charnorro’s staternent cornes from an article in La Prensa, June 2, 2001. In regards La Barricada s
modifications, Jones’ explains that it reverted to its former orientation as a iargely passive mouthpiece for the
FSLN in 1994 i.e., the time ofelections. Finally, the paper was officially closed down in 1998.
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another swerve, this time to the riglit through the eradication of as many
testimonies of the Sandinista version of the past as possible, as well as the
replacement of political messages permeating educational textbooks with more
conservative ones.
Its successes may thus be defined in view of its inherent nature as a value
in the form of a narrative. The popularization of the hero niyth on a national level
led to it validity as a story of heroism, believed as true by the nation for
embodying at once specific values unique to Nicaraguan culture as well as
universal ones. At this forked road, the hero rnyth’s mobilizing purpose also
encouraged Nicaragua’s nation- building process by creating unity and cohesion
between disparate groups through the dissemination of popular living etlmic
memories. In othcr words, if hcro rnyth’s success is rneasurcd according to its
flourishing reception, its indoctrination by the Sandinistas enabled the myth to
make fruitful headway in the eighties. Furtherrnore, the growing fame of the myth
resuscitated the interest of social scientists worldwide, paving the way to its appeal
as a subject of historical interest as dozens of historical works have been written
ever since.
Sandino in the Post-Sandinista Nicaragua
Although the study of the hero myth stops in 1990, it must be clarified that
the Sandinistas’ deployment of the hero myth has not petered out completely. In
front of a crowd of Niquinihomo natives, Tomâs Borge, a year afler the elections
stated that “el Frente Sandinista siempre ha luchado y lucharâ por los interés
populares y jamâs renunciarâ a sus principios porque la causa de Sandino sigue
siendo la misma”.62 This insistence on re-aligning the party with the hero went on
6! David Kunzle, The Murais ofRevolutionaniNicarcigua, 1979-1992. Berkeley, University ofCalifornia
Press, 1995.
62 La Barricada, February 22, 1991.
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to pervade $andino’s centennial commemoration in 1996. Alejandro Bendafia
commenced his speech by ascertaining the hero’s apolitical place as a source of
inspiration for ail Nicaraguans to share and esteem went on to emphasize the need
of Sandinistas to follow and study lis path more diligently than everyone else.
Nonetheless I want to address myseif to my Sandinista brothers and sisters as just
one more Sandinista, one who has had the pnviiege of being able to spend time
studying Sandino. Because even though we can eau on ail Nicaraguan’s to respect
the symbol of Sandino something more is expected of those worthy of cailing
ourselves $andinistas: ioyaity to Sandino’ s thought.63
The speech goes on to relate Sandino’s feats and focuses closeiy on his spirituality,
expressing the latter’s love of God and Jesus as weil as his religious approach to
revolution. This accent on $andino’s spirituality may be perceived as promoting
the Sandinistas’ own religious propensity in the face of the Conservatives’
criticisrn, which has ahvays depicted them as communists (and thus atheists). Once
again, religion and poiitics intermingle in the discourse of politically driven
speeches, equating loyalty to Sandino with love of God and thus, love of God with
loyalty to the Sandinistas.
Sandino’s mystical propensities seem to be one of the latest fascinations
surrounding his mythic aura. A four-articled Special Report by La Prensa (July
2001) illustrates this point by bringing to light a puzzling letter by Moncada to
Somoza’s wife, Salvadora Maria Debayle.64 The first article exposes contents of
the ietter contrary to the documented mutual hatred between Sandino and
Moncada. The latter writes to Salvadora for “un algodoncito empapado en
Sandino” to serve him as a good iuck charm. In the following articles, “$andino
militô en logia metafisica” and “Aiejandro Boiafios afirma: Moncada no era
mistico”, the literal interpretation of the letter is overridden for a more reasonabie
63 A Sandinista Com,nemoration ofthe Sandino centennial, Speech Given by Alejandro Bendaa to the
Commemoration ofthe 6151 anniversary ofthe Death ofGencral Sandino. Februaiy 21, 1995. Cited from
http://www.hartford-hwp.corn/archives/47/003.htrnl, p. l-7, p. l.Consulted on March ISt, 2003.
64 La Frensa, June 2’”, 2001. Reportaje Especial. The four articles are entitled in order of appearance:
“Moncada queHa un talismin de Sandino.” “Alejandro Bolaïios afiniia: “Moncada no era mistico.” “Sandino
se veia a si mismo corno un mesias.” “Sandino rnilitô en logia metafisica.”
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one. Historians Bolanos and Marco Navarro agree that the correspondence must
have contained “un mensage cifrado para Somoza”, conceming the upcoming
assassination of the guerrilla leader. However, they disagree on the nature of
$andino’s mystical propensities. Bolafios’ explains Sandino’s political ideas from
a deranged perspective whereas Navarro defends $andino as an example of
millenarian tradition. Though historians might neyer agree on the make-up of
Sandino’s personality, the unending interest ofthe figure is a testimony ofmyth’s
potency in invigorating intellectual contemplation as well as in shaping the
collective memories of the nation. It proves, once more, that once a myth is
formed, it is unlikely to fade away completely.
Interestingly, Bolafios’s work E! Ihtminado discredits Sandino as well as
fonseca’s heroic stature.65 He daims that Sandino was unbalanced and rnixed up
in eclectic religious cults whereas Fonseca was a product of Cuba’s cornmunism
and so, that he sought to nd Nicaragua of its Catholic roots and replace them with
Marxist beliefs. The cover of this monograph consists of Sandino’s disembodied
torso in the middle of the seal of Joaquin Trincado’s Magnetic-Spiritual school
whereas a dubious photo of Fonseca with the mark of Soviet Union’s insignia
figuring in the rniddle of his forehead is placed at the back cover. At the bottom of
his head loom the nine directorates; their pictures are stamped with the words
“Made in Cuba”. The transparency of Bolafios political leanings, flot to mention its
presence in special reportage by La Frensa, suggests that the anti-hero bas not
been eradicated either. According to the theory of myth, and the research of this
present paper, it will likely continue to be believed.
Since the political stakes are flot as high, commemorations honoring his
memory may be perceived as more subdued and less loaded with political
overtones. Instead, the hero myth can be perceived as having retrieved its essential
65 Alejandro BoIaios Geyer, E! Ihiininado, Masaya, Nicaragua Libre, 2001.
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function in the reaim of collective memory making— as an inspirational narrative
remembered by a specific people (Nicaraguans of ail creeds and classes) serving as
an honorable reference point of the nation’s beginnings. This retrieval of the
myth’s essential function is substantiated by its continued revival in various arrays
of mythic speech. For instance, Armando Morales’ lithographs of seven moments
in $andino’s life entitled “Adios $andino” represent pivotai moment of Sandino’s
war and complement other forms of mythic speech with visuai interpretations.66
These pictorial representations of the past re-imbue the hero myth with its heroic
spendor, this time rejuvenating the living memory through an artful interplay of
shadow and light.
Conclusion
Post-revolutionary Nicaragua heralded the most complex and multifaceted
phase of the hero myth’s travels, one mirroring the tumultuousness of the social
and political context of the nation. The break ouf of the civil war re-triggered its
mobilizing function yet this time, both sides employed it to construct and defend
their version of the past. Unanimously accepted by the majority of Nicaraguans,
the hero myth of Sandino became a common denominator and reference point for
ail people of the nation to share— a symbol ernbodying a muitifarious array of
cultural values, such as the Christ figure, the father figure, the epitome of
Nicaragua’s heroic tradition.
The eiectoral defeat of the Sandinistas followed by the desandinization
campaign has somewhat de-politicized the myth, enabling it to settie in the cmx
Nicaragua’s collective memory as a narrative embodying a value, believed as tme
66 Sec Elizabeth F. Ugarte “Historia y Memoria en el “Adiôs a Sandino” de Annando Morales” on
http://www.denison.edu/istmo/v1n1/articuIos/rnemoda. html, p. l-6. August 2001. Consulted on October 12t6,
2002.”Adiôs Sandino” is displayed at the National Museum of Art in Léon. The litographs are entitled “Las
Mujeres de Puerto Cabeza”, “Sandino en la Montana”, “Adiôs a Sandino”, “General Pedrôn (Pedro
Altamirano)”, “La iiltima cena deY General Sandino”, “Rendimiento dcl General Sandino frente al
“Honniguero” and “el Asesinato dcl General detn’is del Viejo Campo de Aviaciôn”.
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despite any historical records that might prove otherwise. In other words, the
success of the revolution dispelled the Black version of the myth to render the
White version more believable to a larger number ofpeople and in mm, a celebrity
figure as well as a matter of contention in the unending stmggle for political
power.
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Conclusion
This thesis has argued that the historical figure, Augusto César Sandino,
gradually came to be perceived as a hero as well as a hero myth during the
Rebellion of 1927-1933. The aim has been to illuminate the social phenomenon on
two reaims, the specific and the general, by retelling the history of the myth from a
structural and evolutionary perspective. Consequently, it has sought to explain the
emergence and survival ofthe hero myth by understanding it in relation to theories
ofmyth, ideology, leadership, rebellion and revolution.
from a theoretical perspective, this study has reinforced the premise of
myth’s irrefutable nature and in tum, has suggested the definite link between past
hero myths and contemporary hero myths related to the political sphere of the
nation. Like Prometheus battling against omnipotent Zeus full-knowingly to fail or
Robin Hood stealing from the rich to give to the poor, the hero myth of Sandino
exposes the enduring presence of the David vs. Goliath type myths in modem
history. This is especially noticeable in areas such as Nicaragua where anti
imperial sentiments are strongly feit. In other words, as long as such power
struggies exists, rebel or revolutionary leaders challenging their imperial nemesis
through wily methods, a moral rhetoric and who die perceived as martyrs at a
forked road in time, will likely be perceived as heroes and gradually be
transformed into hero myths. The latter’s popularity may rise or plunge, resonating
differently according to the period in which it is told, but the underlying value of
heroism is incontrovertible; once formed, “the hero myth takes on life ofits own”.’
On a more specific level, this thesis hopes to have shed more light on the
historical life of the hero myth by pinpointing its prime authors and in tum,
11$
viewing their politically oriented goals according to the socio-political contexts. Its
major mythmakers have been, to name onÏy a few, Sandino himself, poet
joumalist Froylân Turcios, poetess Gabriela Mistral, Colonel Bayo, Che Guevara,
poet—turned Minister of Culture Emesto Cardenal, writer/joumalist Joaquin
Chamorro, revolutionary leader Carlos Fonseca, Minister of $tate Tomâs Borge
and vice-president $ergio Ramirez. The perpetual re-appropriation of the hero
myth further suggests that the social perception of it has evolved according fo the
needs of its mythmakers. In tum, this approach has exposed the fundamental
functions of the myth as a mobilizing tool (against $omoza’s regime in the sixties
and seventies and anti-Sandinista forces in the eighties), an ideological symbol for
the consolidation and legitimization of the post-revolutionary regime and finally,
as an ethnic narrative serving to create group solidarity.
New Questions, more Historical Paths
The insights brought forth from this thesis have triggered a related set of
questions regarding the workings of the hero myth in the present structure. Firstly,
a thorough study of the hero myth in its current neo-liberal phase might provide
important information for an overail understanding of its mythic course. Secondly,
since the hero myth has come to embody a myriad of identifies, new insights may
be drawn from situating if within the ongoing debate over the evolution of
“traditional” and “modem” imaginary constructions in Latin America.
Thirdly, as this paper lias concentrated solely on the mythic speeches of the
more influential mythmakers of Nicaragua, a study of its re-appropriation by
marginalized groups seeking to promote their collective interests or mobilize
against the political system may broaden our understanding of the hero myth’s
‘Orrin E. Klapp, p. 135.
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workings.2 In other words, how has the Sandino hero myth been perceived and
employed by the popular classes from its inception until today? Though this
question may be answered more aptly by field research on the subject, Jefftey L.
Gould’s work on Chinandegan society offers some worthy dues. Gouid explains
that the working classes of San Antonio sympathized with Sandino because of
their own resentment toward Moncada’s brand of liberalism: “Sandino probably
stimulated union organizational efforts. Sandinismo undoubtedly accentuated the
anti-oligarchie elements in obrerismo and widened the gap between Moncada’s
regime and Liberal labor organizers”.3 Although, the majority of Chinandegans did
not join Sandino’s army, their approval of his cause translated into strikes on the
railroad and sugar plantations. This case clearly illustrates the versatility of the
hero myth insofar as it is interpreted with an eye to the interests of diverse social
groups.
Finally, and perhaps most problematically, there remains the question of
how to understand the hero myth’s effects on the collective consciousncss of the
Nicaraguan people. Sorne historians have affirrned that hero myths entrenched in
the political culture of a system discourage the masses from bettering their social
and economic situations, whereas others have focused on its ability to stimulate
groups into dissension.4 The former consider that the constant invocation of a
glorious past does, which does flot coincide with their present conditions, enforces
national guilt and, even worse, encourages passivity toward their poor living
conditions. The ample popularity of this position overshadows its major weakness,
2 See Samuel Brunk’s “Remembering Emiliano Zapata: Three Moments in the Posthumous Career ofthe
Martyr ofChinameca”. HispanicAmerican HistoricaiReview 79(3) 1998, P. 457-490. His work discusses the
re-appropriation ofthe Zapata hero myth by groups sceking political representation.
Jefftey L. Gould, To Lead As Equals, Rural Protest and Political Consciousness in Chinandega, Nicaragua,
19 12-1979, The University ofNorth Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, 1990, p. 37.
For examples of works focusing on the paralytic etiects of the hero myths, sec Ilene O’ Malley’s The Myth
ofthe Revolution: Hem cuits and the Institutionahzation ofthe Mexican State, 1920-1940. New York,
Greenwood Press, 1986; and, Carrera Damhs, Geniihn’s “Simon Bolivar, et Culto Heroico y la Naciôn”,
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namely, the lack of compelling evidence suggesting the poor (albeit corrigible)
current state ofour research methods on the subject.
A sociological perspective on the history of hero myths may serve as a
fruitful starting point by innovating methods for the inquiry of the phenornenon
and the operationalization of the data at hand. Furthermore, a comparative
approach to the studies of the travels of Latin American hero myths may bring
forth more nuances to our present understanding of the phenomenon.5
For now, this thesis has taken the initial step of providing an overview of
the travels of the hero from its inception until the electoral defeat of the
Sandinistas. The fact that the essential characteristics ofthe hero rnyth have neither
been displaced nor changed considerably in nature proves that Sandino is veritably
a rnyth ofthe Nicaraguan nation. He has indubitably left, in Sidney Hook’s words
“the positive imprint of his personality upon history— an imprint that is stiil
observable afier he has disappeared from the scene.”6
Hispanic American Historical Review 63 (1) 1983, p. 107-145. Samuel Brunk’s work on Zapata, mentioned
in the previous note, is a compelling example exposing its active influence on the masses.
for instance, the serious clash over Zapata’s remains during commernoration ceremonies as opposed to the
very absence of Sandino’s rernains bas induced a different set ofconsequences yet to be explored in relation to
each other.
6 Hook, p. 158.
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